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A Pragmatic Approach to Decision Making

in the Next Era of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence
Laura H. Burney*
"Not the origin, but the goal is the main thing. There can be
no wisdom in the choice of a path unless we know where it
will lead .... The rule that functions well produces a title
deed to recognition .... The final principle of selection for
judges . . .is one of fitness to an end.1

In 1859, "Colonel" Edwin Drake struck oil in Titusville,
Pennsylvania.2 Because markets and technology had converged to
create demand for artificial illumination, Drake's fortunate discovery
of an ample supply of oil ignited the birth of the oil and gas industry.3
In the decades to come, the Titusville pattern of sudden discovery,
followed by unbridled speculation and production, occurred in other
parts of the United States. The last decades of the nineteenth century
saw boom after boom in Ohio,4 Oklahoma,5 Kansas,6 and California.7
Albert and Helen Herrmann Professor of Natural Resources Law, St. Mary's University
School of Law, San Antonio, Texas. The author would like to thank faculty members who
attended a colloquium on this subject including Michael Ariens, Emily Hartigan, David
Dittfurth and Amy Kastely. Thanks also to Professor Jacqueline Weaver of the University of
Houston Law Center for her comments and encouragement. Finally, the author expresses her
deep appreciation to Professor Marsha Huie for her editorial assistance, and to Crystal D.
Chandler for her work as research assistant.
IBENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROCESS 102 (1921).
2 DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND POWER [hereinafter
YERGIN, THE PRIZE] 26-28 (1991). In his seminal work on the history of oil and gas industry,
Dr. Yergin explains that E.L. Drake assumed the title "Colonel" in an effort to impress the
locals. Id. at 26.
3Id. at 22-34.
4 Id. at 52. In the mid-1880s oil was discovered in northwestern Ohio near the Indiana
border, igniting a great boom in an area that became known as the Lima-Indiana Fields. Id.
"The newly discovered fields were so prolific that, by 1890, they accounted for a third of United
States oil production." Id. The field eventually extended into 21 counties in Indiana and 14 in
Ohio, and produced 480 million barrels from 1886 to 1945. EDGAR WESLEY OWEN, TREK OF THE
OIL FINDERS: A HISTORY OF EXPLORATION FOR PETROLEUM 124-26 (1975) [hereinafter OWEN, OIL
FINDERS].
'Several discoveries were made in Oklahoma, including the prolific Glenn Pool outside Tulsa
in 1905. YERGIN, THE PRIZE, supra note 2, at 87. Due to the rapid development of the Glen Pool,
Oklahoma's annual production rose from 1,367,000 barrels in 1904 to 43,524,000 barrels in
1907, making Oklahoma the largest oil producing state at the time. OWEN, OIL FINDERS, supra
note 4, at 230, 233; CARL C. RISTER, OIL! TITAN OF THE SOUTHWEST 124 (1949) [hereinafter
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Spindletop in Beaumont, Texas, gushed forth an unprecedented
seventy-five thousand barrels a day in 1901.8 In 1931, the Texas boom
resumed after discovery of the prolific East Texas Field, where
wildcatter Doc Joiner was to fall prey to the tactics of the notorious
oilman H.L. Hunt.9 For most of the twentieth century, the oil boom
surged in the United States and throughout the world. 10
RISTER, TITAN].
6 See

OWEN, OIL FINDERS, supra note 4, at 231 (discussing early discoveries in Kansas). The

first commercial oil field in the Mid-Continent region was discovered in 1893 near Neodesha,
Kansas. Standard Oil built a refinery at Neodesha in 1897 and by 1904 Kansas' annual
production peaked at 4,250,779 barrels. Id. As one newspaper from that era reported: "'Kansas,
struggling a few years ago to pay off a heart-breaking load of indebtedness, is alive today with
the hum of factory wheels, the flare of furnaces in foundry and glass plants, brick yard and
smelters, flour mills, sorghum mills, cotton mills - all as a result of the coming of oil." RISTER,
TITAN, supra note 6, at 36 (quoting the Kansas City Star from January 18, 1903).
7 See OWEN, OIL FINDERS, supra note 4, at 161 (discussing growth of California oil
industries). The discovery of the Los Angeles City Field in 1892 resulted in the first big increase
in California production. Id. The prolific Kern River field was booming in 1899 and operations
were in progress in other major fields. Id. California had annual production of only 324,000
barrels in 1891, but rapid development thereafter increased the annual output to 24 million
barrels by 1903. Id. Thus, "California had by the turn of the century emerged as a major oil
province." YERGIN, THE PRIZE, supra note 2, at 82. "By 1910, its output would reach 73 million
barrels, more than that of any foreign nation, and 22 percent of total world production." Id. As
Yergin describes, by the turn of the century, "[a] new era had quickly come into existence in the
oil industry ....
It was born of several coincidences: the rapid rise of the automobile; the
discovery of the new oil provinces in Texas, Oklahoma, California, and Kansas; new competitors;
and technological advances in refining." YERGIN, THE PRIZE, supra note 2, at 112.
S YERGIN, THE PRIZE, supra note 2, at 85. "One of the most consequential events in the
history of the American petroleum industry occurred on January 10, 1901, when the discovery
well of the Spindletop oil field near Beaumont, Texas, blew in from a depth of 1,139 feet with
a flush flow estimated at 60,000 to 70,000 barrels per day." OWEN, OIL FINDERS, supra note 4,
at 191. Texas' average daily production increased from 2,300 barrels in 1900 to 50,000 barrels
in 1902. Id. Spindletop created "a new age in human progress... [leaving] America... blessed
with the supply of energy and the incentive to move up from a secondary position in world
affairs to that of undisputed leadership." JAMES A. CLARK & MICHAEL T. HALBOUTY, SPINDLETOP
XV (1952).
9 YERGIN, THE PRIZE, supra note 2, at 248. Yergin recounts that:
Hunt stepped forward when the tidal wave of woes fell upon Joiner after his
first discovery, but before other wells had begun to indicate the true
magnitude of the oil field. . . . Hunt holed up with Joiner for an
interminable negotiating session.., and hammered away at him, trying to
make a deal. Unbeknownst to Joiner, Hunt was being fed secret reports...
Hunt did not share the news with Joiner.
Id.
'0 See OWEN, OIL FINDERS, supra note 4, at 101 (discussing early international oil
discoveries). Russian output, fueled by the efforts of the Nobel family of Sweden, increased from
165,000 barrels in 1871 to 28,691,000 barrels in 1890, almost equaling that of the PennsylvaniaNew York region. Id. After a pre-World War I decline, Russian production, aided by Western
technology, surged in the late 1920s under the Bolshevik regime. YERGIN, THE PRIZE, supra note
2, at 240. In Persia in 1908, a major oil discovery signaled the beginning of the Middle East's
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The boom years were peppered with busts. Yet, new
discoveries or market corrections continually revived the industry."
By the 1980s, however, with United States reservoirs seemingly
exhausted 2 and markets in chaos due to conflict in the Middle East
and OPEC's increased role in controlling world supplies, pundits were
preaching the demise of the domestic oil and gas business." Today,

dominance of world oil markets. Id. at 147, 393. In 1909, the discovery in Mexico of the Potrero
del Llano 4 well, which flowed at 110,000 barrels per day, ignited a boom which made Mexico
a major force in the world oil market. Id. at 231. In Venezuela in 1922, the discovery well of the
La Rosa Field blew in at an estimated 100,000 barrels per day. Id. at 235. This was followed
by major Venezuelan discoveries in the 1930s and 40s, which catapulted Venezuela into the
position it currently holds as a major player in the export market and a member of OPEC.
OWEN, OIL FINDERS, supranote 4, at 1103-04. "So, virtually from the very beginning, petroleum
was an international business. The American oil industry could not have grown to the size it
did and become what it was without its foreign markets." YERGIN, THE PRIZE, supra note 2, at
56.
" See YERGIN, THE PRIZE, supra note 2, at 32-34 (recounting fluctuations in oil markets).
After the Titusville discovery in Pennsylvania, the price of oil fell from $10 per barrel in
January of 1861 to 50 cents per barrel in June of that year. Id. at 30. Demand began to catch
up and by September of 1863 the price was back up to $7.25 per barrel. Id. The result was
overproduction, and the price again dropped drastically to $2.40 a barrel in 1866 and 1867. Id.
at 33. Although oil prices dropped to as low as 3 to 10 cents per barrel in 1901 after Spindletop
came in, prices rose quickly to 35 cents or more in the latter part of 1902 because of the plunge
in production caused by overproduction. Id. at 89. Post-World War I prices, fueled by the rapid
growth of the automobile industry, were driven to $3.36 in 1920, up from $1.20 in 1916, creating
a frantic search for new supply sources. Id. at 218. The discovery of the East Texas Field again
sent prices tumbling to as low as 13 cents a barrel in 1931. In order to stop overproduction and
falling prices, Texas governor Ross Sterling sent the National Guardsmen and the Texas
Rangers into East Texas. Id. at 250. To stabilize prices, production was shut down and a
prorationing system implemented. Id. The following year prices rose to 98 cents a barrel, as the
Texas Railroad Commission continued to issue prorationing orders. Id. at 251. Again from 1960
to 1969 rapid increase in the number of producers resulted in a 22% drop in prices. Id. at 529,
531-32.
12 United States production peaked in 1970 with the production of 9.6 million barrels of oil
per day. After that date, domestic production declined due to depleted resources. An exception
was increased production from the north slope of Alaska from about 1975 to 1985. THE
SOUTHWEST ECONOMY, Issue 4, 1995, at 1, 2.
13See YERGIN, THE PRIZE, supra note 2, at 625 (discussing impact of international political
scene). In 1968, many of the petroleum exporting countries formed the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in order to unify production and pricing policies. By
1972, the nations in OPEC accounted for 77.5 percent of free-world petroleum reserves. 8
HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 757 (1995). For a
discussion of the events leading to the formation of OPEC and its oil boycott of the western
nations, see M.S. AL-OTAIBA, OPEC AND THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 47-63 (1975).
Dramatically increased demand in the early 1970s, combined with the Arab oil embargo in
1973, drove prices up from $1.80 a barrel in 1970 to $11.65 in December of 1973. YERGIN, THE
PRIZE, supra note 2, at 625. Prices continued to rise as a result of OPEC's increased role in
controlling world supplies until, in 1980, it appeared that the market had finally become
saturated with the price at $32 per barrel. Id. at 705-06. The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in
September of 1980 again threw oil markets into chaos, abruptly removing 4 million barrels daily
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the national rig count is 20 percent lower than 50 years ago, and the
price of oil has decreased $21 from the high of $42 a barrel in 1980,
a 50 percent decline. 14
As Professor Richard Maxwell noted recently, the oil and gas
industry, and the body of law it spawned, has reached the end of its
"Great Era."' But to paraphrase Mark Twain, predictions of the
death of the industry have been greatly exaggerated. New
technologies, such as horizontal drilling and three-dimensional
exploration, have revived interest in old formations, 6 and new

from the world market. Id. at 711. The price of Arab light crude temporarily jumped to an alltime high of $42 a barrel, in spite of the fact that world demand was apparently weakening. Id.
The high prices resulted in increased exploration and production in the United States and the
rest of the world in the first half of the 1980s, as well as increased conservation measures and
development of alternative energy sources. Id. at 718-19. OPEC's share of world production
output declined from 55% in 1974 to 30% in 1985. John L. Kennedy, Good Times Ahead at
Today's Prices?, OIL & GAS J., Dec. 26, 1994, at 17. The big blow to the oil industry came in
early 1986 when OPEC announced production increases designed to recapture lost market
share, and oil plunged from $31.75 in November of 1985 to $10 a barrel in the months to follow.
YERGIN, THE PRIZE, supra note 3, at 750.
In a remark representative of the mid-80s, Halliburton president Thomas H. Cruikshank
stated, "[tihe U.S. oil industry is in a fight for survival, and at this point it's losing."
Consequences of U.S. Growing Dependence on Foreign Oil Considered at Symposium, PLATT'S
OILGRAM NEWS, Dec. 12, 1986, at 4. Others stated that, "the recent break in oil prices is
reverberating like a death rattle throughout major segments of the industry." James R. Norman
et al., CasualtiesStart to Pile Up in the Oil Patch,Bus. WEEK, Feb. 10, 1986, at 83. Senator J.
Bennett Johnston (D-La.) described an import fee as "the only thing that will save the domestic
oil industry." Helen Dewar, Slowly but Steadily Scaling the Senate Ladder, THE WASH. POST,

Nov. 28, 1986, at A23.
Last year marked the first time since 1988, that the oil production of non-OPEC nations
increased, which lead to "tempering price increases and limiting the world's dependance on the
oil cartel." Allen Myerson, Rivals Keeping OPEC Defensive, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, Dec.
30, 1994, at ID. "New technology, improved corporate efficiency and the opening to exploration
of vast foreign tracts, energy experts say, promise to increase non-OPEC production 6.5 by
2000." Id.

14The Hughes Tool and rig count peaked at 4,530 in 1981, averaging 3,970 for the year. See
Patrick Jankowski, Why the Oil Import Fee Divides the Industry, HOUS. MAG., Sept. 1, 1986, at

7; Robert J. Beck, PipelineProjects Fuel Rebound in Industry's U.S. Spending Plan, OIL & GAS

J., Feb. 27, 1995, at 17, 19. After the plunge in crude oil prices in 1986, the rig count fell to a
post-World War II record low of 717 in 1992, averaged 757 in 1993 and 775 in 1994. Id. at 19.
As of April 14, 1995, the Baker Hughes active rig count for the United States stood at 676. OGJ
Newsletter, OIL &GAS J., Apr. 24, 1995, at 3. The spot market price of oil jumped to $42 a barrel
immediately after the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war in September of 1980. YERGIN, THE PRIZE,
supra note 2, at 711. The spot market price as of August 25, 1995 stands at $19.70. Business
& Finance, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1995, C15.
" Richard C. Maxwell, Oil and Gas Law at the End of its GreatEra,in NATURAL RESOURCES
POLICY AND LAW, TRENDS AND DIRECTIONS 94, 96 (Lawrence J. Macdonnel et al., eds. 1993)
[hereinafter Maxwell, Great Era].
"Maxwell, Great Era, supra note 15, at 96 .(stating, "It is quite possible that advanced
production and drilling techniques will create new sources of domestic supply and new legal
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sources, particularly for gas, have been identified throughout the
United States."v Additionally, the inevitable increase in demand for
oil and gas due to the prospective growth in population, plus market
shifts to natural gas as an alternative fuel, will continue to provide
life-blood for the business.18
As in the "Great Era," new and recurring questions will
continue to confront courts in this, the next era of oil and gas
jurisprudence. 9 Because the boom years have passed, policies have
shifted, and technology has evolved, it is imperative to reassess the
approaches used by courts in answering these questions. This
assessment will in turn provide guidance to the judges, lawyers, and
legislators charged with creating a coherent jurisprudence for this

problems."). See infra Part III for a discussion on the next era of oil and gas jurisprudence.
17In a recent keynote address, Deputy Secretary of Energy William H. White maintained
that inventories of natural gas are "as much as we choose to drill." Conference Looks at Future
of Oil, Gasoline,Natural Gas, OCTANE WK, July 18, 1994. State legislatures are also enacting
provisions to encourage exploration, prompting Texas Railroad Commission Chairman Barry
Williamson to state: "Well see hundreds of wells drilled because of this bill." Susan Hightower,
Legislative Moves Satisfy Oil Industry, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, June 11, 1995, at 4J
(summarizing tax exemption for drilling gas wells in tight sand formations, or other wells that
require high-cost recovery methods).
is See Ronda Fears, Changes Needed in Thinking on Basic Energy, J. REC., Sept. 17, 1993
available in WESTLAW, 1993 WL 9718076, at *4. In the last 50 years the world population has
more than doubled, "from 2.5 billion people in 1940 to 5.3 billion in 1990." Id. It is estimated
that the world population in the next fifty years will nearly double again to 10 billion. Id. 4-5.
According to the United States Energy Information Administration (EIA), supply and demand
will require the world to need another twenty million barrels of oil per day by 2010. See Bill
White, The Coming Oil Crises, FISCAL NOTES, Aug. 1995, at 8.
The Department of Energy recently proposed rules, required by the Energy Policy Act of
1992, to implement alternative fueled vehicle acquisition requirements, stating a primary goal
as the strengthening of United States energy security by reducing dependence on foreign oil.
See 60 Fed. Reg. 10,970 (1995) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 490) (proposed Feb. 28, 1995). In
an exhaustive report prepared for the Texas Railroad Commission in 1993, an Alternative
Transportation Fuels Committee recommended that the State of Texas implement a
comprehensive alternatively fueled vehicles plan to maximize use of Texas' energy resources and
to take advantage of new federal mandates and research and development opportunities. STATE
OF TEXAS ENERGY POLICY PARTNERSHIP (STEPP), Vol 2, Committee Reports, March 1993, at 56
(on file with author). The report also stated that the policy of the state of Texas is to encourage
the use of fuels that are alternatives to gasoline and diesel-based fuels. Id. at 57. This policy is
reflected in Senate Bill 200 which passed the House by a vote of 137-0. The Health and Safety
Code now defines alternative fuels as "any fuel or power source that, when used in a clean-fuel
vehicle, allows the vehicle to comply with the standards and requirements of the federal Clean
Air Act ... and emission limits at least as stringent as the applicable low-emission vehicle
standards for the clean-fuel fleet program." TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.131 (1992
& Supp. 1995).
19However, as Professor Maxwell predicts, Ithe trend will be toward fewer disputes that
create cases of the sort that oil and gas lawyers have enthusiastically dissected, criticized, and
tried to understand during most of this century." Maxwell, Great Era, supra note 15, at 95-96.
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new era of oil and gas law.
The Great Era of oil and gas jurisprudence arose quickly, as
sudden supplies and emerging markets for oil and gas caused
disputes among property owners. Courts were challenged to provide
answers to questions about the relative rights and liabilities incident
to the production of these coveted resources. The common law
provided few direct answers. To fill that void, judges trained in the
shadow of Langdell 20 strictly followed the dictates of legal formalism
and invoked the logical tool of analogy. By analogizing to the
common-law rule used to determine rights in wild animals (ferae
naturae), courts adopted the rule of capture to define a property
owner's rights in oil and gas beneath her property. Under the rule of
capture, an owner of land "acquires title to the oil or gas which he
produces from wells drilled thereon."2 ' The rule shields the owner
from liability for draining the oil from her neighbor's tract; the
neighbor's remedy is to "go and do likewise. 22
Yet many courts throughout the Great Era recognized a
dissonance between common-law doctrines, such as the rule of
capture and remedies for trespass, and the prevailing policies for oil
and gas production. For example, in 1900 the United States Supreme
Court in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana23 departed from the wild-animal
analogy in upholding regulations on production. Instead, Justice
White focused on the recognized goals of conserving resources and
protecting correlative rights of mineral owners.24 Similarly, in 1962,
the Texas Supreme Court promoted the policy of encouraging
secondary-recovery methods for oil by refusing to enjoin the process
even though injected fluids would cross lease lines. In Railroad
20Christopher Columbus Langdell received his L.L.B. from Harvard in 1853 and practiced
law in New York City until 1870. From 1870 to 1895, Langdell served as dean of Harvard Law
School. His judicial philosophy is described infra at footnote 43 and accompanying text.
21 Robert E. -iardwicke, The Rule of Captureand Its Implications as Applied to Oil and Gas,
8 TEX. L. REV. 391, 393 (1935) [hereinafter Hardwicke, Rule of Capture].
22 Barnard v. Monongahela, 65 A. 801, 801-02 (Pa. 1907).
177 U.S. 190 (1900).
2"4
The correlative rights doctrine developed as a limitation the rule of capture. 1 EUGENE 0.
KUNTz, OIL & GAS-A REVISION OF THORTON § 4.3, at 119-21 (1987). The term "correlative
rights" refers to the rights and duties of all landowners in the common source of supply. Id. at
120. The correlative rights doctrine provides that each owner of minerals in a common source
of supply has the right to a fair chance to produce oil and gas from the reservoir substantially
in the proportion that the quantity of recoverable oil and gas under his land bears to the
quantity in the reservoir. Id. See also 1 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL & GAS
LAW § 203.2 at 39-43 (1995) (discussing common-law restrictions on production and correlative
rights doctrine).
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Commission v. Manziel,2" the court held that the "technical" rules of
common-law trespass did not apply.2 6
In order to respond effectively to questions posed by shifting
policies and new technologies in the next era of oil and gas
jurisprudence, this article urges courts to adopt the pragmatic 27 or
policy-conscious approach exemplified in opinions such as Ohio Oil
Co. v. Indiana and Railroad Commission v. Manziel. These opinions
echo the views of many Great Era commentators by recognizing the
need for a special jurisprudence designed to respond to the unique
realities of oil and gas production. The approach used in these cases
to address new policies and technologies was appropriate for oil and
gas law in the Great Era for two reasons. First, unlike in other areas
of the law, a consensus existed about the guiding policies, which
included conserving our national resources and encouraging fair and
efficient production of oil and gas. 28 These general ends encompassed
more specific goals, such as the need for title stability.29 Second,
because the technology and the markets for oil and gas evolved late

25361
26

S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962).

Manziel, 361 S.W.2d at 568.

As described in Part 1, 1 use the word "pragmatic" both for its generic or lay definition and
as a descriptive form of a jurisprudential theory currently receiving attention from several legal
scholars, particularly Judge Richard Posner. Yet the approach I advocate is clearly influenced
by other prominent jurisprudential theorists, including Henry M. Hart and Albert M. Sacks,
who call for 'reasoned elaboration" in judicial opinions. G. Edward White, The Evolution of
Reasoned Elaboration:JurisprudentialCriticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279 (1973)
[hereinafter White, ReasonedElaboration].I am also influenced by Herbert Wechsler's proposals
for "genuinely principled" opinions that would provide guidance to resolving subsequent similar
conflicts. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 15 (1959). One purpose of this article is to suggest a practical approach to decision making
for oil and gas jurisprudence rather than to reconcile the conflicts between the views of these
and other legal theorists. Other scholars have argued for a 'functional" or 'unique"
jurisprudence for oil and gas issues. See, e.g., David E. Pierce, Toward a More Functional
Mineral Jurisprudencefor Kansas, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 223 (1987); Ronald W. Polston, Surface
Rights of Mineral Owners-What Happens When Judges Make Law and Nobody Listens?, 63 N.D.
L. REV. 41 (1987) [hereinafter Polston, Surface Rights of Mineral Owners]; A.W. Walker, Jr.,
Property Rights in Oil and Gas and Their Effect Upon Police Regulation of Production, 16 TEX.
L. REV. 370 (1938) [hereinafter Walker, Property Rights in Oil & Gas].
2 See infra Part I. Although there was largely a consensus on the guiding goals for the
industry, these goals frequently conflicted. See Walter L. Summers, The Modern Theory and
PracticalApplication of Statutes for the Conservationof Oil and Gas, 8 TUL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1938)
[hereinafter Summers, Modern Theory] (describing two "somewhat contrary policies . . . the
policy of production and the policy of conservation."). As described in Part I, the pragmatic
approach I envision requires carefully assessing prevailing policy conflicts and available courses
of action with a goal toward producing opinions which will provide much-needed guidance for
the property owners and developers affected by oil and gas jurisprudence.
z' See infra Part II.
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in the nineteenth century, the courts had not produced opinions
specifically addressing oil and gas controversies. The pragmatic
approach of Ohio Oil and Manziel did little violence to notions of
common-law decision making because of the lack of direct precedents.
Nevertheless, judges frequently overworked the traditional tools of
logic, such as analogy, in answering questions generated by the birth
of an industry unknown at common law.30
To clarify the contours of the pragmatic approach I envision,
and to demonstrate its value, I will contrast it to two formalistic
approaches used throughout the Great Era. As noted above, by
analogizing to the law of wild animals, many early judges myopically
adhered to common-law rules rather than venturing to fashion a
unique jurisprudence for oil and gas law. For example, in Hammonds
v. CentralKentucky Natural Gas Co.,31 the court stretched the wildanimal analogy to determine ownership of gas stored in depleted
reservoirs.3 2 True to its formalistic foundations, this approach
myopically focused on creating a common-law "pedigree, 33 despite
more compelling contemporary policy considerations.
In a second formalistic approach, judges consider policy only
surreptitiously, thereby masking a pragmatic approach in commonlaw garb. Blatant examples include opinions in which judges
contorted common-law property rules in a subtle effort to invoke the
touted policy of saving widely encountered interests, such as oil and
gas leases, non-participating royalties, and term deeds, from
destruction under the Rule Against Perpetuities. 34 Another recent
example is the Supreme Court of Texas' failure to directly address
and evaluate competing policy considerations in deciding whether

30See infra Part I. See, e.g., Daniel C. K. Chow, A PragmaticModel of Law, 67 WASH.
L. REV
755, 765-66 (1992) [hereinafter Chow, Pragmatic Model] (describing how formalists derived
legal rules from positive law with logical tools like syllogism and analogy).
" 75 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1934), overruled by, Texas Am. Energy Corp. v. Citizens Fidelity Bank
& Trust Co., 736 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1987).
12See Hammonds, 75 S.W.2d at 206 (analogizing oil as mineral ferae naturae).But see Lone
Star Gas Co. v. Murchison, 353 S.W.2d 870, 880-81 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1962, writ refd n.r.e.,
June 27, 1962) (allowing suit for conversion of natural gas injected into natural underground
storage reservoir for storage purposes).
' Judge Posner uses this label in his book: RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE (1990) [hereinafter POSNER, PROBLEMS]. Posner refers to the Cardozo quote that
introduced this article and states, "The reference to 'title deed' is particularly noteworthy; it is
a rebuke to formalists who require that law to be valid be 'pedigreed' by being shown to derive
from some authoritative source." Id. at 29.
3 See infra notes 146-212 and accompanying text.

12

J. ENERGY, NAT. RESOURCES, & ENVTL. L.

[Vol. 16

hydraulic fracturing constitutes a common-law trespass.3 5
By myopically ignoring policy or intentionally masking its role,
these two formalistic approaches create uncertainty about property
rights. This uncertainty leads to costly litigation and creates
disincentives for investment in development of surface and mineral
resources, as well as for investment in technology for alternative fuels
and markets.3 6 In order to avoid the counterproductive effects of these
two approaches, judges should apply a pragmatic approach in which
courts openly address competing policies, such as promoting oil and
gas production versus preserving the environment, in deciding cases
in the next era of oil and gas jurisprudence.
As described in Part I, the approach envisioned here
encourages a process in which judges: (1) identify goals and policy
conflicts; (2) assess the effects of available courses of action; and
(3) adopt standards or rules to clarify the relative rights of property
owners and developers.3 7 This approach promotes the policies
prevalent in the Great Era and also permits more effective
consideration of concerns prominent in the new era, such as
protecting the environment and promoting surface uses. The goal of
this process is to produce opinions that inject a desired degree of
"practical certainty" into oil and gas jurisprudence to ensure that

35See Geo Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co., 817 S.W.2d. 357, 364
(Tex. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that rule of capture allows landowner to drill as many wells on his or her tract as the
Railroad Commission will allow, making self-help the remedy for injured landowners on
adjacent tracts), rev'd per curiam, 1992 WL 80263 (Tex. Apr. 22, 1992), withdrawn and writ of
error denied as improvidently granted, 839 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1992). As discussed infra in Part
II implicit in the court's decision to withdraw its earlier opinion is the objective of encouraging
high-tech exploration, like sandfracing. See Geo Viking, 839 S.W.2d at 797.
36Posner and others have emphasized the effect of clarifying titles to land on efficiency. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 3.1, 3.10, at 30, 67-69 (3d ed. 1986).

[The] legal protection of property rights creates incentives to use resources
efficiently ....
In order to facilitate the transfer of resources from less to
more valuable uses, property rights, in principle, should be freely
transferable.... Efficiency requires that property rights be transferable; but
if many people have a claim on each piece of property, transfers will be
difficult to manage.... Problems in transferring property rights are part of
a larger problem, that of deciding who owns what property.
Id.
3 Deciding whether a standard or rule would be more appropriate is part of the pragmatic
process. To illustrate the choice, for example, title issues generally benefit from clear rules to
ensure stability. See infra notes 150-64 and accompanying text (discussing title stability policy
behind RAP). For other issues, for example, determining whether sandfracing constitutes a
trespass, a standard requiring the judge to balance competing policy considerations would be
more appropriate. See infra notes 121-48 and accompanying text.
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property owners and developers are able to confidently assess their
courses of action.38
The two counterproductive types of decision making described
above detract from achieving "practical certainty" for oil and gas
jurisprudence and hinder efficient use of both surface and mineral
estates.39 Part II examines judicial decisions adopting these
unfortunate approaches, including cases grappling with two classic
common-law doctrines: trespass and the Rule Against Perpetuities.4 °
The negative effects of these decisions serve to illustrate the positive
attributes of a pragmatic approach.
Part III posits that courts should implement a pragmatic
approach in this era despite the decades of precedent available from
the Great Era. As noted above, decision making in the new era must
also incorporate concerns too-often ignored in the formative era,
particularly protection of the environment and the economic viability
of surface uses. These concerns establish goals which conflict with the
early Great Era goal of encouraging full-scale mineral development.
Many state legislatures have exemplified this policy shift by their
adoption of surface-use statutes which temper the traditional
dominance of the mineral estate in development. Major mineral

38 The clarity I seek from the judiciary does not depend upon rigid rules that are

mechanically applied. Instead, I argue for a judicial approach that will achieve "practical
certainty," as described by the philosophy professor John Dewey:
A large part of what has been asserted concerning the necessity of
absolutely uniform and immutable antecedent rules of law is in effect an
attempt to evade the really important issue of finding and employing rules
of law, substantive and procedural, which will actually secure to the
members of the community a reasonable measure of practical certainty of
expectation in framing their courses of conduct.
John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 25 (1924) [hereinafter Dewey,
Logical Method and Law]. Dewey describes the "evil" of rigid, immutable rules as "sancti[fying]
the old; adherence to it in practise constantly widens the gap between current social conditions
and the principles used by the courts." Id. at 26. It is my purpose to urge courts to narrow that
gap in oil and gas jurisprudence.
" See J. Stephens Dycus, Legislative Clarification of the CorrelativeRights of Surface and
Mineral Owners, 33 VAND. L. REv. 871, 883 (1980) [hereinafter Dycus, Legislative Clarification]
(uncertainty prevents both surface and mineral owners from making investments in their
properties).
4oAs described infra in Part II, many cases could be categorized as adopting both of these
counterproductive approaches. For example, Professor Summers suggested in 1938 that it is
likely that early cases that appeared divorced from policy considerations were in fact promoting
the policy of production. Summers, Modern Theory, supra note 28, at 7 (discussing cases that
adopted the ownership in place or non-ownership theories through analogies to other commonlaw doctrines).
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producing states lacking such statutes, such as Texas and Colorado,
continue to struggle with the policy conflicts in their courts and
legislatures. As politics continue to polarize the surface-use debate in
the legislatures, the burden falls upon the courts to respond to the
policy shifts by adopting a pragmatic approach to decision making.
In addition to confronting policy shifts, judges, lawyers, and
legislators will continue to grapple with the effect of technological
advances on oil and gas jurisprudence. For example, new
technologies, including three-dimensional exploration and hydraulic
fracturing, have raised questions about the application of common-law
rules of trespass. Rather than rely on courts incrementally to clarify
the questions caused by the surface-use debate and by new
technologies, Part III also advocates enactment of more statutes
defining the rights and liabilities of landowners and mineral
developers.
In this article, I do not suggest that a pragmatic approach
necessarily will be more determinative than a formalistic approach in
resolving these issues in the next era of oil and gas jurisprudence.
Nor do I suggest ignoring settled precedent to achieve a particular
result.4 1 Instead, the pragmatic approach advocated herein informs
the decision-making process more than the result by encouraging
judges boldly to identify the policy conflicts and to assess the probable
effects of alternative courses of action. With this approach, judicial
decisions will clarify the effect of contemporary policies on the rights
and liabilities of landowners and producers. Indeed, clarifying rights
and liabilities through legislation and judicial decisions should be the
ultimate goal for this, the next era of oil and gas jurisprudence.4 2

41

See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, 400-01 (1995) thereinafter POSNER,

OVERCOMING LAW] (noting that pragmatism is not simple result-oriented decision making but
rather, "[t]he relevant consequences to the pragmatist are long run as well as short run,
systemic as well as individual, the importance of stability and predictability as well as ofjustice
to the individual parties...").
42 See infra Part I. See, e.g., EUGENE 0. KUNTZ ET AL., OIL AND GAS LAW 524 (2d ed. 1993)
(Professor Lowe believes that adopting one rule or another in regards to apportionment, is not
as important as "selecting a rule to ensure stability and clarity of land titles"); Dycus,
Legislative Clarification,supra note 39, at 883 (observing importance of legislative clarity in
surface and mineral rights).
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I. THE CONTOURS OF A PRAGMATIC APPROACH
FOR OIL AND GAS JURISPRUDENCE
A. A General Description of a Pragmatic
Approach to Decision Making
The approach I envision initially can be defined by contrasting
it to traditional or formalistic legal theory prominent during the
formative years of the Great Era. The formalistic approach, associated
with Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell of Harvard, considers
legal reasoning a form of deduction that proceeds from major
premises which have previously been established by earlier
decisions.4 3 When no similar cases exist, the formalist invokes the
logical tool of analogy to supply the missing premises.44 For example,
by analogizing to the law of wild animals, early cases adopt the Rule
of Capture to define rights and liabilities of landowners in the oil and
gas beneath their properties.4 5 Whether or not the courts draw
43 Langdell's judicial philosophy was disseminated to his students through the socratic
teaching method and his casebook on contracts. STEPHEN B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW
AND AMERICAN HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 660 (1980). Like the philosophy behind his

casebook, "Langdell's aim was to train law students to derive 'the few, ever-present, and everevolving and fructifying principles, which constituted the genius of the common law." Id. at n.1.
See POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 41, at 1 (stating that under formalistic devices "law,
like mathematics was understood to be about the relations among concepts rather than about
the relations between concepts and reality"). This approach meant that lawyers, in the eyes of
Langdell and other proponents of formalism, should only act as "professional arbiters of an
apolitical and 'scientific' body of rules." KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 211 (1989) [hereinafter HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR]. Formalists also believed thatjudges
had to restrict themselves to abstract, logical reasoning embodied in laissez faire economic
principles. Id. Thus, the formalist era of decision making also brought with it the end of the
Grand Style of opinion writing, leaving the law "characterized by dry, arid logic, divorced from
society and life." BERNARD SCHWARTZ, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 367 (1993)
[hereinafter SCHWARTZ, CURRENTS].
" Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 75 (1985).
POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 33, at 39-40. In dissecting reasoning by analogy, Posner shows
how formalists desire to change the law only incrementally, illustrating one of the limits of this
logical tool. See Id. at 86-100; see also POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 41, at 518-22. He
cites oil and gas as an example: "The judge who analogizes oil and gas to rabbits and foxes
might think he is taking a small step; actually he is impeding the efficient exploitation of
valuable resources." POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 33, at 92.
45See, e.g., Hammonds v. Central Ky. Natural Gas Co., 75 S.W.2d. 204, 206 (Ky. 1934),
overruled by, Texas Am. Energy Corp. v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 736 S.W.2d 25, 28
(Ky. 1987). The Rule of Capture has been stated as follows: "The owner of a tract of land
acquires title to the oil or gas which he produces from wells drilled thereon, though it may be
proved that part of such oil or gas migrated from adjoining lands." Hardwicke, Rule of Capture,

16

J. ENERGY, NAT. RESOURCES, & ENVTL. L.

[Vol. 16

analogies or merely rely upon cases directly in point, the moorings for
the formalistic approach consist of past cases rather than prevailing
policy considerations.
By contrast a legal pragmatist views adherence to prior cases
as guiding policy, rather than inescapable duty.46 Justice Cardozo, one
of the preeminent legal pragmatists,4 7 stated that it is "[niot the
origin, but the goal [which] is the main thing."48 In addition to
precedent, contemporary legal pragmatists urge juristic consideration
of a "web of beliefs," consisting of history, prevailing policies, and
current societal values. 49 The pragmatist strives to determine those
doctrines which form the center of the web, and those which have
"shifted to the web's periphery."5" Identifying the constituent strands
in the web facilitates achieving goals to serve "the real needs of real
people."5" Serving those needs drives a pragmatic approach to judicial
decision making.52

supra note 21, at 393. It is a rule of non-liability for drainage. 1 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE
LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS 6 (1994).
46 POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 41, at 4.
47POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 41, at 19. See RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A
STUDY IN REPUTATION 1, 26-28 (observing that Cardozo's method of tradition is guided "by
considerations of the effects of its decisions, rules, doctrines, and institutions on social welfare").
Posner explains that for Cardozo,
[tihe rules of the common law are instrumental to social welfare, [and] must
therefore be tested by that standard, and subject to considerations of legal
stability ....Few rules in our time are so well established that they may
not be called upon any day to justify their existence as means adapted to an
end. If they do not function they are diseased. If they are diseased, they
must not propagate their kind. Sometimes they are cut out and extirpated
altogether. Sometimes they are left with the shadow of continued life, but
sterilized, truncated, impotent for harm.
Id. at 27.
CARDOZO, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 1, at 102.
9 Chow, PragmaticModel, supra note 30, at 789, 794. Professor Chow borrows the web
metaphor from scholars who advocate a pragmatic approach to statutory interpretation. Id. at
794 (citing William N. Eskrigdge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479
(1987)). According to Professor Chow, "Dynamic statutory interpretation should seek the result
that best coheres with an existing "web of beliefs." Id.
60 Chow, PragmaticModel, supra note 30, at 789.
61 POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 41, at 19.
62 POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 33, at 29. Posner views pragmatism as an instrumental
approach: "Law is forward-looking. This is implicit in an instrumental concept of law -which is
the pragmatic concept of law, law as the servant of human needs." Id. Although Holmes and
Cardozo are probably the best known pragmatists, several others have discussed and proffered
related views. See generally Edwin W. Patterson, Pragmatismas Philosophy of Law, in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF COMMON MAN: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN DEWEY TO CELEBRATE HIS EIGHTIETH
BIRTHDAY 172 (1940); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatismand the Constitution, 72 MINN. L.
REV. 1331 (1988); Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism,41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 864
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Advocates of pragmatism for legal decision making are quick
to defend against charges that this jurisprudential approach
encourages unbridled judicial activism. Instead, Judge Richard
Posner, perhaps currently the most prominent promoter of
pragmatism, describes the term "pragmatism" as follows:
I mean, to begin with, an approach that is practical and
instrumental rather than essentialist-interested in what
works and what is useful rather than in what "really" is. It
is therefore forward-looking,valuing continuity with the past
only so far as such continuity can help us cope with the
problems of the present and of the future. .

.

. It is a

philosophy of action and of betterment-which is not to say
that the pragmatist judge is necessarily an activist ....

A

pragmatist might have good pragmatic reasons for thinking
that courts should maintain a low profile ....

Emphasizing

the practical, the forward-looking, and the consequential, the
pragmatist, or at least my kind of pragmatist .

.

. is

empirical. The pragmatist is interested in 'the facts,' and
thus wants to be well informed about the operation,
properties, and probable effects of alternative courses of
action."

(1989). Roscoe Pound is another scholar who advanced pragmatic legal theory insofar as his
.sociological jurisprudence" advocated "judging legal doctrines by their social results." Paul D.
Carrington, The Missionary Diocese of Chicago, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 467, 510 (1994). As Posner
indicates, however, judicial pragmatists were not the inventors of pragmatic philosophy; rather,
they formulated their doctrine based on experience and philosophical writings of the era.
POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 33, at 27. Philosophical pragmatism, in which judicial
pragmatism has its roots, is too variform to comprise a single philosophical school of thought.
Id. at 28. But pragmatic philosophers include: the American writers; Charles Sanders Pierce,
William James, John Dewey, George H. Mead, Thomas Kuhn, and Richard Rorty, and the
European philosophers; Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Jirgin Habermas. Id. at 27-28. See generally
JOHN E. SMITH, PURPOSE AND THOUGHT: THE MEANING OF PRAGMATISM (1978); H.S. THAYER,
MEANING AND ACTION: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF PRAGMATISM (1968).
" POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW, supra note 41, at 4-5. In his books, Posner considers Holmes
and Cardozo as the laws greatest Pragmatists. See id. at 13; POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 33,
at 28-30. He quotes extensively from CARDOZO's, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, to
define the contours of a pragmatic approach, including the quote which introduces this article.
See POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 33, at 29.
In another recent article, Professor Daniel C.K. Chow also defends pragmatism against
charges that it represents a total rejection of traditional legal theory:
To the extent that pragmatism emphasizes using arguments based upon
weight rather than logical necessity, pragmatism is at odds with traditional
views of legal reasoning and does resemble the type of informal approach
that we often use in daily life ....
Legal pragmatism does not hold that
logical, discursive reasoning is no longer appropriate at all, but that it
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Judge Posner's description of a pragmatic approach to decision
making encourages a process in which judges directly identify
contemporary problems and assess the effects of available "courses of
action." Obviously, this approach assumes that judges, and lawyers, 4
are motivated to produce decisions that will gain the respect of the
bench, the bar, and society at large. This approach further assumes
that they will therefore boldly and thoroughly engage in this
reasoning process.5" When approached in this manner, the pragmatic
approach I envision for oil and gas jurisprudence will produce
opinions that respect precedent and legislative mandates yet also
respond to prevailing policy concerns as well. The desired result is
opinions that clarify the relative weight given to policy and to
common-law doctrines for specific oil and gas issues and thereby
provide "practical
certainty" for the next era of oil and gas
6
jurisprudence.

should no longer be considered the exclusive paradigm of legal reasoning.
Chow, PragmaticModel, supra note 30, at 790.
' In this article I appear to place the burden solely on the judges who author opinions. The
initial burden, of course, rests primarily on the lawyers who frame the issues and advance their
theories before these judges.
"5See Chow, PragmaticModel, supra note 30, at 189. Professor Chow identifies "The Virtue
of Prudence" in pragmatism:
What makes a counselor wise rather than merely clever is a sense of which
legal doctrines capture the sense of the enduring, underlying values of the
legal community as opposed to legal precedents or doctrines that the legal
community seems ready to abandon. To return to the web metaphor, the
good lawyer will sense which legal doctrines are relatively centrally located
within the web and which doctrines, once at the core, have gradually shifted
to the web's periphery. In this way, the prudent counselor will find the
confluence between his clients' needs and the interests of the legal
community. The wise judge will reach decisions that gain the acceptance
and respect of the bench and bar.
Id. See also White, Reasoned Elaboration, supra note 27, at 285. In considering the rise of
reasoned elaboration as a theory for legal decision making, Professor White explains:
In emphasizing the disingenuous aspects of the use of precedent, rule, and
doctrine, the Realists had made too simplistic an appraisal of the function
of the rationalization process in judicial opinions. They had failed to grant
due respect to the fact that a judge's use of these devices was itself
constrained by the expectations of others. A new set of questions about
judicial decision-making emerged, revolving around the reasoning of
opinions. Had the courts adequately articulated reasons for its result? ...
To what extent did the judge appeal to technical considerations, social
policies, philosophical principles and moral values?
Id.

56See Dewey, Logical Method and Law, supra note 38, at 25.
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B. The PragmaticApproach and Oil and
Gas Jurisprudence
The quilt of oil and gas jurisprudence was formed through a
patchwork of both pragmatic and formalistic case decisions. In cases
decided in the early part of this century, judges frequently showed
allegiance to the Langdellian method and turned to the formalistic
tool of analogy to fill the void of applicable precedents.5" Judges in
different states analogized oil and gas to hard minerals,5" percolating
waters,5 9 and wild animals6 ° to answer fundamental questions about
the legal rights of landowners in oil and gas beneath their property.
These analogies provided the premises upon which judges in various
states eventually based the ownership-in-place or non-ownership
theories to determine a landowner's rights in oil and gas beneath her
land.6 '
67 Although analogy is not solely the tool of formalists, formalists
tended to overwork that
tool in their zeal to demonstrate a common law "pedigree." See supra note 33.
' See, e.g., Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 176 S.W. 717, 720 (1915) ("With the land itself capable
of absolute ownership, everything within it in the nature of a mineral is likewise capable of
ownership, so long as it constitutes a part of it.").
" See, e.g., Higgins Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 82 So. 206, 211 (La. 1919) ("The
analogy between the subterranean oil and subterranean percolating waters is, we believe, near

complete . .
60

").

See Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa. 1889) ("Gas,
it is true, is a mineral; but it is a mineral with peculiar attributes, which require the application
of precedents arising out of ordinary mineral rights, with much more careful consideration of
the principles involved than of the mere decisions.").
, See Summers, The Modern Theory, supra note 28, at 6-7. In illustrating how analogies led
to theories of ownership, Professor Summers states:
The principle of absolute ownership has been applied to minerals of solid
nature such as coal and iron and also to subterranean waters, another
mineral of fugitive nature, therefore, it was only natural for the courts to
follow as far as possible these analogies and precedents and make the
principle of absolute ownership the basis of property rights in oil and gas.
Walter L. Summers, Property in Oil and Gas, 29 YALE L. J. 175, 174, 178 (1919); see also
RICHARD HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 1.3, at 26-27 (3d ed. 1991) (noting that,
"[sluch analogies generally led to a concept that, like wild animals, the landowner had title only
to such products as he actually reduced to possession").
As various courts began determining the nature of [oil and gas rights, three ownership
theories emerged: (1) Ownership in place: oil and gas in the ground is a part of the land until
severed, and as realty are owned by the landowner; (2) Non-ownership in place: the owner of
the land has nothing more than the mere right to reduce oil or gas to possession, with title to
the oil or gas passing only when possession is actually obtained; and (3) Qualified ownership:
which exists in a few of the non-ownership jurisdictions and provides the landowner with
standing to prevent injurious or wasteful operations to the oil and gas in place. Id. at 27; see
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example, in Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas
De Witt, 62 an 1889 Pennsylvania case, the court adopted
principle of oil and gas law, the rule of capture, by
to wild animals. The court reasoned:

Water and oil, and still more strongly gas, may be classed by
themselves, if the analogy be not too fanciful, as minerals
ferae naturae. In common with animals and unlike other
minerals, they have the power and the tendency to escape
without the volition of the owner. Their "fugitive and
wandering existence within the limits of a particular tract
was uncertain".

. .

but when they escape, and go into other

land, or come under another's control, the title of the former
owner is gone. Possession of the land, therefore, is not
necessarily possession of the gas. If an adjoining, or even a
distant, owner, drills his own land, and taps your gas, so
that it comes into his well and under his control, it is no
longer yours, but his. 3
Yet, Pennsylvania courts quickly recognized the awkwardness
of the analogy owing to the obvious physical differences between
substances in the ground and animals roaming on the surface. In
1907, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court admitted, "Exact knowledge
on this subject is not at present attainable ....This may not be the
best rule; but neither the Legislature nor our highest court has given
us any better."6 4

also KUNTZ, supra note 24, § 2.4, at 64-67 (1962) (explaining ownership theories).
Many scholars have criticized the adoption of the ownership-in-place doctrine. See Harry
Cohen, Property Theories Affecting the Landowner in a New Oil and Gas Producing State, 10
ALA. L. REV. 323, 337 (1958) [hereinafter Cohen, Property Theories]. Professor Cohen explains
that the ownership-in-place doctrine encumbers title:
Experience has shown that there are many conveyances of "minerals" on
record which merely "cloud" titles because the owners thereof have forgotten
them and have disappeared .... [Tihe main policy behind any rule of
property relating to oil and gas should be that of promoting the rapid and
orderly development of theses resources.
Id. at 337-38; see also Ronald W. Polston, Mineral Ownership Theory: Doctrinein Disarray,70
N.D. L. REv. 541 (1994) [hereinafter Polston, Doctrine in Disarray](discussing lack of a clear
body of law resulting from application of ownership-in-place doctrine to minerals).
62 18 A. 724 (Pa. 1889).
63

Id. at 725.

' Barnard v. Monongahela Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 802 (Pa. 1907).
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1. Promoting the Policies of Conserving Resources
and Protecting CorrelativeRights of Property

Owners-Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana
As early as 1900, the United States Supreme Court admitted
that although there is an analogy between gas and wild animals,
66
there is "no identity between them."6 5 In Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana,
the Court held constitutional a statute that prevented waste by
prohibiting the flaring of natural gas. States began enacting statutes
promoting goals of conservation and prevention of waste as early as
1878.67 In the Ohio Oil opinion, Chief Justice White evinced a
pragmatic approach by considering the animal analogy as precedent,
but only in light of prevailing policy. In order to serve the goals of
preventing waste and protecting the correlative rights of landowners
in a common supply of oil and gas, Justice White upheld the statute
as a proper exercise of the police power.6"
Four decades after Ohio Oil, Professor Maurice Merrill praised
the approach used by Justice White and other judges for furthering
the goals of conserving resources and protecting correlative rights of
landowners by upholding statutory regulations:
To reach such a result, it was necessary that the courts take
account of the increasing fund of knowledge concerning the
nature of oil and gas and the conditions surrounding their
exploitation, the experience of the industry, the relative
66
66

Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209 (1900).
177 U.S. 190 (1900).

67 See

Summers, The Modern Theory, supra note 28, at 1 (noting that Pennsylvania enacted

first statute in 1878). See generally BLAKELY M. MURPHY, CONSERVATION OF OIL & GAS: A LEGAL
HISTORY, 425, 1948 (1972) [hereinafter MURPHY, CONSERVATION OF OIL & GAS] (summarizing
history of oil and gas conservation in United States).
68 Ohio Oil, 177 U.S. at 210. Justice White explains the validity of the statute:
This necessarily implied legislative authority is borne out by the analogy
suggested by things ferae naturae .... Viewed, then, as a statute to protect
or to prevent the waste of the common property of the surface owners, the
law of the state of Indiana which is here attacked because it is asserted that
it devested private property without due compensation, in substance is a
statute protecting private property and preventing it from being taken by
one of the common owners without regard to the enjoyment of the others.
Id. See also Summers, The Modern Theory, supra note 28, at 9 (describing how Ohio Oil
'exposed the fallacies of the wild-animal analogy, and pointed out that landowners' privileges
to take oil and gas actually constitute a property interest"); KUNTZ, supra note 24, § 4.3, at 120.
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importance of the interests involved, and the ideals of the
social order which lie back of the broad standards of decency
and reasonableness controlling the substance of
governmental regulation which are embodied in the due
process clause.69
In praising these decisions, Professor Merrill voiced approval of a
pragmatic approach informed by a broad "web of beliefs" including
knowledge, needs, and experience, rather than simply past cases and
analogies."v
2. The Reign of the Wild-Animal AnalogyHammonds v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co.
In other cases, however, judges remained enamored with the
formalists' use of analogy. Indeed, Professor Walker expressed dismay
that, "as late as 1921, one of the Texas courts indulged in the fanciful
statement that oil and gas 'are supposed to percolate restlessly about
under the surface of the earth, even as the birds fly from field to field
and the beasts roam from forest to forest."'' Additionally, in the 1934
Kentucky case, Hammonds v. Central Kentucky NaturalGas Co. ,72 the
opinion egregiously overworked the animal analogy to determine if a
gas company had lost title to gas it had produced and then reinjected
into the reservoir for storage. Appellant, Della Hammonds, sought to
hold a gas company liable for having stored the gas in an exhausted
reservoir beneath her property. By the date of the opinion, the goals
of preventing waste and protecting correlative rights were wellensconced in statutes in many states.73 More significant for the issue
in this case, the geological properties of oil and gas were wellrecognized.7 4 Yet, the judge myopically applied the pre-packaged
69 Maurice H. Merrill, The Evolution of Oil and Gas Law, 8 MISS. L.J. 281, 289-90 (1941).
70 Id. at 290-91.
71

A.W. Walker, Jr., PropertyRights in Oil and Gas and Their Effect Upon Police Regulation
of Production, 16 TEX. L. REV. 370, 370-71 (1938).
72 75 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1934).
3
7 See MURPHY, CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS, supra note 67, at 571-72.
74
See Hardwicke, Rule of Capture,supra note 21, at 394. Professor Harwicke recognized that
the availability of information allowed for greater production control:
It is generally recognized that a great deal is now known about the
accumulation and movement of oil and gas in the reservoir, and that, with
a reasonable amount of data available, experts can estimate with
approximate accuracy the oil and gas in place in a pool, and the amount
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common-law rules for "ferae naturae":
If one capture a fox in a forest and turn it loose in another,
or if he catch a fish and put it back in the stream at another
point, has he not done with that migratory, common property
just what the appellee has done with the gas in this case?
Did the company not lose its exclusive property in the gas
75
when it restored the substance to its natural habitat?
Based on this analysis, the court held that the company was not
liable to Della Hammonds because it had lost title to the gas.
As described above, a pragmatic approach would have required
the judge in Hammonds to identify goals and policy conflicts and to
assess the effects of available courses of action. The opinion, on its
face, skips these steps. Relevant competing policies, such as
encouraging production versus protecting property rights, are not
mentioned. Rather than assume a forward-looking stance, the opinion
resorts to extant law of wild animals and adopts the rule that a
producer loses title once it reinjects the gas into a reservoir for
storage, a rule which frustrates the goal of promoting efficient
76
production and marketing of gas by encouraging subsurface storage.

ultimately recoverable under any given producing conditions.
Id. As early as 1930 a representative of petroleum engineers was describing to the American
Bar Association about the nature of oil and gas in the earth. Earl Oliver, Oil and Gas Law
Responsible for Over-Productionand Waste, 55 A.B.A. REP. 712 (1930). Lawyers in the oil and
gas industry knew a great deal about the physical nature of oil and gas as shown in articles by
the general counsel of Carter Oil Company in 1920. See James A. Veasy, The Law of Oil and
Gas, 18 MICH. L. REV. 445, 448-53 (1920) [hereinafter Veasy, Law of Oil & Gas]. Scholars have
distinguished the evolution of oil and gas jurisprudence according to the relative knowledge:
[I)n the evolution of a separate jurisprudence on oil and gas, the cases may
be distinguished on the basis of a clearly recognizable time sequence- before
1900, the era of definition and comparative ignorance of how oil occurs and
reacts when a well penetrates the reservoir; between 1900 and 1932- the
era of scientific awareness of the nature of petroleum and petroleum
reservoirs ....
See Robert E. Sullivan, A Survey of Oil and Gas Law in Montana as It Relates to the Oil and
Gas Lease, 16 MONT. L. REV. 1, 16 (1955) [hereinafter Sullivan, Oil and Gas Law in Montana].
7 Hammonds, 75 S.W.2d at 206.
76 The importance of underground storage was well known by the 1944 opinion. See Alan
Stamm, Legal Problems in the UndergroundStorage of Natural Gas, 36 TEX. L. REV. 161, 167
(1957) [hereinafter Stamm, Legal Problems] (discussing growth of natural gas industry). "Gas
was first deliberately stored underground by man as early as 1915 in the Welland, Ontario,
field." Id. at 161. (citing INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION, A SURVEY OF UNDERGROUND
NATURAL GAS STORAGE PROJECTS IN THE UNITED STATES 2-3 (1943)). "Shortly thereafter, in
1916, the first subsurface gas storage project in the United States was inaugurated at the Zoar
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Since the importance of underground storage was appreciated by
1944, a judge committed to a pragmatic process could have considered
that policy in the decision-making process." Moreover, by the date of
the opinion, the factual basis for the wild-animal analogy had been
repudiated by courts and scholars, and the need for a special
jurisprudence governing oil and gas had been recognized.78 In spite of
that recognition, the opinion myopically clings to the wild-animal
analogy in an apparent attempt to fulfill the formalistic goal of
establishing a reliable "pedigree" for the decision.7"
In an article written a year after the Hammonds decision, a
well-known oil and gas scholar, Robert E. Hardwicke, criticized these
false pedigrees created through analogy:
field near Buffalo, New York." Id.
7 See Stamm, Legal Problems, supra note 76, at 161. Underground storage was the only
economical method for storing large quantities of gas. Id. at 163. In his article Professor Stamm
explains that, "in order to make it easier for storage companies to acquire the necessary rights"
states began enacting legislation authorizing storage companies to bring condemnation
proceedings against owners. Id. at 174-75.
Kentucky's preoccupation with coal could provide an excuse for the judge's failure to promote
the policy of gas storage in 1944. Kentucky's first comprehensive law enacted in 1932 regulating
oil and gas wells was "designed primarily for the protection of the commonwealth's extensive
coal deposits." MURPHY, CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS, supra note 67, at 193-94. See generally
Appalachian Coals Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360-61, 376-77 (1933) (holding
corporation formed by competing producers of bituminous coal for exclusive purpose of acting
as an agent did not violate Sherman Act).
718See, e.g., Ohio Oil, 177 U.S. at 208-10 (regarding animal analogy as precedent but
only
in light of prevailing public policy); Standard Oil Co. v. Oil Well Salvage Co., 281 S.W. 360 (Ark.
1926) (holding ferae naturae analogy does not apply to oil which escapes from surface area);
Medina Oil Dev. Co. v. Murphy, 233 S.W. 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (criticizing "fanciful
analogy" between oil and gas and animals ferea naturae in dealing with acquisition of title).
Commentators have long criticized the continued use of the animal analogy. See A.W.
Walker, Jr., Fee Simple Ownership of Oil and Gas in Texas, 6 TEX. L. REV. 125, 125 (1928)
[hereinafter Walker, Fee Simple Ownershipof Oil and Gas]. In 1928, Professor Walker identified
why continued use of the analogy was no longer appropriate:
[Clourts at first attempted by analogy to pigeonhole oil and gas under the
category of some other type of property which, in the court's mind, it seemed
most to resemble .... Experience, and a better understanding of the nature
of oil and gas and the economical and physical conditions surrounding its
production, soon revealed that in many respects oil and gas was a species
of property peculiar unto itself, and that rules of law that worked very well
when applied to other types of property were wholly inadequate and unjust
in their operations when applied to oil and gas.
Id. See also Veasy, Law of Oil and Gas, supra note 74, at 454-55 (noting "[tihis fundamental
misconception of the nature and habits of oil and gas has produced great confusion of judicial
thought upon the subject ....Their views in this regard have not kept pace with the expansion
of physical and scientific knowledge upon the subject.")
'9See POSNER, PROBLEMS, supra note 33, at 29 (the author will continue to use Judge
Posner's label throughout the remainder of the article as explained supra).
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The courts naturally undertook to apply by analogy the
common law which had been recognized as to other
substances which are somewhat similar in several
characteristics. This effort brought about complications,
because in many ways the analogies to wild, roving animals,
to percolating waters, and to minerals generally, were not
wholly accurate, and were somewhat misleading.
Furthermore, the courts seem to have been more interested
in selecting high sounding labels, which they assumed
almost automatically settled the law questions, than in
working out fundamental principles, whatever the
appropriate labels might be.8"
As authority for these words, Hardwicke cited one of the premier
pragmatic jurists, Justice Cardozo. ' It would be decades, however,
before courts embraced Justice Cardozo's pragmatic philosophy in
opinions rejecting the Hammonds rule. 2
3. Rejecting the Wild-Animal Analogy to Encourage
Underground Storage of Gas-Lone Star Gas
Co. v. Murchison
In 1962, a Texas case exhibited a pragmatic approach and in
so doing rejected the Hammonds rule. In Lone Star Gas Company v.
Murchison,83 the appellate court considered a "web of beliefs" similar
to the approach used by Justice White in 1897, which included
precedent, but only in light of prevailing policy considerations: "An
exegesis of the Hammonds opinion, when considered in the light of
present day development of the gas industry, is unimpressive." 84 The
opinion relied on several law review articles exposing the fallacies of
the wild-animal analogy and emphasizing the policy arguments in
favor of rejecting the Hammonds rule. One authority cited in Lone
Star concluded, "The analogy between oil and gas and animals ferae
naturae is inappropriate and should not be allowed to result in
so

Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture, supra note 21, at 399.

" Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture, supra note 21, at 399. Hardwicke notes that his idea,

"was forcibly expressed by Mr. Justice Cardozo" in Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114
n.10 (1934). Id.
82 Texas Am. Energy Corp. v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 736 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1987).
83

353 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).

8

Id. at 879.
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decisions which would needlessly hinder an industry so vital to the
economy as the underground storage of natural gas." 5 Therefore, the
Texas court held that an owner of gas retained title after reinjecting
the gas into a well-defined reservoir for storage. This result fulfilled
the pragmatists' "practical and instrumental" aim to serve "the real
needs of real people." 6
4. A PragmaticApproach to Trespass: Encouraging
Secondary Recovery of Oil-Railroad

Commission v. Manziel
In another Texas opinion decided in 1962, the same year as
Lone Star, the Texas Supreme Court assumed a pragmatic approach
in adopting a rule designed to serve another well-recognized goalencouraging secondary recovery of oil. In Railroad Commission v.
Manziel, 7 the Whelans and the Manziels were operators in a field
with rules providing for eighty acre production units.8 8 The wells were
to be located on that unit 660 feet from lease lines. 9 The Whelans
had unitized all of their leased properties but had no unitization
agreement with the Manziels.9 ° The Whelans planned a waterflooding program designed to recover an estimated 930,000 barrels of
oil. 9 ' To implement this plan, they had received an order from the
Railroad Commission permitting injection of water into a well located

Id. at 878 (citing Note, Oil and Gas-Mines and Minerals-Injectorof Natural Gas into a
Natural UndergroundReservoir Retains Title to the Gas: White v. New York State Natural Gas
Corp., 190 F. Supp. 342 (W.D. Penn. 1960), 40 TEx. L. REV. 290, 292 (1961)).
86 See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
87 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962).
88 Id. at 562.
85

89

Id.

90 The terms "unitization" and 'pooling" are often used interchangeably, however, the two
words do have different meanings and it is important to distinguish which term is meant. SMITH
& WEAVER, supra note 45, at 427. Pooling is the process of combining small tracts into an area
of sufficient size to merit a well permit under the field's applicable spacing rule. Id. at 427-28.
Pooling serves to reduce the economic waste of drilling and producing unnecessary wells, while
at the same time protecting the correlative rights of landowners in a drilling unit. Id. at 428.
Unitization is the process of combining all or a large part of the acreage of an entire field into
a unit, and may involve the joint operation of hundreds of individual drilling units covering
thousands of acres. Id. Unitization serves to increase the amount of oil and gas recovered from
a reservoir by allowing operators to choose the best production and development pattern for the
field as a whole, while simultaneously protecting the correlative rights of all the field's owners.
Id. at 428.
9' Manzeil, 361 S.W.2d at 564.
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only 206 feet from lease lines, rather than the 660 feet set forth in
the field rules. 92
The purpose of the water-injection program was to recover oil
left in place after initial, or primary, recovery by sweeping water
towards one well.93 Because the injected water "spreads out radially
from the injection well bore,"94 water inevitably crosses lease lines. It
was this sort of "trespass" which the Manziels sought to prevent by
seeking to set aside the Railroad Commission's order. 95
The Texas Supreme Court held that a trespass does not occur,
and an injunction will not lie, when secondary-recovery projects are
conducted pursuant to a valid commission order. 9 In reaching that
result, the court weighed the interests of individual operators and
landowners against the public policy of encouraging secondaryrecovery operations:
It cannot be disputed that such operations should be
encouraged, for as the pressure behind the primary
production dissipates, the greater is the public necessity for
applying secondary recovery forces. It is obvious that
secondary recovery programs could not and would not be
conducted if any adjoining operator could stop the project on
the ground of subsurface trespass .... The technical rules
of trespass have no place in the consideration of the validity
of the orders of the Commission.9 7
While commentators generally have praised the Manziel
decision for promoting an accepted goal-encouraging secondary
recovery-one scholar has criticized the decision as stifling efforts to
prevent physical waste of oil and gas with a compulsory-unitization
statute.98 Professor Jacqueline Weaver has convincingly championed
92 Id.

93 Secondary recovery is a method of extracting oil, gas, or both when a reservoir is
approaching or has reached the exhaustion of natural energy. HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES
J. MEYERS., OIL AND GAS TERMS 886 (7th ed. 1987). Fluid in the form of water, gas, air, or other
substance is injected into the formation through an input well. Id. The natural energy is then
removed
from surrounding wells. Id.
94
Manziel, 361 S.W.2d at 564.
95 The court recognized that "ifthe irregular spacing is used, the life of the [Manziel's] well
would be reduced to three and one half to eight months" from thirty-two months. Id.
9 Id. at 568.

9 Id. at 568-69.
98Jacqueline L. Weaver, The Politics of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence:The Eight-Six Percent
Factor, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 492, 510 (1994) [hereinafter Weaver, Politics of Oil and Gas
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the need for a compulsory-unitization statute in Texas. 99 As she points
out, Texas is an anomaly as the largest producing state without such
a statute. 10 0 Even the court in Manziel recognized that if the field in
that case had been appropriately unitized by including the Manziels
in the agreement, the secondary-recovery efforts would have been
more efficient. 1 Equally significant, if the field had been uniformly
unitized, the trespass issue would have disappeared because
unitization in effect erases the lease lines between unitized owners.
According to Professor Weaver, the Texas Supreme Court
should have strictly applied common-law rules for trespass to force
the legislature to fulfill its duty to implement public policy by
enacting a compulsory-unitization statute. 0 2 But the court recognized
that by denying the injunction and allowing the authorized secondaryrecovery project to proceed, it was reinforcing public policy 10to3
encourage the secondary recovery of oil as expressed in legislation.
Granting the injunction, on the other hand, would have frustrated the
legislature's policy by empowering "holdout" owners who refuse to join
voluntary-unitization agreements unless their unreasonable demands
are met. The Manziel opinion considered this holdout problem 10 4 in
quoting from an Illinois decision refusing to enjoin a water-flooding
program:

Jurisprudence].
99See JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS 257 (1986)
(discussing attitude of Texas courts toward unitization issues).
'ooWEAVER, Politics of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence,supra note 98, at 499. Texas does have
a voluntary unitization statute. 1949 TEx. GEN. LAWS, ch. 259 at 477-83 (codified at TEX. NAT.
RES. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001-101.052 (West 1993 & Supp. 1996)). However, that act provides the
Railroad Commission with only limited authority to approve unitization agreements. See
generally SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 45, at ch. 11 (discussing voluntary unitization act).
101 Manziel, 361 S.W.2d at 564. As the court noted in Manziel, because there was no
unitization agreement between the Manziels and the Whelans, "[tihe plan was not set up out
of a consideration of what pattern would result in the most recovery from the entire field; but
rather a plan was used that would result in the most recovery from that one lease." Id.
102 Weaver, Politicsof Oil and Gas Jurisprudence,supra note 98, at 513. "Such statutes may
be more effective in promoting conservation than judicially created doctrines which try to fill
the vacuum in legislative policy making." Id.
103Manziel, 361 S.W.2d at 569-70.
104 Holdouts reflect a form of strategic behavior that may prevent the parties from reaching
an agreement even when both could be made better off. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 18 (2d ed. 1989). Holdouts can halt activities by refusing
to comply with an agreement unless demands are met. Id. Generally, these demands are in the
form of exorbitant prices reflecting the holdout's monopolistic power. See Harold Demsetz, When
Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, in ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW (Bruce A.
Ackerman ed., 1975); see also SMITH & WEAVER, supranote 45, 431 (describing several obstacles
to voluntary unitization, including holdouts).
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If a minority of one or more persons affected by the
operations could prevent it by refusing to join in the
agreement, they could then force the others to choose
between leaving a large part of the oil underground, or
consent to granting the dissidents an unreasonably large
percentage of the oil. In other words, the power to block a
repressure program by refusing to sign the unitization
agreement, would be the power to insist upon unjust
enrichment. 5
As Professor Weaver recognized, the danger in leaving to the
legislature the duty to resolve the issue of trespass, incident to
secondary-recovery projects, by enacting a compulsory-unitization
statute is that "the politics of conservation will stalemate change."' '
Indeed, Professor Weaver has thoroughly documented the disruptive
effects of the politics between the independents and the majors on
Texas pooling and unitization legislation.10 7 The Manziel decision does
not remove the need for a compulsory-unitization statute. Because the
field in Manziel had not been completely unitized, the water-flooding
plan did not ensure efficient recovery from the whole field, but only
from one lease.'l 8 This fact, coupled with Manziel's message in favor
of secondary recovery, should have convinced state legislators of the
need for such a statute. One can only speculate whether a different
decision in Manziel would have galvanized the political forces in the
legislature to a point of consensus necessary for passing an effective
compulsory-unitization statute.'0 9 To date, those disparate legislative

361 S.W.2d at 570-571 (quoting Reed v. Texas Co., 159 N.E.2d 641,644 (Ill.
App.
4d 1959)). See, e.g., Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 168 N.W.2d 510, 518 (Neb. 1969) (stating,
"[Wihile we agree he had a perfect right to refuse to join the project, he should not be rewarded
because he did ....Neither should he be permitted to recover what he would have received if
he had assumed the risks of the project").
106 See Weaver, Politics of Oil & Gas Jurisprudence,supra note 98, at 514.
'07 Weaver, Politicsof Oil & Gas Jurisprudence,supra note 98, at 537.
'08
Manziel, 361 S.W.2d at 564.
Texas Supreme Court decisions in the 1960s finally led to a pooling statute in Texas. See
105Manziel,

TEx. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 102.001-102.112 (West 1993). However, as Professor Weaver
notes, that statute is narrow and badly needs reform before the benefits of pooling can be
realized for technological advances, including horizontal drilling and sandfracing. See Weaver,
Politics of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence,supra note 98, at 525. Professor Weaver cites the East
Texas injection program and the Boonsville episode as successful examples of courts lobbing
significant oil and gas issues to the legislature. Id. at 513. The East Texas injection program
was established as a result of the court's opinion in Goldsmith & Powell v. State, 159 S.W.2d
534 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942). In Goldsmith, the Texas Attorney General sued 155 operators in the
East Texas field to enjoin them from polluting the Neches river by discharging salt water and
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forces continue to block the passage of such a statute. 110
Professor Weaver's criticisms of the Manziel approach, that the
court should have forced the legislature to enact a unitization statute
by strictly adhering to common-law conceptions of trespass, are in
accord with criticisms generally launched against legal theories
perceived as condoning the courts' consistent judicial usurpation of
the legislative role."' As described above, however, the pragmatic
approach promotes a particular process, not unbridled judicial
activism. The process includes directly identifying goals and policy
conflicts, weighing precedent and legislative mandates, and assessing
the effects of alternative courses of action. In Manziel, the court

chlorides from their oil wells. Id. at 511. The small operators could not afford to comply with
the ruling and sought the Railroad Commission's help. Id. In response to the small operators
disposal problem, the commission began the bonus allowable rule which assured that the costs
of building and operating a fieldwide salt water injection system would be recovered by varying
the bonus allowable to equal the cost of injection. Id. at 513. In response to the rule, the East
Texas Saltwater Disposal Company began injection operations in October 1942, serving all
operators in the field regardless of whether they were stockholders. Id.
In the Boonsville episode, the Texas legislature responded to the Supreme Court opinion
that conservation statutes, which prohibited the downhole commingling of oil and gas from
different strata, only authorized the commission to prorate oil and gas produced from a common
source of supply. Id. at 504 (citing Gage v. Railroad Comm'n, 582 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. 1979)). The
court further held that each stringer in the Boonsville field was a separate source of supply
which prevented the commission from prorating wells with commingled production. Id. The
commission began to deny all requests for commingling in order to maintain the integrity of the
prorationing system. Id. at 505. Eventually, the Texas legislature granted the commission the
authority to prorate production from commingled zones as if they were a single pool. See TEX.
NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.053 (West 1993).
110
See Weaver, Politicsof Oil and Gas Jurisprudence,supra note 98, at 537 n. 115 (discussing
political debate that prevents passage of a compulsory unitization bill in Texas). "TIPRO [Texas
Independent Producers and Royalty Owners Association] opposes any such bill which does not
require the unit operator to market the gas of the nonoperators on the same terms as the
operator's gas contract." Id. "The debate over this aspect of compulsory unitization is
reminiscent of the great Panhandle prorationing battles between the majors and independents
in 1930's." Id.
' The longstanding dispute between judicial restraint and judicial activism is often
characterized today as "interpretive" and "noninterpretive." See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (1980). Interpretive judges decide constitutional
issues by confining themselves to "enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the
written Constitution." Id. Noninterpretive judges "go beyond that set of references and enforce
norms that cannot be discovered within the four corners of the document." Id. Advocates of
judicial restraint believe that it is not the function of the judiciary to strike down laws with
which the judge may disagree. SCHWARTZ, CURRENTS, supranote 43, at 381. It is the legislator,
not the judge, who has "the primary say on the policy considerations behind a regulatory
measure." Id. But see Linda Greenhouse, Farewellto the Oil Order in the Court: The Right Goes
Activist and the Center Is a Void, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1995, § 4, at 1 (noting that judicial
activism, "a phrase that conservatives once hurled as an epithet," now describes the opinions
of the United States Supreme Court's conservative block of justices).
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proceeds with this process and succeeds where the legislature has
failed to promote its own mandate in favor of secondary recovery.
Courts in other jurisdictions faced with the Manziel trespass
issue have engaged in a pragmatic process but reached different
results. For example, in Jameson v. Ethyl Corp.,112 the Arkansas
Supreme Court overtly identified the competing goals and assessed
alternative courses of action:
A determination that a trespass or nuisance occurs through
secondary-recovery processes within a recovery area would
tend to promote waste of such natural resources and extend
unwarranted bargaining power to minority landowners. On
the other hand, a determination that the rule of capture
should be expanded to cover the present situation could
unnecessarily extend the license of mineral extraction
companies to appropriate minerals which might be induced
to be moved from other properties through such processes
and, in any event, further extend the bargaining power of
such entities to reduce royalty payments to landowners who
are financially unable to "go and do likewise".... 13
In Jameson, the Arkansas court determined that the goals of
encouraging secondary recovery and protecting property rights could
be balanced if the denial of an injunction were conditioned upon
requiring compensation for excess oil and gas removed from
neighboring tracts through secondary recovery, as well as requiring
compensation for any special damages. As explained in Part II, it is
arguable whether Manziel would shield operators in Texas from
liability for damages in private trespass actions, or whether Manziel
only disallows an injunction when the Railroad Commission has
approved a secondary-recovery plan.114 Yet, in an effort to promote
secondary recovery, both Manziel and Jameson evince a pragmatic
process, informed by a "web of beliefs" inclusive of precedent and
policy. Moreover, in both instances, the courts are able to fashion
rules that promote secondary-recovery projects.
Although reaching different results, Jameson and Manziel, like

112609 S.W.2d 346 (Ark. 1980).
-1 Id.
at 351. As discussed in Part II infra, most jurisdictions have not totally shielded

operators from liability for approved secondary-recovery projects.
114 See supra, Part II, notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
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Lone Star and Ohio Oil, demonstrate the value of a pragmatic
approach to decision making. Part II highlights the preferable
attributes of this pragmatic approach by reviewing other cases that
fail to follow its tenets. One example is a recent Texas case that
presented the opportunity for the court to clarify Manziel's effect on
common-law trespass suits between private parties. Other cases
consider the role in oil and gas jurisprudence of another classic
common-law rule, the Rule Against Perpetuities.
II. THE ANTITHESIS OF THE PRAGMATIC
APPROACH: MASKS AND MYOPIA
In the formative years of the Great Era, commentators
consistently called for a special jurisprudence for oil and gas, one
which would respond to prevailing policies rather than to
inappropriate common-law analogies.115 Such policies included
conserving natural resources and encouraging fair and efficient
production of oil and gas. As early as 1878, a litany of statutes
codified measures to achieve these goals.1 16 As described in Part I,
Ohio Oil, Lone Star,Manziel, and Jameson exemplified many courts'
promotion of policy by embracing a pragmatic approach to decision
making.1 17 The pragmatic approach was appropriate in the Great Era
for two reasons. First, unlike in other areas of the law, the
commentators and statutes attest to an early consensus about the
guiding policies. Second, because the technology and markets for oil
and gas evolved late in the Nineteenth Century, judges turning to the
common law encountered a paucity of applicable rules. Free from
direct precedent, courts could employ a pragmatic approach, which

115

In addition to the articles cited in Lone Star and others cited in the text, volumes were

written in the Great Era. In these articles, scholars consistently criticized cases for rigid
formalism and urged courts to assume more pragmatic approaches. See Veasy, Law of Oil and
Gas, supra note 74, at 454 (criticizing continued use of animal analogy in light of physical and
scientific knowledge); Walker, Fee Simple Ownership of Oil and Gas, supra note 78, at 125
(recognizing that early use of inappropriate analogies demands evolution of oil and gas law);
Hardwicke, Rule of Capture, supra note 21, at 399 (noting that adherence to high sounding
labels obscured fundamental questions); Walker, PropertyRights in Oil and Gas, supra note 27,
at 370 (cited in Lone Star urging special jurisprudence for oil and gas); Summers, The Modern
Theory, supra note 28, at 5 (observing policy concerns in oil and gas production).
6 In that year Pennsylvania enacted the first conservation statute, which required plugging
and casing wells. Summers, The Modern Theory, supra note 28, at 1 n. 1. Similar legislation was
enacted in New York in 1879, in Ohio in 1883, and in West Virginia in 1891. Id.
117 See supra notes 65-114 and accompanying text.
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did no violence to strict notions of more formalistic decision making.
Unfortunately, as in Hammonds and other cases, judges
trained in the shadow of Langdell frequently overworked traditional
tools of logic, such as analogy, in answering questions spawned from
the birth of an industry unknown at common law. As described in
Part I, the Hammonds decision represents the antithesis of a
pragmatic approach by clinging to the wild-animal analogy to
construct a common-law pedigree. The text of that decision subverts
the pragmatic process by failing to weigh policy considerations, to
identify goals, or to consider factual differences undermining the logic
for the analogy.
Viewed in this manner, the approach in Hammonds can be
classified as myopic rather than pragmatic. However, one might also
accuse the Hammonds court of intentionally concealing the role of
policy. In fact, a leading oil and gas scholar criticized Hammonds, and
other early cases strictly adhering to the wild-animal analogy, as
being faulty for intentionally masking, rather than myopically
ignoring, the role of policy. In analyzing the analogies used by courts
to form differing theories of ownership in oil and gas, Professor
Summers concluded:
From fact analogies so different resulting in identical legal
conclusions, it becomes apparent that the real basis for these
decisions was something that did not appear in the language
of the opinions. These judges were aware of the economic
value of oil and gas after production. They disregarded such
physical facts of oil and gas, if any, as may have been
presented in the course of the proceedings .... In other
words, the decisions were clearly based upon a false
assumption of facts which pointed to the enforcement of a
policy of production and a disregard of the policy of
conservation."'
Whether these cases are characterized either as innocently
ignoring policy or as purposefully hiding the role of policy, Professor
Summers concluded correctly that they stifle development of a
coherent jurisprudence for oil and gas law: "Out of these few decisions
...there developed a rule of property law, an illegitimate progeny of
the policy of production, conceived in ignorance, and christened in
118Summers,

The Modern Theory, supra note 28, at 7-8.

J. ENERGY, NAT. RESOURCES, & ENVTL. L.

34

[Vol. 16

later years as the law of capture, which has lived in the minds of
many judges and lawyers to form an obstructive force in the
enactment as well as in the enforcement of conservation
legislation."1 19
A weak defense of those cases would include assertions of
ignorance about oil and gas properties and policies, a lack of
knowledge unavoidable in that early era. 120 Yet, that defense becomes
even weaker when, despite the passage of time and the evolution of
knowledge and technology, modern courts frequently revert to these
counterproductive approaches to decision making. Illustrating this
unfortunate regression is the recent treatment by courts of two classic
common-law rules, the doctrine of trespass and the Rule Against
Perpetuities.
A. The Trespass Example-Geo

Viking v. Tex-Lee Operating Co.
Thirty years after the Manziel decision, Texas courts recoiled
from revisiting the trespass/policy dichotomy in a pragmatic fashion
and rendered opinions that have created uncertainty about property

119

Summers, The Modern Theory, supra note 28, at 8. Several scholars, in addition to

Professor Summers, point to the rule of capture and the ownership-in-place doctrine as
hindering oil and gas jurisprudence, and consequently, the efficient production of natural
resources. See Polston, Doctrine in Disarray, supra note 61 (asserting that application of
ownership in place theory to minerals prevented development of sound body of law); Cohen,
Property Theories, supra note 62, at 337 (criticizing incorporeal interest in oil and gas for
preventing rapid and orderly development of resources ). But see KUNTZ, supra note 24, § 4.1,
at 113 (praising adoption of rule of capture in oil and gas law, regardless of its questionable
genesis). Professor Kuntz recognizes that originally the adoption of the rule of capture was due
to lack of scientific knowledge, "but the subsequent advance in scientific knowledge does not
necessarily lead to a different rule." Id. See also SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 45, at 5-7
(illustrating that the rule of capture worked well when treated as policy rather than a rule of
property).
20
See Sullivan, Oil and Gas Law in Montana, supra note 74, at 16. Professor Sullivan views
oil and gas jurisprudence as three distinct periods distinguished by relative knowledge:
[11n the evolution of a separate jurisprudence on oil and gas, the cases may
be distinguished on the basis of a early recognizable time sequence-before
1900, the era of definition and comparative ignorance of how oil occurs and
reacts when a well penetrates the reservoir; between 1900 and 1932-the era
of scientific awareness of the nature of petroleum and petroleum reservoirs
and the emergence of the conventional "unless" lease; from 1932 to the
present-the era of conservation.
Id. The ignorance defense loses cogency since most cases were decided when information and
scholarship were widely available.
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rights. In Geo Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co.,121 the trespass
issue stemmed from a hydraulic fracturing, or "sandfracing,"
procedure. Tex-Lee sued Geo Viking for damages under the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act claiming Geo Viking failed properly to
"frac" an oil well.'2 2 Fracing is designed to increase permeability and
production by breaking up tight oil and gas bearing formations.'2 3
Generally, a mixture of liquid and sand is injected into the formation,
creating cracks which are then propped open by the sand. These
cracks can extend for thousands of feet subsurface, raising the
trespass issue. 124 Geo Viking countered Tex-Lee's claim by arguing
that if the fracing job had been performed as planned, it would have
extended beyond the boundaries of the unit.125 Therefore, GeoViking
requested a limiting instruction to the jury not to consider minerals
obtained by trespass in computing damages. The trial court refused
1 26
the request.
In resolving the propriety of refusing the jury instruction on
damages, a pragmatic approach would have required identifying the
policies and principles embraced in precedent and legislation, and
assessing their role in determining whether sandfracing constitutes
a trespass. Unlike the water-flooding project in Manziel, sandfracing
lacks express legislative blessing. 12 Pertinent Texas statutes do not
121817

S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), rev'd per curiam, No. 1992 WL 80263 (Tex. Apr. 22,

1992), withdrawn and writ of error denied as improvidently granted, 839 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.
1992).
122Id. at 359.
123Id. The fracing was performed on a well in the Austin Chalk Formation in Lee County,
Texas, "an extremely tight formation containing intermittent fractures which must be tapped
in order to obtain oil." Id. See infra note 128 (discussing advantages of sandfracing).
'12 Geo Viking, 817 S.W.2d at 359. The rapid development and improvement of recovery
technologies such as fracturing presents a variety of potential legal problems. The current
practice of using a larger casing to perforate and stimulate reservoirs has led to greater fracture
lengths and proppant concentrations. See Gary Cartwright, Tight Oklahoma Gas Sands Remain
an Attractive Play, OIL & GAS J., April 24, 1995, at 55. The extension of these fractures beneath
neighboring tracts suggests that the fractures themselves could constitute a trespass. See Terry
D. Ragsdale, Hydraulic Fracturing:The Stealthy Subsurface Trespass, 28 TULSA L.J. 311, 338
(1993) [hereinafter Ragsdale, HydraulicFracturing](discussing whether a subsurface entry into
an offsetting property constitutes an actionable tort). See infra Part IV (discussing recent
technologies that raise new trespass concerns in oil and gas jurisprudence).
'2 Geo Viking, 817 S.W.2d at 359.
126Id. at 363-64.
127Weaver, Politics of Oil and Gas, supra note 98, at 524. Professor Weaver indicates that
the legislature's refusal to categorize fracing as a secondary-recovery operation prevents the
Railroad Commission from authorizing fracing procedures since "it is doubtful that it fits into
the category of cooperative agreements that the Railroad Commission can approve under §
101.011 of the voluntary unitization act." Id.
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classify sandfracing as a secondary-recovery project and thus, the
Railroad Commission had no authority to authorize the procedure.
Nevertheless, like secondary-recovery projects, there is no doubt that
fracing operations lead to more efficient production.' 28 Yet, with both
secondary recovery and fracing, the procedure involves a physical
intrusion of substances, including water and sand, onto a neighboring
tract. 129
Because the injected substances originate from procedures
conducted on the potential defendant's land, Professors Williams and
Meyers have proposed a "negative rule of capture," which would
preclude liability for trespass damages:
Just as under the rule of capture a landowner may capture
such oil or gas as will migrate from adjoining premises to a
well bottomed on his land, so also may he inject into a
formation substances which may migrate through the
structure to the land of others, even if it thus results in the
displacement under such
land of more valuable with less
0
valuable substances.

13

128Weaver, Politics of Oil and Gas, supra note 98, at 524. Hydraulic fracturing provides a

method of recovery in many situations where conventional recovery techniques fail. See
Chemical EOR: Enhanced Imbibition in Tight Reservoirs, ENHANCED ENERGY RECOVERY &
REFINING NEWS, July 1, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 VL 8309057. Fracturing is often
chosen over other methods of recovery, particularly for high-permeability reservoirs, due to
productivity increases and the reduction of sand production. See R.G. Dusterhoft, Fracturing
High-Permeability Reservoirs Increases Productivity, OIL & GAS J., June 20, 1994, at 40.
Dusterhoft explains that:
A key element is the reduction of near well bore drawdown during
production. Drawdown, the difference between reservoir and production
pressures, is the driving force for flow into the well bore. As drawdown
increases because of higher production rates or depletion, formation
instability may cause fines and sand to migrate into the well bore region. A
greater well bore cadius reduces both radial velocity and drawdown.
Fracturing beyond the well bore region effectively bypasses the damages
zone, increasing the effective radius of the well bore and enabling higher
flow rates with lower drawdown pressure.
Id. See also John E. Smith, High Sand-ConcentrationFracturingTreatments, WORLD OIL, Mar.,
1990, at 77 (recognizing that hydraulic fracturing is only technique in many areas that
substantially increases production).
129See Ragsdale, Hydraulic Fracturing,supra note 124, at 346-47 (explaining that "[wlith
the advent of deep-penetrating, hydraulic fracturing operations in the past decade primarily in
tight reservoirs, the potential for an operator to effect a subsurface entry into an adjacent lease
is amplified").
130 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 24, § 204.5, at 60.
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In Manziel, the court sent mixed messages about its stance on
trespass damages between private parties. On the one hand, the
opinion limited the issue, stating "We are not confronted with the tort
aspects of such practices."' 3 1 Given only this statement, Manziel could
be interpreted narrowly as simply prohibiting an injunction of a
commission-approved, secondary-recovery project, but not as
precluding liability for trespass.'3 2 Yet, because the opinion quotes the
Williams and Meyers' "negative rule of capture" with approval, it also
suggests that liability for trespass is precluded. The opinion further
concludes, "The technical rules of trespass have no place in the
consideration of the validity of the orders of the Commission.
Clearly Geo Viking presented Texas courts with the opportunity to
resolve these mixed messages. Unfortunately, the appellate court's
opinion short-circuits the trespass issue and the Texas Supreme
Court ultimately avoids it.
In upholding the trial court's refusal to give the limiting
instruction to the jury not to consider minerals obtained by trespass,
the appellate court allocated only one paragraph to the trespass issue
and decided it was "without merit." 134 The opinion rests its ruling on
a curt recitation of the rule of capture and its accompanying remedy
for an aggrieved landowner, self-help. 35 In a concurring opinion,
Judge Cornelius only briefly acknowledged the trespass issue: "If Geo
Viking is responsible for depriving Tex-Lee of production, it cannot
defend on the basis that Tex-Lee might have secured some of that
land. That is a
production by [having trespassed] on someone else's
" 1 36
landowner.
other
the
and
Tex-Lee
matter between
Only the dissenting opinion scrutinized the rule of capture as
applied to hydraulic fracturing. 137 In his dissent, Judge Grant noted

131Manziel, 361 S.W.2d at 566.
132

See SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 45, at 476 (considering alternative interpretations of

Manziel).
13 Manziel, 361 S.W.2d at 568-69.
134Geo Viking, 817 S.W.2d at 364.
13 Id. The self-help suggestion arises from early cases that admonished landowners
concerned about drainage to "go and do likewise." See Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co.,
65 A. 801, 802-03 (Pa. 1907) (recognizing ability of landowner whose tract was being drained
to protect himself by offset drilling).
136 Geo Viking, 817 S.W.2d at 364 (Cornelius, J., concurring). As indicated by Professor
Weaver, this concurrence may mean damages will be permitted for trespass. Weaver, Politics
of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence,supra note 98, at 523-24. Unfortunately, the Texas Supreme
Court allowed this ambiguous opinion to stand.
137 Geo Viking, 817 S.W.2d at 365 (Grant, J., dissenting).
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that the rule of capture applies only if the producing well does not
commit a trespass.1 3 Manziel is neither cited nor discussed. Instead,
the dissent relied on another Texas Supreme Court case, Gregg v.
Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp.,
which had, in dictum, determined that
fracing was similar to drilling a slant-well bottomed on a neighbor's
tract and would constitute a trespass. 4 ' Because in Geo Viking there
was evidence that the fracing process extended beyond the unit's
4
boundaries, Judge Grant concluded damages should be limited.1 '
In its initial opinion in Geo Viking, the Texas Supreme Court
agreed with the dissent.'4 2 Although not mentioning policy
implications or Manziel's mixed messages, the opinion briefly
embraced a rule that sandfracing beyond lease lines "constitutes a

138Id. at 365-66 (Grant, J., dissenting).

13'344 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. 1961).
140Geo Viking, 317 S.W. 2d at 365 (citing Gregg, 344 S.W.2d at 416). In addition to Gregg,
there were three other Texas opinions involving the same plaintiff, Delhi-Taylor, collectively
referred to as the Delhi-Taylor cases. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Holmes, 344 S.W.2d 420 (Tex.
1961); Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Gregg, 337 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), affd, 344 S.W.2d
411 (Tex. 1961); Holmes v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 337 S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), rev'd,
344 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1961). In Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., Delhi-Taylor owned a mineral
lease adjacent to Gregg's lease. Gregg drilled a gas well 80 feet to the south and 37.5 feet to the
east of Delhi-Taylor's lease and planned to perform a hydraulic fracture operation to increase
productivity. Gregg, 344 S.W.2d at 412. In Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp. v. Holmes, Holmes drilled a
well on his mineral lease, a tract only 30 feet wide, and like Gregg planned to perform a
hydraulic fracture operation on the well. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d at 420. Gregg and
Holmes arrived as companion cases before the Texas Supreme Court on the issue of whether
the Railroad Commission had primary jurisdiction to hear the case. The court concluded that
they had jurisdiction to hear cases concerning hydraulic fracture subsurface trespass and that
the allegations were sufficient to raise the issue. Gregg, 344 S.W.2d at 416. The court in
determining whether hydraulic fracturing constitutes a trespass held, "entry upon another's
land need not be in person, but may be made by causing or permitting a thing to cross the
boundary of the premises." Id. In dictum, the court compared subsurface trespass by hydraulic
fracturing to slant well drilling. Id.
Slant well drilling began in the 1930s as a result of technological advances, such as the
whipstocks, "which permitted the drillers to deviate a wellbore toward a neighboring property
line." See Ragsdale, HydraulicFracturing,supra note 124, at 319 (tracing history of directional
well subsurface trespass). The advent of directional drilling tools allowed operators to "engage
in sneaky, but intentional, subsurface trespasses." Id. The East Texas Field "slant hole" scandal
in the 1960s put an end to the abuses. Id. In response to the directional drilling controversies,
"many state conservation agencies began enforcing requirements that operators take and keep
inexpensive surveys indicating the angle of deviation at specified drilling depths." Id. Today,
many technological advances are raising similar allegations of subsurface trespass issues
previously resolved by these state agencies. Id.
141Geo Viking, 817 S.W.2d at 365 (Grant, J., dissenting). Justice Grant originally wrote the
majority opinion but changed his mind on motion for rehearing.
142 Geo Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co., No. D-1678, 1992 WL 80263, at *2 (Tex. Apr.
22, 1992).
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subsurface trespass."14 3 Six months later, the court withdrew that
opinion and denied the application for writ of error with the
noncommittal statement that "we should not be understood as
approving or disapproving the opinions of the court of appeals
analyzing the rule of capture or trespass as they apply to hydraulic
fracturing."14 4
The Geo Viking opinions represent the antithesis to a
pragmatic approach. The appellate court opinion, in a myopic mode
reminiscent of the Hammonds decision, invoked the rule of capture
without considering the policy conflicts of protecting the rights of
property owners and promoting hydraulic fracturing to ensure
efficient production, or the physical distinctions between hydraulic
fracturing, conducting secondary recovery, and drilling an initial well.
Or, as advanced by Professor Summers above, perhaps the opinion's
myopia is merely a ruse for advancing the policy of production. By
belatedly denying the application for writ of error, the Texas Supreme
Court deprived Texas jurisprudence of the guidance provided by its
first opinion. This side-step suggests that the court recognized that a
finding of trespass would discourage hydraulic fracturing and hinder
development. The court, rather than overtly address policy, masked
its role by simply allowing the lower court's ambiguous opinion to

stand. 145
By failing to adopt the tenets of a pragmatic approach, the Geo
Viking opinions illustrate its very value. A pragmatic approach would
require: (1) identifying the competing policies, including encouraging
efficient production and protecting the correlative rights of
landowners; (2) assessing the effects of available courses of actions in
light of policy and precedent, including the Manziel and the Delhi
cases; and (3) articulating standards or rules to clarify the relative
i43Id.

'" Geo Viking, 839 S.W.2d at 798.
145 See Weaver, Politics of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence, supra note 98, at 524. Professor

Weaver reveals the court's effort at masking the role of policy by comparing Geo Viking to
Manziel. In attempting to explain the Texas Supreme Court's change of mind Weaver suggests:
Return to the excerpt of the court's opinion in Manziel, substituting
"hydraulic fracturing" for "secondary recovery." To paraphrase the resulting
excerpt, it is obvious that fracturing operations could be encouraged and
that they will not occur if adjoining operators can stop them on the ground
of subsurface trespass. The proper measurement of damages at issue in the
Geo Viking case implicates much larger public policy matters affecting the
ultimate recovery of oil and gas in Texas.

40

J. ENERGY, NAT. RESOURCES, & ENVTL. L.

[Vol. 16

rights of owners and operators. Pursuant to this pragmatic process,
the courts could have encouraged fracturing techniques by relying on
Manziel's rejection of the "technical rules" of trespass in oil and gas
secondary recovery, and by expressly adopting the Williams and
Meyers' "negative rule of capture" precluding tort liability. On the
other hand, a pragmatic judge might have weighed the precedential
value of the Delhi cases recognizing trespass liability, and
distinguished Manziel because of the lack of legislative approval for
hydraulic fracturing. 146 Under this approach, the policy conflicts could
have been balanced by adjusting the remedies as in a nuisance cause
of action, by denying an injunction but requiring damages.'4 7
Following this trajectory would have placed Texas in line with the
treatment of the trespass issue in most other jurisdictions. 4 '
By failing to engage in the pragmatic process the courts
deprived Texas jurisprudence of "practical certainty" on the trespass
issue. Without this certainty, operators cannot ascertain whether, and
to what extent, trespass damages should figure into their cost/benefit
analysis before fracing a well. This uncertainty raises transaction
costs, decreases the incentive for exploration and development of oil
and gas, and ensures a multiplicity of subsequent lawsuits.
B. The Rule Against Perpetuities
Manziel's rejection of the "technical" common-law rules of
trespass would have gratified scholars in the Great Era who called for

146Weaver, Politics of Oil and GasJurisprudence,supra note 98, at 525.
As discussed earlier,

Professor Weaver believes this approach would force the legislature to amend the MIPA to
permit effective use of new technologies, including horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing.
Id.
147See Jameson,supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text; see generally SMITH & WEAVER,
supra note 45, § 11.71C] (noting that "prevailing right of judicial opinion is that tort liability
exists in private lawsuits for damages caused by a unit's operation").
148 See, e.g., Jameson v. Ethyl Corp., 609 S.W.2d 346 (Ark. 1980) (balancing
goals of
encouraging secondary recovery and protecting property rights by requiring compensation for
excess oil and gas removed from neighboring tract); Tidewater Oil Co. v. Jackson, 320 F.2d 157
(10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 942 (1969) (recognizing recovery of damages caused by
adjacent water flooding operations); Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 168 N.W.2d 510 (Neb. 1968)
(denying willful trespass to owner refusing to join unitization project); see also 2 SMITH &
WEAVER, supra note 45, at 481 n.136 (acknowledging that negative rule of capture has not
developed as projected by Williams and Meyer); Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Rights and
Obligations, With Respect to Adjoining Landowners, Arising Out of Secondary Recovery of Gas,
Oil and Other Fluid Minerals, 19 A.L.R. 4th 1182 (1994) (analyzing state and federal cases
which have determined rights and obligations arising from secondary recovery operations).
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a special jurisprudence for oil and gas, a jurisprudence that would
consider the needs of a new industry unknown at common law. Many
Great Era commentators urged courts to liberate oil and gas law from
the dictates of another classic common-law rule, the Rule Against
Perpetuities (RAP). For example, Williams and Meyers asserted that
most oil and gas interests should be exempt from the rule "on the
straightforward basis that they serve social and commercial
convenience and do not offend the policy of the Rule Against
Perpetuities." 4 9
A straightforward consideration of policy is consonant with the
pragmatic process described herein. Pursuant to that process, a court
considering a perpetuities problem would: (1) identify the policies
behind the RAP and the role of those policies in oil and gas
jurisprudence; and (2) assess available options and their effects,
including either applying the RAP as a legislative mandate, or
exempting oil and gas interests on policy grounds.
The dilemma posed by the perpetuities problem is the same as
that posed by the trespass issue: whether policy and precedent permit
courts to exempt oil and gas jurisprudence from the strict commonlaw dictates, or whether they require courts strictly to apply these
rules and leave it to the legislature to resolve the dilemma.
Unfortunately, as in Geo Viking, courts in many oil and gas cases
faced with perpetuities problems shun both of these straightforward
approaches and opt for the myopic or the masking methods described
above.
1. The Policy Behind the Rule Against
Perpetuities:Title Stability and
Efficient Use of Resources
The Rule Against Perpetuities is a rule of property created by
courts concerned about fettering real property titles with interests
vesting remotely in the future. 5 ' Professors Bergin and Haskell

149 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 24, § 335, at 185. But see Bruce
M. Kramer, Property
and Oil and Gas Don't Mix: The Mangling of Common Law Property Concepts, 33 WASHBURN
L.J. 540, 559 (1994) [hereinafter Kramer, Mangling] (concluding that "[a] wholesale exemption
for these types of transactions from the application of the Rule is unwarranted").
'50Gray's classic statement of the rule is, "[nlo interest is good unless it must vest, if at all,
not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest." JOHN
C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191 (Roland Gray ed., 4th ed. 1942). The
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explain that the rule against perpetuities was aimed at family wealth:
"Land was wealth, the landowner frequently wished to assure himself
that his wealth would remain in the family for many generations; as
a consequence various ingenious and complex forms of land
settlement involving future interests were employed to accomplish
this end." The RAP originated as a means for controlling this "dead
hand" control. Because the RAP renders void interests that vest too
late, it increases marketability by removing contingencies on titles.
This clarity serves to ensure efficient use of resources by lowering
transaction costs.'5 1 Since the RAP was celebrating its bicentennial
before the first oil and gas well was drilled in Titusville,
Pennsylvania, in 1859,152 oil and gas interests were not the concern
of its common-law creators. However, posed as a theory about the
remote vesting of real property interests, the RAP has obvious
application to many oil and gas transactions, including leases,
executive rights, non-participating royalty interests, and term mineral

rule against perpetuities is more of a rule against remoteness of vesting, than a rule
invalidating interests which last too long. See Thomas F. Bergin & Paul G. Haskell, PREFACE
TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 183 (1966). Bergin explains that the
phrase "rule against perpetuities" does not describe what the rule actually accomplishes:
The rule does not attempt directly to limit the number of successive future
interests that can be created . .. duration of a trust . . . period of time
between the creation of a future interest and its realization as a present or
possessory interest ... [or] within which absolute title to property is
incapable of being transferred. What the rule does is to limit the period of
time between the creation of a contingent future interest and its vesting in
interest. If it is possible that a contingent future interest may vest in
interest after the time limitation established by the rule, then the interest
is void.
Id. at 185; see also W. Barton Leach, Perpetuitiesin a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638, 639 (1938)
(recognizing Rule as a rule invalidating interests which vest too remotely).
151See supra Part I (discussing theory of reducing transaction costs by clarifying land titles).
152 GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, supra note 150, § 22, at 18. The rule against
perpetuities originated as a means of solving the problems in dealing with "peculiarities of
English land law with its medieval overtones." See BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 150, at 184
(noting common law origin of the Rule which remains in effect in most states). The modern rule
originated in the 1682 Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682) in which
it was declared to be a rule against remote contingent future interests. See LEWIS M. SIMES,
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 122 at 255 (2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter SIMES, LAW OF FUTURE
INTERESTS] (tracing history of rule against perpetuities). In the Norfolk's case, the court did not
establish the maximum number of years within which contingent future interests must vest,
but it did hold "that they are valid if they must vest within a life in being." Id. In subsequent
English cases, the permissible period of twenty-one years was determined, "to have derived from
the period in which an estate tail could be made unbarrable." Id. at 258. The common law rule
dominated when John Chipman Gray published the first edition of his treatise clarifying the
rule of perpetuities in 1886. Id.
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and royalty interests. 1" 3 Similarly, the RAP's general aim to clear land
titles and increase marketability applies to the oil and gas industry.
When oil and gas titles are unclear, transaction costs rise and
incentives to develop resources or invest in new technology
decrease.' 5 4 Therefore, it is imperative for courts to create clear rules
for the interpretation of mineral and royalty deeds.' 5 5 As described
below, however, perpetuities analysis in the oil patch frequently
creates uncertainty in land titles.
Classic perpetuities analysis requires a two-step process. First,
it must be determined whether the rule applies. Second, if the rule
applies, it must be determined whether it has been violated. '56 Under
the common-law doctrine, the RAP applies to real property interests
not presently vested, including contingent remainders and executory
interests.'5 7 Although the RAP applies to those interests, it is not
violated if the interests will vest within the RAP's time period of8
5
twenty-one years after a life in being at the creation of the interest.'

153See

KUNTZ, supranote 24, § 17.2, at 518-22 (discussing application of Rule to oil and gas
leases); see also Kramer, Mangling, supra note 149, at 551-59 (explaining that creation of
defeasible term interests and transfer of stand alone interests have created the most difficult
Rule problems in oil and gas jurisprudence).
' See supra Part I (discussing reduction of transactions costs through clarity of titles).
115 Courts have generally recognized this duty. See, e.g., Moser v. United States Steel Corp.,
676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984) (insisting upon rules which ensure title stability); Atlman v. Blake,
712 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1986) (recognizing necessity for stability and certainty in construction of
mineral deeds); see also Bruce M. Kramer, Conveying MineralInterests - MasteringThe Problem
Areas, 26 TULSA L.J. 175, 175 (1990) (stating.that "one of the universal objectives of real
property conveyancing rules is that courts will attempt to reach results which ensure title
certainty"); Laura H. Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-GrantDoctrine in Texas Deed
Construction, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 73, 81 (1993) (recognizing that courts need to ensure title
stability "in order to facilitate the transfer of property rights ... ."); Eugene 0. Kuntz, The Law
Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 WYo. L.J. 107, 114 (1949) (noting that "[in matters of
land titles, and most certainly in the field of oil and gas where heavy expenditures of capital are
incident
to exploration, development, and production, certainty is of the utmost importance").
56
1 See BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 150, ch. 8.
...BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 150, at 209-10. These future interests arise when the
grantor conveys a fee leaving a reversion in the grantor or a future interest in a third party. Id.
at 115-18. The Rule also applies to other interests, including powers of appointment and option
contracts. Id. at 203-09, 211-12.
158 In applying this time period, the doctrine requires assuming anything can happen, rather
than considering what actually occurs. For example, the fertile octogenarian rule assumes that
an 80-year-old could have more children; therefore, the contingent remainder created in the
following grant is void:
Suppose testator bequeaths in trust to pay income to A for life, then to pay
the income to the children of A for their lives, and upon the death of the
survivor of such children, to pay the principal to the grandchildren of A. At
the time of the testator's death A is 72 years old, and has two children. ...
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Additionally, courts and legislatures have fashioned exceptions to the
RAP's application permiting courts to "wait and see" whether the
interest in fact vests too late, 159 or allowing a court to interpret a
document in a manner to avoid the RAP's application and honor the
16
parties' intent.
Although these case-by-case exceptions avoid the harshness of
the RAP in specific instances, they do not serve the goal of clearing
titles to ensure efficient use of resources. Under the "wait and see"
exception, titles are in limbo during the observation period.' 61 Giving

A could have an additional child who would not be a life in being at the
testator's death, and that child could have a child who would be born beyond
the permissible period.
See BERGIN & HASKELL, supranote 150, at 193 (interpreting certainty of vesting in rule against
perpetuities).

1"9 The Restatement (Second) of Property incorporated the "wait and see approach"
in 1981
when it applied the rule against perpetuities to donative transfers. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
PROPERTY § 1 (1981). The Restatement (Second) version of "wait and see" has neither been
directly adopted by any common law covets, nor legislatively enacted by any state. At least
twenty states have legislatively adopted both the "wait and see" and cy pres reformation
modifications, but many of these states have repealed their listed statutes and replaced them

with the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities. LEWIS M. SIMES & ALLEN F. SMITH,
FUTURE INTERESTS § 1411,254-56 (1956). The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities was
approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1986 and
incorporates the "wait and see approach," the cy pres reformation approach, and an alternative

ninety-year perpetuities period in modifying the common law Rule. UNIFORM STATUTORY RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1, 8B U.L.A. 321-33 (1993). The Uniform Rule has been enacted in
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oregon, South Carolina, and West Virginia. Id. at 321.
160This approach is the doctrine of cy pres, meaning as "nearly as possible." See W. Barton
Leach, Perpetuities: Cy Pres on the March, 17 VAND. L. REv. 1381 (1964) (discussing
development of cy pres doctrine and its growing acceptance). The concept of the cy pres doctrine
was originally found in the law of charitable trusts as a means of mitigating the destructiveness
of the rule against perpetuities. Id. See also SIMES, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, supra note 152,
§ 130, at 275. "States with cy pres reformation legislation but not "wait and see" legislation
include Idaho, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas." ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF
PROPERTY § 3.22, 144 n.3 (2d ed. 1993). "Courts in Hawaii, Mississippi, and New Hampshire
have applied the cy pres reformation approach to validate interest otherwise void under the
common law Rule without any statutory basis." Id. The states with "wait and see" but not cy
pres reformation legislation include Alaska, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and
Rhode Island. Id.
161 The uncertainty created by the "wait and see approach" has caused many
scholars to
criticize it. See Richard R. Powell, Commentary, Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1978). In his commentary on
the "wait and see approach," Professor Powell explains: 'luinder the 'wait-and-see approach,' the
whole limitation is before us as soon as the creating instrument speaks, but we would be
compelled to wait for the whole period of the rule before determining the location of ownership
of the affected asset." See also, SIMES, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, supra note 152, at 271
(criticizing doctrine for rendering a contingency neither valid nor void during period Rule
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courts latitude in interpretation provides no guarantees until after
litigation over specific documents has ended. Only the straightforward
exemption for most oil and gas interests, favored by Williams and
Meyers, would guarantee title certainty. Rather than adopt such a
straightforward approach, most majority opinions engage in more
surreptitious approaches, including cases that appear to ignore the
role of policy or blatantly mask its role by distorting common-law
property principles.'6 2 Other opinions consider policy at the periphery
of the applicable "web of beliefs," but ultimately retreat to more
comfortable, but less effective, case-by-case exceptions.' 6 3
One approach that avoids the RAP and protects interests
created in widely-used oil and gas transactions is to determine that
the interest is vested and therefore not subject to the Rule Against
Perpetuities. For example, courts are seen to have established early
on that an oil and gas lease vests an interest in the lessee
immediately, rather than postponing the vesting of the interest until
production.'6 4 Even if these early decisions mask the goal of
exempting oil and gas interests from the Rule, or whether they arrive
at that result through a genuine exegesis of property-law principles,
the effect is the same: The Rule Against Perpetuities is not applicable
to the lessee's interest in the oil and gas lease.
Unlike case-by-case exceptions, this blanket exemption served
the industry, and the interests of landowners seeking to profit from
oil and gas beneath their lands, by freeing one of its basic
transactions from challenges under the RAP. That result achieved the
goal of the pragmatic approach, serving the "real needs of real
people." But the pragmatic process would require directly
acknowledging the goal of exempting leases from the RAP's

applied); Lewis M. Simes, Is the Rule Against PerpetuitiesDoomed? The 'Wait and See" Doctrine,
52 MICH. L. REV. 179, 190-94 (1953) (noting that wait and see doctrine will have little
restrictive effect and "[plroperty will be tied up more frequently and for longer periods of time").
162 See infra notes 165-206.
163 See infra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
1 See, e.g., Rich v. Doneghey, 177 P. 86 (Okla. 1918) (holding that an oil and gas lease
conferring mining rights for a specified time grants lessee a present vested interest in land);
Central Ohio Nat. Gas & Fuel Co. v. Eckert, 71 N.E. 281 (Ohio 1904) (recognizing lease as a
vested interest); Brown v. Fowler, 63 N.E. 76 (Ohio 1902); Heller v. Dailey, 63 N.E. 490 (Ind.
1902) (noting that exclusive and assignable right to acquire minerals is a subsiding, exclusive
assignable and irrevocable right which vests before production); Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas
Oil & Gas Co., 254 S.W. 290 (1923) (recognizing oil and gas lease as a determinable fee that
vests interest immediately); see also KUNTZ, supranote 24, § 17.2, at 518 (discussing application
of the rule against perpetuities to oil and gas leases).
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application. As described below, however, few cases addressing the
RAP in the oil patch have adopted such a process.
2. The Rule Against Perpetuitiesand
Non-ParticipatingRoyalties-

Cosgrove v. Young
Similar to oil and gas leases, most courts have saved royalty
interests from a Rule Against Perpetuities challenge by determining
that a nonparticipating royalty interest is a vested real property
estate. 165 In 1982, however, the Kansas Supreme Court reached the
opposite conclusion. In Cosgrove v. Young, 16 the court dutifully
engaged in the two-step perpetuities analysis. 67 First, the court
determined that an instrument executed in 1918 created a contingent
interest. 168 The court held it was subject to the RAP, because the
instrument conveyed an interest in royalties from future leases.'69
Second, relying on an earlier Kansas Supreme Court case, 7 ° the

165See,

e.g., Dusquesne Natural Gas Co. v. Fefolt, 198 So. 2d 595 (Pa. 1964) (recognizing
royalty interest as real property that will pass to grantee upon conveyance of land); Hanson v.
Ware, 274 S.W.2d 359 (Ark. 1955) (holding conveyance of perpetual nonparticipating royalty
interest vests immediately preventing violation of Rule); Callahan v. Martin, 43 P.2d 788 (Cal.
1935) (determining that assignment of oil royalty is vested estate in land); Gulf Refining Co. v.
Stanford, 30 So. 2d 516 (Miss. 1947) (recognizing reserved royalty interest as real property
interest); Schlittler v. Smith, 101 S.W.2d 543 (1937) (asserting that grantor is entitled to
reserved royalties from subsequent mineral production lease). See generally KUNTZ, supra note
24, § 15.4 (tracing history of nonparticipating royalty interest); Bruce M. Kramer, Royalty Not
Cut From the Same Cloth?, 29 TULSA L.J. 449 (1994) (discussing diversity of opinion on royalty
interest); But see Dauphin Island Property v. Callon Inst., 519 So. 2d 948 (Ala. 1988) (refusing
to distinguish between nonparticipating royalty interests that are "interests in the minerals"
or "personal property rights in the mineral interest" since they are both vested interests).
Since an executive right is considered a vested property interest in Texas, it should also be
exempt from a rule against perpetuities challenge. See Day & Co., Inc. v. Texland Petroleum,
Inc., 786 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990) (reversing precedent to hold that executive right is real
property interest). But see Kevin J. Croy, Note, Executive Right in a Mineral Estate is a
Separate Interest in Real Property Subject to Property Law Principles: Day & Co. v. Texland
Petroleum, Inc., 786 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1990), 22 TEX. TECH L. REV. 281, 299-303 (1991)
(suggesting that since an executive right is recognized as an interest in real property it is
subject to rule against perpetuities). Not all jurisdictions have classified the executive right as
a real property interest. See Dallapi v. Campbell, 114 P.2d 646 (Cal. 1941) (classifying power
to lease as special power of appointment violating RAP since it is nonvested interest).
1'6 642 P.2d 75 (Kan. 1982).
167 Id.

at 82.

IG8Id.

at 83.

169Id.
i76

Id. (relying on Lathrop v. Eyestone, 227 P.2d 136 (Kan. 1951)).
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Cosgrove court concluded that, "[niaturally, if no future oil and gas
leases are made and executed, there would never be a vesting of title
to any royalty interest.' ' 171 Because the interest might not vest within
the RAP period, 172 the court concluded that the interest failed the
second step of the analysis and was void.'7 3
The court myopically applied the two-step analysis, citing only
common-law restatements of the RAP from general treatises and prior
cases.' 74 The court also failed to discuss the policies behind the RAP
and their relevance to oil and gas interests. 175 Only17 6 a dissenting
opinion pursued a more inclusive, pragmatic process.
Unlike the majority opinion, the dissent's opinion in Cosgrove
scans a wide web composed of policy and precedent. The dissent relies
on Williams and Meyers' observation that "[tio hold perpetual royalty
to be too remote is to confuse the value of the right with the right
itself."177 William and Meyers point out that if oil and gas leases
create vested rights, although those rights are dependent upon future
production, a royalty interest should be considered vested as well.' 7 8
The dissent, assessing the effects of available courses of action, also
includes Williams and Meyers' prediction that the Kansas view "will
impel persons to demand a fully participating fraction of the mineral
estate, with the result that large areas of mineral land in Kansas are
likely to be held by tenancy in common. . . . "" In accord with
Williams and Meyers' view, the dissenting judge doubts that the
policy behind the RAP is served by encouraging "the division of
minerals into small shares held in common."8 ° The dissent concludes
that the "conveyance of future royalties does not violate the spirit of
the rule" but promotes the development of minerals.' 8 '

171 Id.
172 The

court also seemed impressed that the interest did not in fact vest until thirty-one

years after the execution of the document, at which time the royalties became payable. Id. at
83. The grantee's successors, however, did begin receiving royalties. Id. at 83, 86.
173Id.
174Id.
175

at 82-3.

Id.

176 Id.

87-90 (Herd, J., dissenting).

177Id. at 89 (Herd, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 324.4).
178Id. (Herd, J., dissenting).

(Herd, J., dissenting).
s Cosgrove, 642 P.2d at 89 (citing 2 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 323).
1 Id. at 90 (Herd, J., dissenting). Justice Herd relied on an Arkansas case that also overtly
relied on policy in determining that non-participating royalty interests are vested interests not
subject to the rule. Id. (citing Hanson v. Ware, 274 S.W.2d 359 (Ark. 1955)).
179Id.
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Blindly following the letter and not the spirit of the Rule, the
majority opinion in Cosgrove jeopardizes the validity of countless
transactions by invalidating a commonly encountered oil and gas
interest, the nonparticipating royalty. Unlike the pragmatic
paradigm, this myopic approach ignores and ultimately frustrates the
RAP's purpose. As described below, in another counterproductive
approach to decision making, other cases mask the role of policy in
common-law garb. These cases involve other widely used oil and gas
transactions, including deeds reserving a term mineral interest and
top leases.
3. The Rule Against Perpetuitiesand Reservations
of Term Interests-Williams v. Watt
From a pragmatic perspective, the non-participating royalty
and the oil and gas lease share the advantage of being interests
virtually unknown at common law. Thus, courts are generally free to
promote contemporary policy by christening them "vested interests"
in the first step of the perpetuities analysis. However, the reservation
of a term mineral interest by a grantor who has conveyed the surface
estate to the grantee parallels the very type of interest targeted by
the common-law creators of the RAP, the springing executory
interest.182 Most courts do not adopt a straight forward approach
which would strictly apply common law rules and void, or globally
exempt, the interests on a policy basis. Rather, most courts lapse into
approaches which uphold the interest at the cost of creating

182Before the enactment of the Statute of Uses, a future interest in a grantee could
not be

made to take effect before the expiration of the preceding estate. See SIMES, LAW OF FUTURE
INTEREST, supra note 152, § 5, at 8. The Statute of Uses changed the law of future interests by
allowing the creation of legal future interests in transferees that had the capability to divest or
cut short vested estates in others. Id. These interests are divided into two categories: springing
and shifting executory interests. See BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 150, at 115. The shifting
executory interest is a future interest created in a transferee which will, if it "vests," divest or
cut short a vested estate in a transferee created simultaneously with it. Id. at 116. "The
springing executory interest is always a future estate created in a transferee which will, if it
"vests," divest a present estate in the person who created the executory interest or his
successor." Id. A springing executory interest is created in the grantee when a grantor conveys
a future interest in his surface estate but retains a minerals interest. The grantor's present
interest in the estate is subject to divestment, since the grantee's interest may commence while
the grantor's interest is still possessory. Id. Since the grantee's lease is a springing executory
interest that may vest 21 years after some life in being, it is void according to common-law
standards.
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uncertainty in land
titles. The most extreme of these opinions is
183
Watt.
v.
Williams
In Watt, a bank had conveyed ranch land to Williams in a
warranty deed that contained the following language: "[Elxcepting
and reserving an undivided one-half interest in all oil, gas, and
mineral rights . . . for a period of twenty years from the 10th day of
April, 1940, and as long thereafter as oil, gas, or other minerals
continue to be produced therefrom or said property is being so
developed or operated." 18' Because of a reservation in a subsequent
deed from Mr. Williams, as grantor, to Mr. Watt, as grantee, the issue
was whether the RAP had voided any interest Mr. Williams received
85
in the one-half interest reserved by the bank.
The majority opinion foreshadows the contorted course of its
analysis by initially recognizing the effects of properly labeling the
estates created in the Bank-to-Williams deed. 186 If the judges
determine the deed has created an executory interest in Williams,
they must also find the interest void under the RAP. However, if they
can label the interest a "vested remainder" instead of an executory
interest, they can avoid applying the RAP. '7 Having charted this
course, the majority opinion freely floats from one distortion of
property principles to another.
The opinion analogizes to the oil and gas lease and to grants
of term mineral interests to determine that the estate retained by the
bank was a fee-simple determinable.' 8 According to rules of property
law, grantors create this estate when they convey fee simple title
conditioned with the words "so long as."' 9 The majority was correct

183

668 P.2d 620 (Wyo. 1983). Professor Bruce Kramer has called Watts "the principle

mangler of property principles." Kramer, Mangling, supra note 149, at 552.
'84 Watt, 668 P.2d at 622.
"" Id. at 621-22. In conveying to Watt, the deed provided: "Excepting and reserving to...
[Williams], his heirs, successors and assigns, all of the oil, gas and mineral rights running with
said land and to which he is entitled under the present ownership of said lands, and which have
not been reserved to [the bank]." Id. at 621. The Watts made no claim to the half of the
minerals not reserved by the Land Bank. However, if Williams had an interest in the remaining
one-half, he would have reserved them under the language of the Williams/Watts deed. Id. at
623. Williams claimed the parties did not bargain for any of the minerals. Id.
186id.
187Id. at 624.
188Id.
i89

A defeasible fee is a kind of estate in fee simple, which though potentially infinite in

duration, may terminafe upon the happening of an event specified in the grant. BERGIN &
HASKELL, supra note 150, at 27. There are three defeasible fee estates: 1) the fee simple
determinable; 2) the fee simple subject to condition subsequent; and 3) the fee simple subject
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in recognizing that granting instruments containing these magic
words have been labeled as creating a fee simple determinable estate
in the grantee; 190 however, the deed in Watt involved a reservation,
not a grant. Had the majority opinion remained faithful to the
property treatises quoted, it would have discovered that a reservation
of this type creates a springing executory interest in the grantee,
Williams. Springing executory interests are subject to the Rule
Against Perpetuities.191
While the court was aware of RAP's application to a springing
executory interest, the majority opinion strained to avoid this result
by labeling Williams' interest a vested remainder rather than an
executory interest.'9 2 Accepted property principles provide that
remainders generally follow only life estates.19 3 In order to transform
the Bank's interest from a fee simple determinable into a life estate,
the majority opinion admits to a "little exercise of property law
imagination" and resorts to the tool of analogy: "When the minerals
'die' (the passage of 20 years or the cessation of production), the

to an executory limitation. Id. at 53. The fee simple determinable is a fee estate that is subject
to a special limitation. Id. The special limitation subjects a fee to possible termination on the
happening of a designated event. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 23, at 55 (1936). The
grantor retains a future interest, called the possibility of reverter, which is the right to the fee
simple estate should the special limitation occur and the grantee's fee terminate. Id. § 154, at
525. Such a future interest in the grantor is deemed to be a presently vested interest and does
not violate the rule against perpetuities. Id. § 372, at 2168. The possibility of reverter may be
created in a person other than the grantor, in which case the fee simple determinable would be
classified either as a fee simple subject to executory limitation or as a fee simple with an
executory limitation creating an interest which takes effect at the expiration of the prior
interest. Id. §§ 46, 47, at 147-66.
190 The words, "while," "during," "until," and "so long as" are typical words of special,
limitation and are usually held to manifest an intent to create a fee simple determinable.
CORNELIUS J. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 99 (1962) [hereinafter
MOYNIHAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY]; see also BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 150, at 55
(noting that use of certain words by transferrers give presumed meaning); Luckel v. White, 819
S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991) (recognizing words of limitation that introduce fee simple
determinables).
191An executory interest, by definition, does not vest so long as it remains a future interest.
SIMES, LAW OF FUTURE INTEREST, supra note 152, § 221, at 249. Consequently, all executory
interests are subject to invalidation by the rule against perpetuities. See GRAY, RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES, supra note 150, § 317 at 351 (stating that shifting and springing uses and
executory devices are subject to Rule); see also BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 150, at 209
(discussing interests subject to rule against perpetuities).
192Watts, 668 P.2d at 630.
193 Life estates are generally followed by remainders since remainders cannot follow fees.
SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS, supra note 159, § 103, at 81. The justification for this rule
is that once the owner of an estate in fee simple conveys his estate in fee simple, there is
nothing left to constitute a remainder. See BERGIN & HASKELL, supra note 150, at 72.
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present estate in the Land Bank expires and passes automatically to
Williams."' 94 Therefore, the court concludes that Williams had a
vested remainder free from the RAP's application.'9 5
Whereas Hammonds uses the tool of analogy to forge a
formalistic pedigree, Watt goes further and contorts applicable
property law concepts. Unlike Hammonds, the Watt opinion briefly
acknowledges other options. The Watt court cited other jurisdictions
which avoid the perpetuities challenge to interests created by the
reservation of a term interest through a "grant and re-grant
fiction." 196 That fiction relies on a common-law distinction between
"exceptions" and "reservations" and views one deed as making two
grants. The basis for the two-grant fiction has been largely repudiated
today.'9 7 However, using the fiction conveniently converts the
springing executory interest into a "possibility of reverter."9l 8 The
possibility of reverter is an interest retained by a grantor who conveys
a fee simple determinable. Largely through historical accident, the
possibility of reverter, unlike the executory interest, is not subject to

194Watt, 668 P.2d at 632. Again, had the court remained true to its property
lessons it would
have seen the weakness in this analogy. At common law life estates could only be based upon
human lives. See SIMES, LAW OF FUTURE INTEREST, supra note 152, § 5, at 8 (explaining that
very early in the medieval law life estates were considered "of infinite, or potentially infinite
duration land] on the death of the owner passed to his heirs"). The life-estate analogy obviously
contradicts the court's earlier classification of the bank's interest as a fee simple determinable.
195Watts, 668 P.2d at 633.
196 Watts, 668 P.2d at 630.
197 See, e.g., Calli v. DeMattei, 460 N.E.2d 121 (Ill. 1984) (ignoring technical common law
distinctions and holding that intent was to reserve interest to grantors where term "excepting"
was used); Earle v. International Paper Co., 429 So. 2d 989 (Ala. 1983) (using strained
application of common-law rules to hold that grantor owned fee simple determinable and
grantee reversion ); Bagby v. Bredthauer, 627 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. App.-Austin 1981) (writ not
filed) (reluctantly treating reservation as creating new interest in grantor and leaving possibility
of reverter in grantee); see also HEMMINGWAY, supra note 61, § 1.3, 30-31 (recognizing that
"[t]he attitude of present day courts is to give effect to intent the intent of the parties wherever
expressed in the instrument ... without regard to older rules of construction . . . ").
19
See Earle v. International Paper Co., 429 So. 2d 989 (Ala. 1983) (invoking regrant fiction
to uphold grantee's interest in deed in which grantor reserved term mineral interest). The grant
and regrant fiction is based on the common-law definition of a reservation as equivalent to a
grantee receiving the interest and then regranting it to the grantor. Id. The fiction assumes the
grantor conveyed the whole estate to the grantee and then the grantee reconveyed a term
mineral interest to the grantor. These two grants would result in the grantee owning a
possibility of reverter, an interest not subject to the Rule. Id. at 994-95; Bagby, 627 S.W.2d at
195-96; see generally HEMINGWAY, supra note 61, § 1.3.
In Earle, the Alabama Supreme Court admitted the artificial nature of the regrant fiction
but applies it to the deed at issue to avoid frustrating "the policies behind the rule." Earle, 429
So. 2d at 995.
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the RAP. 199
The Watt opinion also notes that other jurisdictions view these
interests as commercial in nature and, therefore, not covered by the
policy of the RAP. 2°° Rather than adopt this straightforward approach,
the court feigned allegiance to state statutes adopting the RAP. A
court feeling genuinely constrained by legislative mandates, however,
should have determined that reserved term interests create springing
executory interests in the grantees which violate the RAP, and left it
to the legislature to create an exception.
A concurring opinion by Justice Thomas acknowledged the regrant fiction but considered it to be as "awkward" as the majority's
"vested remainder" analysis. 20 1 Instead, the concurring opinion
assumed a pragmatic posture and advocated a straightforward
approach endorsed by commentators.2 °2 The concurrence began by
weighing the effect of applying common-law property principles
against the need to respect the policy behind the Rule.20 3 Justice
Thomas concluded that the deed created an executory interest in the
grantee, which would be void under the RAP.2 4 After considering a
case-by-case exception,20 5 the concurring justice also deemed it
"appropriate to judicially recognize the exception to the Rule Against
Perpetuities advocated in Williams and Meyers... particularly when
the recognition of the exception serves the ultimate purpose of the

199

Possibilities of reverter are not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. MOYNIHAN, LAW

OF REAL PROPERTY, supra note 190, at 95; John Chipman Gray, Perpetuitiesin a Nutshell, 51
HARV. L. REV. 638, 647 (1938).
20 Watts, 668 P.2d at 630. One case noted the Rule developed to prevent dead hand control
of family property, which explains the use of 21 years, the age of majority. See Earle, 429 So.
2d at 995 (attempting to reconcile common-law analysis with polices behind rule against
perpetuities); see also GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, supranote 150, § 18 (explaining origin
of Rule was to alleviate transfer of interests to future generations allowed by fee tail);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, DONATIVE TRANSFERS 12 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1979)
(observing that rule against perpetuities developed in context of family wealth transactions).
20 Watts, 668 P.2d at 636 (Thomas, J., concurring).
202 Id.
at 638 (Thomas, J., concurring).
203 Id.
at 635.
.04Id. at 639 (Thomas, J., concurring).
205Id. at 636 (Thomas, J., concurring). The concurring opinion relied on an exception from
the Restatement of Property that requires separately testing the validity of alternative interests
in a wait and see approach. Id. Because there was no mineral production in the set twenty year
term, this exception would validate the whole interest. Id.
The concurring opinion also considered adopting the view of scholars that many executory
interests should be considered vested and exempt from the rule. Id. at 635 (citing SIMES &
SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1236 (1956)).
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rule promoting the free alienability of property ....
4. The Problems with Piecemeal
Exceptions to the Rule
Against Perpetuities
Under a general exception to the RAP for oil and gas interests,
developers and landowners can be confident that interests created in
leases and deeds are valid, without resorting to litigation or awaiting
the passage of time. This result promotes the goal behind the RAP of
increasing marketability of resources by clearing titles, as well as the
goal of the pragmatic approach, injecting "practical certainty" into oil
and gas jurisprudence. Both goals are frustrated by case-by-case
exceptions such as the re-grant fiction or the "wait and see" approach,
which create unpredictability as to the RAP's application to specific
documents. For example, in a 1986 North Dakota opinion, Nantt v.
Puckett Energy Co. ,207 the state supreme court held a top lease2 .° valid
against a perpetuities challenge but did not clarify whether it was
adopting a blanket commercial exemption or applying a fact-specific
"wait and see" exception.2" 9 As described by Professor Owen Anderson,
this decision "causes needless confusion for title examiners who
encounter instruments which raise perpetuities questions."2 10
Id. at 638.
382 N.W.2d 655 (N.D. 1986).
208 A top lease is a "lease granted by a landowner during the existence of a recorded mineral
206
207

lease which is to become effective if and when the existing lease expires or is terminated." 8
WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 13, at 1147-48. A top lease, may be subject to the RAP if its
wording suggests that the possibility of reverter created in the lessor from the bottom lease does
not vest immediately in the top lessee. See Peveto v. Starkey, 645 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1982)
(holding deed void as violating the RAP since interest could not vest until termination of prior
estate); see also J. Suzanne Hill, Top Leases and the Rule Against Perpetuities,10 PEPP. L. REV.
773 (1983) (discussing application of Rule to top leasing). But see Venture Oil Co. v. Fretts, 25
A. 732
(Pa. 1893) (holding oil and gas lessee did not receive vested interest until production).
0
2 9 Nantt, 382 N.W.2d at 661. The opinion relied upon both a general commercial exception
and a wait and see approach. Id. In Texas, the Supreme Court held invalid a top lease with
wording that did not purport to convey a present interest to the top lessee. Peveto v. Starkey,
624 S.W.2d 310 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1981), rev'd, 645 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1982).
California is another jurisdiction which has created confusion with inconsistent approaches
to the perpetuities problem. See Watt, 668 P.2d at 636 (Thomas, J. concurring) (discussing the
following California cases: Victory Oil Co. v. Hancock Oil Co., 270 P.2d 604 (Cal. 1954); Brown
v. Terra Bella Irrigation District, 330 P.2d 775 (1958); and Rousselot v. Spanier, 60 Cal. App.
3d 238, 131 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1976)). See also WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 24, § 335.
210 Owen L. Anderson & Charles T. Edin, The Growing Uncertainty ofReal Estate Titles, 65
N.D. L. REV. 1, 88 n.518 (1989). In light of North Dakota's statutory treatment of the RAP,
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Depending on a state's statutory scheme, courts may consider the
piecemeal approach the only alternative to voiding the oil and gas
interest for violating the RAP.2 1' But most statutes re-enact the RAP
as it was formulated by common-law judges. Therefore, a pragmatic
jurist would consider the judicial justification for the RAP, which is
increasing marketability by removing contingencies on land titles.2 12
Weaving that policy consideration into their "web of beliefs" is what
led the concurring justice in Watt and the dissenting justice in
Cosgrove to urge straightforward rules exempting oil and gas
interests from the RAP. Had the majority opinions in Watt and
Cosgrove adopted the pragmatic approach used by those justices, the
courts could have satisfied the policy behind the rule. This would
have contributed to achieving the ultimate goal for the next era of oil
and gas jurisprudence, clarifying property rights to ensure efficient
use of resources.
III. THE ROLE OF A PRAGMATIC APPROACH
IN THE NEXT ERA OF OIL AND GAS
JURISPRUDENCE: SHIFTING POLICIES
AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES
Whether court opinions such as Hammonds, Watt, and Geo
Viking are classified as cases in which judges myopically ignore
policy, or as cases in which judges surreptitiously mask the role of
policy in formalistic garb, the approaches used in these cases create
confusion and unpredictability about the relative rights of landowners
and mineral developers. The ensuing uncertainty leads to costly
litigation and creates disincentives for investment in the development
of resources and in the creation of alternative markets. To avoid the
counterproductive effects of these approaches, judges should boldly

Professor Anderson concludes that the courts should have adopted the alternative
straightforward approach outlined in the text of this article: strictly applying the RAP and
leaving reform to the legislature. Id.
211See Kramer, Mangling, supra note 149, at 558. In discussing the Nantt case, Professor
Kramer concludes that, "North Dakota has a statutory Rule, which should have restricted the
court's ability to find exceptions to the Rule's coverage." Id.
212 For an example of an opinion in which a judge focuses solely on this policy in deciding
that the RAP should not apply to nonparticipating royalty interests, see Dauphin Island
Property, 519 So. 2d at 952 (Houston J., concurring) (questioning, "What is the reason for the
rule against perpetuities? It is to make certain that the property is not removed from the stream
of commerce for an unreasonable period of time.").
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apply the pragmatic approach described herein. Because this
approach advocates an overt consideration of policy as well as
precedent, it permits more effective consideration of concerns
prominent in the current and future eras, including protection of the
environment and promotion of surface uses.
As described in this section (Part III), courts adhering to the
pragmatic process recognize that classic concepts from the Great Era
have shifted to a position on the periphery of the current web of
beliefs informing the decision-making process. One such concept is the
dominance of the mineral estate in defining the scope of its
appurtenant surface easement. This judicial recognition of shifting
priorities should produce opinions that inject practical certainty into
oil and gas jurisprudence by narrowing the gap between rights
asserted by mineral owners and surface owners, thereby, clarifying
the discourse of debates for legislators and private parties. Examples
in two major producing states, Texas and Colorado, illustrate the
value of the pragmatic approach in an era of shifting policies.
The final section of Part III urges courts to aim towards
achieving practical certainty by adopting a pragmatic approach for
issues posed by new technologies, particularly three-dimensional
geophysical exploration. Rather than rely on courts incrementally to
clarify the issues raised by the surface-use debate and new
technologies, Part III also advocates statutes defining the rights and
liabilities of landowners and mineral developers.
A. Shifting Policies:The Surface-Use Debate
In 1955, a commentator identified three eras in the evolution
of oil and gas jurisprudence, calling pre-1900, "the era of definition
and comparative ignorance"; 1900-1932, "the era of scientific
awareness of the nature of petroleum and petroleum reservoirs"; and
from 1932 to 1955, "the era of conservation."2 13 In light of
environmental awareness emergent in the 60s and 70s,214 the current

213
214

Sullivan, Oil and Gas Law in Montana, supra note 74, at 16.
In response to this awareness, considerable amounts of federal and state environmental

legislation arose. Legislation, such as the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, created
methods for incorporating environmental concerns into the Federal legislative process. See
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1988 & Supp. 1994). Specific
legislation was established to regulate the environment's exposure to pollutants. The Clean Air
Act (CAA) originally enacted in 1970, was designed to protect and enhance the quality of the
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era of oil and gas jurisprudence has been labeled "the environmental
era."2 1 The concerns of this era have induced policy shifts which
emphasize promoting surface uses particularly for agricultural use,
and protecting the environment rather than engaging in full-scale
mineral development.2 1
The policy shifts in the environmental era, in which we
currently operate, have created a philosophical clash between owners
of the surface and the mineral estates.'
This clash will continue to
polarize legislatures and challenge courts. The primary point of

nation's air resources by establishing specific emissions limitations and standards for polluting
sources. Clean Air Act §§ 101-618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. 1994). In 1972, the
Clean Water Act (CWA) established a comprehensive program designed to 'restore and maintain
the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the nation's waters." Clean Water Act, §§
101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. 1994). Legislation was also enacted to meet
many of the growing environmental problems associated with contamination and hazardous
waste. In 1976, Congress passed the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), a
comprehensive regulatory statute that creates a "cradle to grave" system of controlling the
entire hazardous waste lifecycle. RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 1994). The
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) was
enacted to provide the federal government and states with the authority to cleanup abandoned
sites containing hazardous substances. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
Unlike RCRA, CERCLA's primary purpose was the cleanup of leaking and past hazardous waste
disposal sites.
21 See James M. Colosky, The Implied Covenant for Diligent and Prudent Operations in An
Environmental Era, 39 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 15, at 15-2-15-3 [hereinafter Colosky,
Implied Covenant] (recognizing that "ti[n this era of environmental awareness and activism, the
oil and gas industry rides the crest of a wave of overhaul and refitting within the order of oil
and gas law.").
216 Oil and gas exploration and production has been spared some of the effects of
environmental legislation through the petroleum exclusion. CERCLA excluded petroleum,
including crude oil, from the definition of'hazardous substance." CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
Although petroleum is expressly excluded from the list of hazardous wastes, there still remains
some concern since there are some substances used in oil and gas operations that are not
exempted. Id. Proposed amendments to CERCLA could have profound effects on the oil and gas
industry. A recent bill would have amended CERCLA § 107's liability provisions to include
certain releases or threatened releases of pollutants or contaminants, significantly altering the
Superfund's effect on the industry. Estela S. Wackerbarth, Environmental Law in the Oil PatchMore Patch, Less Oil, 40 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. §§ 14.01, 14.02121 (1994) [hereinafter
Wackerbarth, Environmental Law in the Oil Patch] (discussing legislation that would
specifically effect oil and gas industry).
217The effects of the policy shifts induced by the environmental era are evident in programs
sponsored for practitioners. See, e.g., Samuel D. Hass & A. Kay Roska, Environmental
Indemnities and Other EnvironmentalProvisionsin the Purchaseand Sale of MineralProperties,
38 RoCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 22 (1992) (addressing environmental liabilities and their impact
on transactions involving oil and gas properties); R. Kinnan Golemon & Danny G. Worrel,
ProducingPropertyConveyances and EnvironmentalLiabilities:A Minefieldfor the Unwary, 43d
OIL AND GAS INST. 3-1 (Matthew Bender 1992); Wackerbarth, Environmental Law in the Oil
Patch,supra note 190, at § 14 (surveying current environmental legislation and its effect on oil
and gas industry).
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contention is, who should bear the costs of damage incidental to
mineral production? Mineral owners contend that "severed" surface
owners, those who bought their land with no mineral rights, have
taken their lands subject to the mineral owners' implied right to use
the surface and cannot force mineral owners to pay for a right already
owned.2 18 Surface owners claim that in an environmental era, mineral
developers should internalize the cost of production. 9 For "severed"
surface owners, reaching their objective has required conquering one
icon from earlier eras, the dominance of the mineral estate and the
broad scope of the implied easement granted the mineral estate for
surface use.
One of the first cases to express the concept of mineral-estate
dominance hailed from Pennsylvania, birthplace of the oil and gas
industry. In 1893, in ChartiersBlock Coal Co. v. Mellon,2 2 ° the court
recognized the public's interest in ensuring access to valuable
minerals. Denying access, according to the court, would have deprived
the public "of the hidden treasures which the great laboratory of

218 See, e.g., Getty Oil Company v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618, 623-27 (McGee, J.,
dissenting)

(concluding that surface owners who purchase property with full knowledge of an oil and gas
lease take a servient estate subject to dominant right of lessee to use "as much of the premises
as is reasonably necessary to comply with the terms of the lease and to effectuate its purpose");
John F. Welborn, New Rights of Surface Owners: Changes in the DominantIServient
Relationship Between the Mineral and Surface Estates, 40 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. §§ 22,
22.06, 22-39 (1994) [hereinafter Welborn, New Rights of Surface Owners] (noting that mineral
owners believe they possess ownership of property rights once land is purchased and as such
refuse to pay twice by having to reimburse surface owners for loses in market value). Mr.
Welborn, who as a member of Colorado's Conservation Commission has witnessed the surfaceuse debate first hand, explains that surface owners are imputed with knowledge:
Most mineral owners would say that they do not owe the surface owner for
diminution in value of the land since the surface estate is servient and is (or
should be) already devalued to reflect the fact that it is a severed surface
estate. In other words, to require payment for diminution in value is to
require payment for something the mineral owner already owns. If the value
of the surface is not already diminished as a result of the mineral severance,
then it has been artificially inflated, and the mineral owner should not bear
this burden.
Id. at
22-18.
219
See John S. Lowe, The Easement of the Mineral Estate for Surface Use: An Analysis of Its
Rational, Status and Prospects, 39 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. §§ 4-1, 4-35 (1993) [hereinafter
Lowe, Easement ofthe Mineral Estate] (contending that costs should be internalized since "those
who create or use products also ought to bear the costs that are associated with their creation
or with their use."). See infra notes 323-49 and accompanying text (discussing Colorado's
surface-use debate between surface and mineral owners).
220 25 A. 597, 599 (Pa. 1893). The dispute in Mellon was between a surface owner who
maintained title to the oil and gas and the owner of the coal beneath the surface. Id. at 597.

J. ENERGY, NAT. RESOURCES, & ENVTL. L.

58

[Vol. 16

nature has provided for man's use in the bowels of the earth."2 2 ' To
ensure access to these treasures, courts recognized that the mineral
estate should be considered the dominant estate, with an appurtenant
easement implied to use the surface estate.22 2
Although considering the right of access to oil, gas, and other
minerals absolute, courts in the earlier eras restricted the scope of the
easement by requiring "reasonable use," which prohibited both using
more land than reasonably necessary and using a reasonable amount
of land in a negligent manner. 22 3 Courts, however, maintained
mineral-estate dominance by interpreting "reasonableness" strictly
from the mineral owner's point of view.22 4 Therefore, as long as the
lessee's use was reasonable according to industry practices, the effect
on the surface estate was irrelevant.2 25 For example, the broad scope
of the easement sanctioned the destruction of crops,2 26 the killing of
cattle, 227 the depletion of water supplies, 228 and the interference with
221 Id.
22 2

Id. See, e.g., Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S.W. 513, 514-15 (Tex. 1992) (stating that 'The

substantial value of property lies in its use. If the right be denied, the value of the property is
annihilated and ownership is rendered a barren right."); Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348, 352
(Tex. 1971) (quoting favorably from an article that states, "The manner of enjoyment of the
mineral estate is through the extraction of valuable substances."); Buck Creek R.R. Co. v. Haws,
69 S.W.2d 333, 334 (Ky. 1934) (holding that implied right of access was an easement
appurtenant to mineral estate); Muscogee Mfg. Co. v. Eagle & Phenix Mills, 54 S.E. 1028, 1034
(Ga. 1906) (recognizing that "whoever grants a thing is deemed also to grant that without which
the grant itself will be of no effect."). See also 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 10.28 (1958)
(recognizing that where mineral interest has been severed from surface estate it is subject to
implied easement appurtenant belonging to mineral owner). The easement retained by the
mineral owner entitles him to make such use of the surface as is reasonably necessary for the
exploration, production, and marketing of the minerals. This implied easement is appurtenant
only to the adjoining surface estate and using the surface to benefit a non-appurtenant mineral
estate results in an overburden. Id.
22 Lowe, Easement of Mineral Estate, supra note 219, § 4.03, at 4-8.
14 See Bruce Kramer, Conflicts Between the Exploitation of Lignite and Oil and Gas: The
Case for Reciprocal Accommodation, 21 HOUS. L. REv. 49, 61 (1984). Many opinions evaluated
reasonableness as sanctioning activities that would protect the "mineral owner's or lessee's
ability to exploit his resources and receive the benefit of his bargain." Id. Professor Kramer
refers to this reasonable-use analysis as "unidimensional," which focuses not on injuries suffered
by the surface owner but on the mineral owner's activities. Id.
225

Id.

226 See,

e.g., Robinson Drilling Co. v. Moses, 256 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Tex. Ct. App. 1953)

(refusing to allow tenant of surface land recover damage to crops); Adkins v. United Fuel Gas
Co., 61 S.E.2d 633 (W. VA. 1950) (denying surface owner recovery for destruction of crops);
Rohner v. Austral Oil Exploration Co. Inc., 104 So. 2d 253 (La. Ct. App. 1958) (preventing
surface owner from recovering damages sustained to crops despite agreement to pay for any
crop damages).
7
22 See, e.g., Satanta Oil Co. v. Henderson, 855 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to
apply due-regard concept to injury-to-livestock situation); Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v.
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roads and residences.2 29
In the environmental era, the scope of the mineral estate's
231
23 °
surface easement has been eroded by federal and state legislation
and, in some jurisdictions, by court decisions. For example, the
federal Stock-Raising Homestead Act recently has been amended to
provide protection to private surface owners by placing conditions on
the right of access and by increasing liability for damages.2 3 2 Since
1979, nine states have passed Surface Damage Acts.2 33 The goal of
these acts is to protect the "economic well-being" of surface estates,
particularly for agricultural uses.23 4 Although most of these acts
retain the traditional right of access for the mineral-estate owner,23 5

Rhodes, 240 P.2d 95 (Okla. 1951) (denying recovery for injuries resulting to cattle from ingestion
of pollutants contained in slush pit); Pure Oil Co. v. Gear, 83 P.2d 389 (Okla. 1938) (holding that
surface owner could not recover for salt water poisoning to cattle).
' See, e.g., Ricks Explor. Co. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 695 P.2d 498 (Okla. 1984)
(allowing mineral lessee to obtain a nondomestic groundwater use permit for oil and gas
development); Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972) (denying surface owner
compensation for fresh water used by mineral owner for water flooding project); Norum v.
Queen City Oil Co., 264 P. 122 (Mont. 1928) (denying surface owner recovery for pollution of
water reservoir).
"' See, e.g., Grimes v. Goodman Drilling Co., 216 S.W. 202 (1919) (rejecting nuisance claim
based on engine noise interfering with sleep, slush pit spattering onto house, doors, and
windows and danger of fire due to proximity of engine, boiler and slush pit); Mary Oil & Gas
Co. v. Rainer, 235 P. 1085 (Okla. 1925) (denying surface owner injunction enjoining oil and gas
lessee from constructing, drilling and operating wells that interfered with peaceable occupation
of plaintiffs home); Otis v. Haas 569 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978) (installing tank batteries
on surface
near drilling site and in close proximity to lessor's home was reasonably necessary).
23 0
See supra note 214.
231See infra note 233.
232 See Welborn, New Rights of Surface Owners, supra note 218, §§ 22.01, 22.02[3]
(suggesting that, "the SRHA amendment reflects a change, at least in spirit, of the public policy
that determined that the mineral estate should be dominant to begin with.").
233The nine states adopting surface damage acts in one form or another are as follows: ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 765, para. 530/1-530/7 (Smith-Hurd 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 353.595
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 82-10-501 through-503 (1995); N.D. CENT.
CODE 99 38-11.1-01 through-10 (1987 & Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 318.2
through .9 (West 1991 & Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 45-5A-1 through-li (1993
& Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 60-1-601 through-608 (1989 & Supp. 1995); TEX. NAT. RES.
CODE ANN. §§ 92.001 through 92.007 (Vernon 1993); W. VA. CODE §§ 22-7-1 through-8 (1994
& Supp. 1995).
2-4 N.D. CENT. CODE § 3817.1-02. The "Legislative Findings" of the North Dakota Statute
provides that: "It is necessary to exercise the police power of the state to protect the public
welfare of North Dakota which is largely dependent on agriculture and to protect the economic
well-being of individuals engaged in agricultural production." See Lowe, Easement of the Mineral
Estate, supra note 219, at 4-25 (noting that "agricultural protection" is expressly recognized as
a public purpose in eight of nine surface-damage acts).
...The Oklahoma statute is the only act that does not protect the common-law right of
access. Oklahoma's surface damage statute precludes an operator from entering and drilling
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they increase the amount of damages recoverable by a surface owner
under the common-law rule.2 36 Other states have responded to
contemporary policy shifts by charging regulatory agencies with
protecting all natural resources, in addition to their traditional
responsibility of preventing waste of oil and gas.2 37 In addition to
diminishing mineral-estate dominance through statutes, courts in a
few states have restricted the scope of the surface easement by
adopting the accommodation doctrine.23 8 This doctrine requires
mineral-estate owners to exercise "due regard" for the rights of the
surface-estate owners.23 9
As described below, the court that first adopted the
accommodation doctrine employed a pragmatic approach which
included recognizing a shift in policies. 2" That pragmatic approach
produced a doctrine that appropriately narrowed the gap between
rights asserted by owners of the two estates in an environmental era.
1. A PragmaticApproach to the Surface-Use
Debate in an Environmental Era: Getty

Oil Co. v. Jones (1971)
The accommodation doctrine was first recognized in a 1971
case announced by the Texas Supreme Court, in the midst of a tide

without first petitioning the court to commence the appraisal process. OKLA. STAT. ANN. 52 §
318.5A (West 1991 & Supp. 1996).
236The surface damage statutes of Oklahoma, North Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia,
all change the common law approach by adopting a strict liability standard for damages. Though
Texas has not adopted a strict liability standard it has enacted the Mineral Use of Subdivided
Land Act to deal with the surface/mineral conflict. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 92.001-007
(Vernon 1993). For a comparison of the various surface-damages acts see Welborn, New Rights
for Surface Owners, supra note 218, at 22-16.
237 See infra notes 332-34 and accompanying text.
238See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Carter Farms Co., 703 P.2d 894 (N.M. 1985) (recognizing that
mineral lessee is entitled to reasonable use of surface area but requiring that this servitude be
exercised with due regard for rights of surface owner); Flying Diamond Co. v. Rust, 551 P.2d
509 (Utah 1976) (stating that, "wherever there exists separate ownerships of interest in the
same land, each should have the right to the use and enjoyment"); Diamond Shamrock Corp.
v. Phillips, 511 S.W.2d 160 (Ark. 1974) (calling for accommodation by mineral lessee since
actions were unreasonable as against surface owner's proposed surface use); Getty Oil Co. v.
Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971) (requiring mineral owners to accommodate surface owners).
The accommodation doctrine was becoming the law in North Dakota before the adoption of its
Surface Damage Act. See Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 136 (N.D. 1979) (adopting
accommodation doctrine set forth in Getty Oil).
239See supra note 250.
240 See infra part III.A. 1.
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of legislation passed in response to the ideals of the early
environmental era.24 ' In Getty Oil Co. v. Jones,24 2 Mr. Jones, a cotton
farmer, purchased his tract in 1955, seven years after Getty Oil had
obtained its lease covering a portion of the tract.2 43 Mr. Jones' tract
was also subject to a lease owned and operated by other oil
companies. 244 In 1963, Jones installed an automatic sprinkler system
which extended seven feet above the ground. In 1967, Getty Oil
completed two producing wells that required pumping units. 24' The
units installed extended above the seven-foot height required by the
sprinkler system and so prevented the use of the system. The other
lessees, however, had installed pumping units which did not interfere
with the sprinkler system.2 46
Mr. Jones brought suit against Getty Oil seeking an injunction
and damages.2 4 7 Although Getty Oil won in the trial court, the court
of appeals ruled in favor of the surface owner, Mr. Jones, on the
ground that the traditional scope of the surface easement had been
exceeded because Getty Oil had used more land than was reasonably
necessary. 248
In affirming the appellate court, the Texas Supreme Court
redefined the scope of the surface easement in light of the "public
policy of developing our mineral resources while, at the same time,
permitting the utilization of the surface for productive agricultural
uses." 249 The court reassessed the concept of reasonableness by
requiring mineral-estate owners to exercise their rights with "due
regard" for the surface owner.2 5 ° Therefore, the court held that the
mineral owner must accommodate the surface owner in the following
circumstances:
Where there is an existing use by the surface owner which
241See Colosky, Implied Covenant, supra note 215, at 15-18-19 (discussing federal and state

environmental legislation that emerged in response to societal activism and its influence); see
also supra note 214 (discussing legislative response to growing environmental awareness).
242 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971).
243Id. at 620.
244
245

Id.
Id.

246 Id.
247 Id.

at 618.
at 619.
24
1 Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 458 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Tex. Ct. App. 1970), affd, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex.
1971).
249

Getty Oil, 470 S.W.2d at 622-23.
at 621-22.

250Id.
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would otherwise be precluded or impaired, and where under
the established practices in the industry there are
alternatives available to the [mineral-estate owner] whereby
the minerals can be recovered, the rules of reasonable usage
of the surface may require the adoption of an alternative by
the lessee.25 1
On motion for rehearing the court added that the initial inquiry is
whether the surface owner's existing use is reasonable. 5 2 On this
question the court determined that Mr. Jones had no reasonable
means of developing his land for agricultural purposes other than
with the automatic sprinkler system in use.253
In reaching its decision, the Texas Supreme Court expressly
considered the primary point of contention in the debate over surface
use, namely, who should bear the costs of oil and gas development in
an environmental era?2 4 Getty Oil argued that the beam-type
pumping units it used were more economical from its point of view
and, therefore, it should not be required to incur the extra expense of
using below-surface cellars to avoid interfering with the sprinkler
system.25 5 The dissenting justice agreed with this proposition, noting:
Jones bought this surface with full knowledge of the
lease .... Now, by changing the nature of his surface
operations, Jones seeks to alter the terms of the prior
mineral lease and to impose additional burdens on the oil
and gas lessee which are not imposed by the original oil and
gas lease.256
Nevertheless, the majority reviewed evidence showing that the
alternative pumps would have cost less than $5,000 more than the
pumps installed. Then, applying the test above, the court held that
the below-surface cellars were reasonable alternatives for the
mineral-estate owner.25 7
In Getty Oil Co., the court evinced a pragmatic approach by

21

Id. at 622.

262 Id.

M3Id.
25

Id. at 621.

2"SId. at 624 (McGee, J., dissenting).
267

Id. at 623.
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expressly addressing precedent in light of prevailing policy,
particularly the need to protect agricultural surface uses. The opinion
also acknowledged the question about the allocation of costs in the
implied-easement debate. By including these issues in the web of
beliefs that informs the decision, the Getty Oil opinion responded to
the contemporary policy shifts affecting the scope of the surface
easement. Unfortunately, subsequent Texas decisions detract from
Getty Oil's contribution to oil and gas jurisprudence by failing to
embrace a pragmatic approach to decision making.
2. Post-Getty Oil Cases-A Retreat from
the PragmaticApproach
By adopting the accommodation doctrine, the Getty Oil opinion
tempered traditional mineral-estate dominance by requiring the
mineral-estate owner to bear the costs occasioned by the needs of the
surface-estate owner when the following criteria are met: (1) the
surface owner has a pre-existing use; (2) that use is reasonable; (3)
the surface use would be precluded by the mineral owner's proposed
use; and (4) there are reasonable alternatives for the mineral owner
or lessee.2 8 However, Getty Oil did not place surface owners on parity
with mineral-estate owners. For example, the opinion placed the
burden of proving all criteria under the accommodation doctrine on
the surface owner. 2 9 Additionally, access for the mineral owner is
guaranteed: "There may be only one manner of use of the surface
whereby the minerals can be produced. The lessee has the right to
pursue this use, regardless of surface damage.' 26 °
Although the opinion does respond to public policy concerns,
Getty Oil's fact-specific formulation of the accommodation doctrine left
several issues open for clarification in subsequent decisions. These
issues include: (1) When does pre-existing use status attach for a
surface owner?; (2) What is the effect of the converse of the Getty Oil
258See Tarrant County Water Control and Improvement Dist. Number One v. Haupt, Inc.,

854 S.W.2d 909, 911-13 (Tex. 1993) (quoting passages from Getty Oil that establish criteria for
applying accommodation doctrine); see also Laura Burney, Accommodating and Condemning
Surface and Mineral Estates-The Implication of Tarrant County Water Control and
Improvement DistrictNumber One v. Haupt,Inc., 12 ADVANCED OIL, GAS & MIN. L. COURSE E-1
(1994) [hereinafter Burney, Accommodating and Condemning Surface and Mineral Estates]
(assessing accommodation doctrine as it currently exits under Texas Law).
259 Getty Oil, 470 S.W.2d at 622-27.
260 Id. at 622.
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situation, i.e., a mineral owner with a pre-existing use?; and (3) Will
a technologically possible but expensive alternative be considered
reasonable for the mineral-estate owner? Courts could provide
answers to these questions by emulating the pragmatic approach
embraced in Getty Oil. Unfortunately, in key cases courts have
convoluted the issues by failing to expressly consider the policy
conflicts prevailing in this environmental era.
a. Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker
Post-Getty Oil cases have done little to refine the
accommodation doctrine by answering the above questions. An
Arkansas case, Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Phillips,2 6 ' responded to
the first question by extending Getty Oil's protection for surface
owners to preclude a proposed use, of which the mineral owner has
knowledge, in the definition of a "pre-existing surface use."262 Rather
than expand the scope of the accommodation doctrine as in Phillips,
a Texas Supreme Court case decided a year after Getty Oil, has
restricted the application of the doctrine.
In Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, Mr. Whitaker, a farmer, sought
damages and an injunction against Sun Oil's plans to use not more
than 100,000 gallons of fresh water per day for a water-flooding
project.2 6 3 Mr. Whitaker argued that purchasing water from sources
other than the surface estate was a reasonable alternative for Sun
Oil. 264 Evidence showed the cost of this alternative to Sun Oil to be
about $42,000, a cost that would still result in the recovery of $2
million in additional oil (net value) from Sun Oil's water-flooding
project. The majority opinion, written by Justice McGee who had
dissented in Getty Oil, confined the "reasonable alternative" criterion
to a consideration of alternatives on the leased premises.2 65 In a fiveto-four decision, the court held that requiring Sun Oil to purchase
water from other sources "would be in derogation of the dominant

261 511
262

S.W.2d 160 (Ark. 1974).
d. at 163. The mineral lessee was aware of the particular homesite chosen by the surface

owner. Id. at 161. While the surface owner was gone from the state, the lessee disregarded the
site selected and drilled a well over the five acre tract. Id.
263Sun
264

265

id.

Oil, 483 S.W.2d at 809.

Id. at 811.
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[mineral] estate."26 6
Unlike the Getty Oil opinion, the Sun Oil decision shunned a
pragmatic approach by failing to consider public policy concerns for
protecting surface uses, and by failing to address the pivotal point in
the debate between owners of the surface and the mineral estate, the
allocation of costs. The dissenters, however, reasserted the pragmatic
approach of Getty Oil: "In this day of unitizations, availability of fuel
and water from other sources at economically feasible costs, and
customary field and industry practices ... the Getty rule should not
be limited to alternatives involving only the leased premises.... 26
The majority opinion in Sun Oil manifests
the
counterproductive traits of the approaches described in Part II. On its
face, the opinion appears myopically to consider precedent born in
earlier eras that established mineral-estate dominance, with no
consideration of contemporary concerns about protecting surface uses.
More likely, however, Sun Oil, like the Geo Viking opinions, masks
in formalistic-garb the policy of promoting oil and gas production in
spite of consequences for other landowners. Regardless, Sun Oil has
created uncertainty about the relative rights of oil and gas developers
and surface owners by contradicting Getty Oil's message about
redefining the scope of the implied surface easement in the
environmental era.
b. Tarrant County Water Control and Improvement
District No. One v. Haupt, Inc.2 68
Recently, in 1993, the Texas Supreme Court had the
opportunity to clarify the mixed messages of Getty Oil and Sun Oil,
and to refine the criteria for the accommodation doctrine. Rather than
seize this opportunity, the court provided little enlightenment through
its opinion in TarrantCounty Water Control and Improvement District
No. One v. Haupt, Inc.269 This case also demonstrated the
responsibility devolving upon lawyers who frame the issues for the
courts, as well as the judges who hear their cases, to ensure a
266Sun Oil, 483 S.W.2d at 812.
267

Id. at 820-21 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
of this section appeared in a paper written by the author and presented to the

268 Portions

12th Annual Advanced Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Course 1994. See Burney, Accommodating
and Condemning Surface and Mineral Estates, supra note 258.
269 854

S.W.2d 909 (Tex. 1993).
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coherent jurisprudence for oil and gas law by engaging in the
pragmatic process.
In Haupt, the lawyers and courts initially focused on
condemnation law, rather than on the accommodation doctrine.2 7 ° In
1981, the water district condemned the surface of an eighty-acre tract
for construction of a reservoir.27 1 Frances Breithaupt and Lillian
Weiss, who each owned an undivided 1/4 mineral interest in the
tract,2 72 had leased their mineral interests in 1952. That lease was
later assigned to Four-W Oil Company, which drilled two producing
vertical wells.273 In 1987, the water district condemned the assignee
Four-W's working interest under the 1952 lease, but not the
possibility of reverter in the lessors, Ms. Breithaupt and Ms. Weiss.2 74
Therefore, the lessors' reversionary interest, and the executive right
appurtenant thereto, remained intact after condemnation of their
lessee's interest.
Prior to the condemnation by the water district, Ms.
Breithaupt and Ms. Weiss had executed top leases2 75 to Bar J B
Company.27 6 In June 1987, the water district plugged the assignee
Four-W's two producing oil wells, whereupon the top leases became
effective.2 77 Pursuant to the top leases, Bar J B attempted to re-enter
Four-W's plugged wells, but was enjoined in 1988 lawsuit filed by the
water district. 278 Also in 1988, Ms. Breithaupt's son James acquired
a 1/6 mineral interest in the eighty acres and leased that mineral
interest to Haupt, Inc.2 79 In May 1989, Four-W's plugged wells, along
with approximately sixty-eight of the eighty acres were inundated by
the new lake.280 After inundation, Haupt Inc. unsuccessfully drilled
a directional well located on the remaining twelve dry acres of the

270Id.

at 911.

271 id.
272 The two women
27
3 Id. at 910.

were sisters. Id.

274 Id. When a grantor conveys an oil and gas lease, the lease creates a mineral estate as a
determinable fee leaving in the grantor the "possibility of reverter" as a future interest. Id. This
reversionary interest entitles the grantor to fee ownership of the property once the conditions
terminating the lease occur. Id. at 464. See Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459, 464 (Tex. 1991).
275 See supra note 208 (discussing top leasing).
27
6 Haupt, 854 S.W.2d at 910.
277

Id.

278

Id.

2 79

Id.

280 Id.
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eighty acre tract.28 '
The mineral owners and lessees brought suit claiming that the
water district had inversely condemned their interests in the mineral
estate.1 2 The trial court, without considering the accommodation
doctrine, determined that the interests of mineral owners/lessors Ms.
Breithaupt and Ms. Weiss had been taken in 1987, but not the
23
interests of the lessees James, Haupt and Bar J B Co., the lessees. 8
The Texas Court of Appeals reversed and held that the lessees'
interests had also been inversely condemned by the water district.2 s4
Ironically, although once again the parties failed to raise the
accommodation doctrine, the court of appeals still focused on the

281

Id.

282

1nverse condemnation occurs when the actions of a governmental entity result in the

taking of property rights without initiating condemnation proceedings and without paying just
compensation as required by the federal and state constitutions. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET
AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.1, at 510-12, 19 (1984). Therefore, in an inverse condemnation
action, courts must determine, first, the extent of the parties' property interests and, second,

whether those interests have been "taken" by the governmental entities' action. Id. at 511-13;
see also William B. Stoebuck, Condemnation of Rights the Condemnee Holds in Lands of

Another, 56 IOWA L. REV. 293, 296 (1970) (recognizing that an individual's property interest is
not restricted to "physical land" but rather applies to legal abstractions of property rights). In
Texas, the Supreme Court decided in 1970 that condemnation of the surface is not an inverse
condemnation of the underlying mineral estate so long as mineral estate owners "possess their
common law right to the reasonable use of the surface estate." Chambers-Liberty Counties
Navigation Dist. v. Banta, 453 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tex. 1970). That same year, the court in Getty
Oil defined that common law right with the accommodation doctrine. Getty Oil, 458 S.W.2d at
96.
283
Haupt,854 S.W.2d at 910. By focusing on the date 1987, it appears the trial court did not
understand the interests of the mineral owners. In 1987, Four-W's wells were plugged and the
lease terminated. Id. Briefs filed on behalf of the water district in the appellate court argued
that compensating the mineral owners for these lost royalty payments would fully compensate
them for their interests. See Brief for the Appellee Tarrant County Water Control and
Improvement District Number One, in the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Judicial District of
Texas. (No. 10-91-00150-CV). The trial court apparently agreed with that logic and concluded
that the mineral owners' property was taken because the royalty payments ceased. Haupt, 833
S.W.2d at 698. But terminating Four-W's lease did not effect the lessors' reversionary interest
and the appurtenant executive right. Id. Therefore, the mineral owners had the right to lease
again and receive additional royalty payments. Id.
284 Haupt, 833 S.W.2d at 698. The court of appeals relied on a 1970 Texas Supreme
Court
case that held condemnation of the surface did not automatically result in a taking of a mineral
estate owner's interest "as long as the common-law right to access the minerals through
reasonable use of the surface remained unimpaired." Id. Chambers-Liberty, 453 S.W.2d at 137.
In 1971, the Texas court defined that common-law right by adopting the accommodation
doctrine in Getty Oil, 458 S.W.2d at 96. That doctrine was not raised in the appellate court in
Haupt. Instead, in ruling in favor of the lessees and mineral owner, the opinion relied on cases
involving denial of access between a privately owned tract and public streets. Haupt,833 S.W.2d
at 698 (citing City of Waco v. Texland Corp., 446 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. 1969) and City of Austin v.
Avenue Corp., 704 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex. 1986)).
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pivotal issue in the surface-use debate, the allocation of costs.28 5 The
court of appeals stated that "[tihere is conclusive proof that
inundation resulted in a permanent restriction of the most
reasonable, lowest-risk, and most cost-effective means of access:
vertical drilling from dry land. 2 6 Therefore, the appellate court
rejected the water district's argument that the reservoir had not
caused a taking of the appellants' property interests because the
appellants could still access the minerals with directional drilling
from the dry part of the tract or with vertical drilling from a platform
over the lake.28 7
The water district appealed to the Texas Supreme Court and
argued for the first time that the accommodation doctrine should
determine if interests in the mineral estate had been taken through
inverse condemnation. The supreme court agreed and extended the
Getty Oil accommodation doctrine to apply "when [a] governmental
288
entity is the surface owner.
In analyzing the accommodation doctrine in Haupt, the Texas
Supreme Court dutifully delineated the Getty Oil criteria and began
its discussion with the pre-existing use criterion.28 9 The court

285Haupt, 833
286

S.W.2d at 700.

Id.

" Id. at 699. In arguing that platform drilling was a "reasonable" alternative, the water
district also pointed to a producing well (Fullwood No. VI) located on land adjacent to the eighty
acre tract which had been vertically drilled from a platform prior to inundation. Id.
28 Haupt, 854 S.W.2d at 912. In applying the Getty Oil test, the court viewed the evidence
as legally sufficient to deem a finding that the alternative means of access found to exist by the
trial court, platform or directional drilling, provided reasonable access to the mineral estate. Id.
at 911. The court remanded the case to the appellate court for reconsideration of the factual
sufficiency of the evidence. Id. at 913. The appellate court ultimately remanded all of the causes
for a new trial. Haupt, Inc. v. Tarrant County Water Control and Improvement District Number
One, 870 S.W.2d 350, 355 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994). The appellate court was obviously frustrated
with the Supreme Court's view of the evidence:
After considering the entire record, we hold the evidence is factually
insufficient to support a finding, which has been deemed by the Supreme
Court on the basis of the evidence's legal sufficiency, that the alternative
means of production provide reasonable access to the mineral estate. The
paucity of evidence that would support a finding of reasonableness is so
weak as to make such a finding clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.
Id. at 355.
289 Haupt,854 S.W.2d at 911. Before proceeding to the Getty Oil accommodation criteria, the
court disposed of the plaintiffs' argument that the accommodation doctrine should not be
extended to inverse condemnation actions. Id. at 910-11. They emphasized that the doctrine had
previously been applied only between surface and mineral landowners. Id. at 911. However, that
argument ignores the role of the accommodation doctrine in defining the mineral owner's
property rights. Those rights include the right to reasonable use of the surface estate. After
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concluded, without analysis, that the surface owner, the water
district, had a pre-existing use as a reservoir.29 ° Yet, that conclusion
ignored the facts that led to the creation of the reservoir: but for the
water district's condemnation of the surface and condemnation of
Four-W Oil Company's lease interest, the mineral owners' production
of oil from vertical dry-land wells would have continued.2 9 ' Thus, the
facts present the converse of the Getty Oil situation. In Haupt there
is a mineral owner with a pre-existing use. It is noteworthy that a
concurring opinion in Getty Oil had insisted that a mineral owner
would not be required to incur the expense of changing its operations
merely because the surface owner might decide to change his use.292
In Haupt, by ignoring these facts (that there is a mineral owner with
a pre-existing use put to expense when the water district changed its
use), the court allowed a governmental entity to manipulate preexisting use status through its condemnation powers.29 3 More
importantly, the Haupt decision failed to clarify the pre-existing use
criterion of the accommodation doctrine.
The Texas Supreme Court's dubious conclusion that the water
district had a pre-existing use294 facilitated its leap to the next

Getty Oil, reasonableness is determined by applying the accommodation doctrine. Because the
doctrine defines the extent of the mineral owner's property rights, it must be applied to
determine if the government has inversely taken that property. Id. at 912. Thus, the court
properly held that the doctrine applies when a governmental entity is the surface owner.
290 Id. at
291 Id.

912.
at 910.

292 Getty
293

Oil, 470 S.W.2d at 621 (Greenhill, J., concurring).
Haupt, 854 S.W.2d at 912-13. The court appropriately considered surface reservoirs as

a valuable public use and wanted to protect that resource from contamination. Id. at 913. Under
a takings analysis, that use would permit the condemnation; however, the governmental entity
would be required to pay for all of its damage. Thus, the problem in Haupt can be traced to the
water district's failure to pay for all the property rights "taken" for the reservoir in the initial
condemnation proceedings. Records revealed that the water district knew it would likely have
to compensate future lessees since they did not condemn the mineral owners' executive rights.
Haupt, 833 S.W.2d at 701. That fact led the appellate court to chastise the water district's
attorney for arguing that requiring the district to pay a subsequent lessee, Bar J B Company,
would be forcing it to pay twice for the same interest. Id. (noting that, "lawyers occasionally
resort to hyperbole in defending their clients' position. In this instance, however, hyperbole
crosses the line between credible argument and knowing misstatement."). However, under
Banta, the District was not required to pay for deprivation of the surface easement until the
condemnor later interferes with that right. Banta, 453 S.W.2d at 137; see also Burney,
Accommodating and Condemning Surface and Mineral Estates, supra note 258, at E-10
(describing inequities caused by Banta rule for mineral owners); Fred M. Lange, The Mineral
Estate in Condemnation, 10 Hous. L. REv. 266,276-77 (1973) (observing disadvantages suffered
by mineral owners and lessees as a result of Banta decision).
294Had the court recognized there was no pre-existing use by the surface owner, it should
have concluded there was no duty for the mineral owner to accommodate the surface owner.
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question posed by the accommodation doctrine, the availability of
reasonable alternatives for the lessees.29 5 Albeit tangentially, the
court appeared to recognize the significance of costs in the debate
between surface and mineral owners, referring to evidence which had
consistently showed that using directional or platform drilling would
severely reduce the value of the mineral interests.2" The Haupt court
also held that "the evidence may indicate that surface drilling is the
only manner of use of the surface whereby the minerals can
reasonably be produced. In that event, the lessee has the right to
pursue this use under the accommodation doctrine."2 9' 7
Although complicated by the condemnation proceedings, the
facts in Haupt presented the courts with the opportunity to clarify the
accommodation doctrine by addressing the mixed messages of Getty
Oil and Sun Oil and the specific questions noted above: (1) When does
pre-existing use status attach?; (2) Would a mineral owner be
required to accommodate a surface owner's change in use in the
converse of the Getty Oil situation-a mineral owner with a preexisting use?; and (3) Will a technologically feasible but expensive
alternative for a mineral owner be considered reasonable?
The Haupt court's conclusion that the water district had a preexisting use failed to provide guidance on the first issue. When does
pre-existing use status attach for surface owners? The court should
have noted that in Getty Oil, the surface owner changed uses after
severance but physically implemented the use before the mineral
owner began production.2 9 8 While in Haupt, the mineral owner was
producing first, before the surface use was changed by the water

Since the reservoir necessarily interferes with the mineral owner's exercise of its common law
right at that point, the second taking under Banta would have occurred. See Banta, 453 S.W.2d
at 137 (holding there is no duty for condemnor to compensate mineral owner for loss of access
until that loss actually occurs). The sole issue then would have been the value of the mineral
estate owners' property interest. Because the court determined there was a valid pre-existing

surface use, it erroneously proceeded to the next question under the accommodation doctrine,
whether there were reasonable alternatives for the lessee. Haupt, 854 S.W.2d at 912-13.
295Haupt, 854 S.W.2d at 913.
' Id. Several expert witnesses testified that the value of the mineral interests would be
reduced to nearly zero by restricting access to directional or platform drilling. Haupt, 833
S.W.2d at 699-70. However, each expert had a differing opinion as to the value of the mineral
interest prior to inundation. Id. One expert testified that inundating the surface had reduced
the market value of the recoverable reserves from $3.75 million to $937,500. Id. at 700. Another
experienced producer estimated the market value of recoverable reserves at $1.2 to $1.6 million
before inundation and "close to zero" afterwards. Id.
27 Haupt, 854 S.W.2d at 913.
298Getty Oil, 470 S.W.2d at 620.
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district's condemnation. This sequential change in facts should have
elicited from the court an assessment of the second question, the
converse of the Getty Oil situation.
Leaping instead to the final Getty Oil criterion, the Haupt
court tacitly addressed the third question and determined that
mineral owners will not be required to adopt technologically feasible
but economically prohibitive alternatives. However, despite the
striking evidence that the available alternatives would render the
mineral estate worthless, the Haupt court found sufficient evidence
of reasonableness and remanded the case.299 Although the court's
haphazard approach makes discernment difficult, perhaps this action
can be dismissed as a procedural aberration rather than a signal that
mineral-estate owners will be required to bear heavy cost burdens in
the environmental era.
In Haupt, the court completed its truncated analysis of the
Getty Oil criteria without ever addressing the mixed messages from
Sun Oil.3" Read broadly, the Texas Supreme Court rejected Sun Oil's
return to unabashed mineral-estate dominance. Although the Haupt
opinion does not expressly mention Sun Oil's contradictions with
Getty Oil's rationale, it refers in a footnote to "a trend toward the
balancing of the interests between the surface and mineral estates."3 ° '
Sun Oil's departure from the trend initiated in Getty Oil, was
apparent by the Sun Oil court's ignoring cost considerations and
failing to promote agricultural surface uses. Apart from the foregoing
speculations about the Haupt holding, the current status of the
accommodation doctrine remains unclear. It is unfortunate for oil and
gas jurisprudence that the Haupt opinion failed to apply a pragmatic
process and thereby failed to provide guidance on the questions
articulated in Getty Oil.
3. Achieving Clarity Through Statutes
In more than twenty years since the accommodation doctrine

299

See supra note 288 and accompanying text.

'o While the Haupt opinion quotes extensively from Getty Oil, it only cites Sun Oil once for

the proposition that the accommodation doctrine had previously only been applied between
private landowners. Haupt, 854 S.W.2d at 911.
30' Id.
at 911 n.3 (citing Paul F. Hultin, Recent Developments in Statutory and Judicial
Accomodation bewteen Surface and Mineral Owners, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1021, 1066
(1983)).
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was first recognized early in the current, environmental era, courts
have not refined the doctrine. °2 Statutes can provide the clarity that
judicial decisions have been shown to provide only incrementally.
Thus, several jurisdictions have responded to the surface-use debate
with legislation holding mineral developers strictly liable for surface
damage. 30 3 These statutes have the advantage of ensuring access for
the mineral-estate owner, but at costs exceeding those placed on
mineral owners in earlier eras.3"
4. The Model Surface Use and Mineral
Development Accommodation Act
The Model Surface Use and Mineral Development
Accommodation Act strives to respond to the issue at the heart of the
implied-easement debate: defining the relative rights of owners of
"severed" surface estates and owners or developers of the underlying

302

There were several Texas cases decided since Sun Oil but none addressed the mixed

messages of Sun Oil and Getty Oil, the role of cost, or public policy. Nor have the courts
addressed the questions concerning the accommodation doctrine posed in the text. Though many
issues remain unresolved which create uncertainty in the relative rights of the surface and
mineral estates, there is some suggestion that mineral owners with pre-existing uses may be
required to accommodate. In Getty Oil Co. v. Royal, 422 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Tex. Ct. App. 1967),
a mineral owner had roads in existence several years before the surface estate was subdivided.
Id. at 592. One of the surface owners erected unlocked gates over the roads to protect his
property. Id. The court held that since no conflict existed, the rule of dual possession applied.
Id. at 593. The court defined the rule as allowing the lessee "to use so much of the leased
premises as is required in its lease operations reasonably necessary for development and
exploration," and entitling the surface owner to "the right to use the portion of the surface not
so required by the mineral lessee." Id. However, the Royal decision is distinguishable because
it was premised on the lack of a "conflict" and the fact that only minimal costs and
inconveniences were added to the lessee's operations. Id. at 593. A subsequent decision suggests
that a mineral owner should accommodate the surface owner if a reasonable alternative exists,
but mere inconvenience to the surface owner is not enough to require the mineral owner to
accommodate. Reading & Bates Offshore Drilling Co. v. Jergenson, 453 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1970). In Jergenson,a landowner in the cattle feeding business sued a lessee claiming that
by drilling a well at the edge of an ensilage pit, the pit was destroyed, his business ruined, and
the land permanently damaged. id. at 854. The lessee argued that it had the right to use so
much of the surface and to use it in such a manner as is reasonably necessary to accomplish the
purposes of the lease. Id. The Jergenson court recognized that those rights are to be exercised
with "due regard" for the rights of the surface owner and held that the lessee's location of the
well was an unreasonable use. Id. at 855-56.
The paucity of cases providing courts with the opportunity to discuss the unresolved issues
of Sun Oil may be due to the industry's reliance on privately negotiated documents. See infra
note 328 (discussing role of private agreements).
31 Supra note 233 and accompanying text.
304 See supra note 233.
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mineral estates. °5 In 1990, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Law approved the Model Act after a three-year
36
study of the rights and liabilities of surface and mineral owners.
The Model Act draws its definition of accommodation from Getty Oil
and clarifies accommodation doctrine criteria. Also, the Model Act
incorporates the pre-existing use requirement and defines it as an
"existing surface use or improvement. 0 7 In order to protect proposed
surface use, the Model Act requires surface owners to give notice to
mineral owners. However, the Model Act provides broad protection to
mineral-estate owners by similarly protecting their proposed uses. 0 8
The Model Act expressly addresses the converse of the Getty Oil
situation by providing that if there is "ongoing mineral development,"

305 Clyde Martz, a member of the drafting committee for the National Conference
of
Commissioners on Uniform Laws, explains many of the problems giving rise to the Model
Surface Use and Development Act arose from wide-spread use of the broad form severance
documents:
By the middle of the twentieth century, extensive severance practices and
use of broad form severance documents without the definition of any party's
rights began to produce significant title and land development problems.
Uncertainty as to the scope and extent of potential mineral development and
consequential surface impact from such development impeded land
development in a number of ways. Owners of severed mineral estates...
could interfere with new surface improvements and deter financing for such
improvements by a mere manifestation of intention to exercise dominant
rights in the surface estate for mineral access, exploration, excavation,
storage... Severed surface rights could impair mineral development under
the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act and similar state
mine permitting statutes ....
Clyde 0. Martz, The New Model Surface Use and Mineral Development Accommodation Act, 5
NAT. RESOURCES & ENv r 30, 31 (ABA Winter 1991). The beginning of the Model Act
encompasses a policy statement that guides its interpretation and promotes the efficient
development of both surface and mineral estates:

[I]t is declared that where mineral estates are severed from surface estates
by grant or reservation it is the public policy of this State to: (i) facilitate
responsible development of surface and mineral estates by quantifying so far
as practical the surface and mineral rights and burdens arising from the
severance of the estates; (ii) encourage accommodation of potentially
conflicting interests by agreement; and (iii) provide expeditious procedures
for defining and quantifying rights and obligations of owners of severed
estates whenever uncertainties exist and conflicts arises.
MODEL SURFACE USE AND MINERAL DEVELOPMENTACCOMMODATION ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 100, 101

(Supp. 1995).
3 Martz, supra note 305, at 30.
3

MODEL SURFACE USE AND MINERAL DEVELOPMENT ACCOMMODATION ACT § 2(a)(comment)

(Supp. 1995) [hereinffter THE MODEL ACT].
308
Id. § 4.
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a surface owner is not entitled to accommodation. 30 9 The term
"ongoing mineral development" is defined to include approved
development plans and "the resumption or extension of mineral
development within thirty years after the previous production
stopped."'3 1 The Model Act also limits acceptable alternatives to those
that are "technologically sound and economically practicable., 3 11 If
accommodation is not required under these criteria, the act provides
that the mineral developer may proceed without liability for
damages.3 1 2 Also, a mineral owner's right of access is protected by
denying courts the authority to issue injunctions against the owner's
right of access.3 13
In addition to clarifying Getty Oil's accommodation doctrine
criteria, the Model Act implicitly disapproves of Sun Oil. Sun Oil is
conspicuously absent from cases cited as authority for the
accommodation doctrine.3 14 Moreover, an express policy statement
which promotes efficient development of both surface and mineral
estates suggests that Sun Oil has been rejected. 315 The Model Act
would have clarified the rights of the parties in Haupt. The mineral
owners' "ongoing" development would have allowed them to continue
drilling without accommodating the change in surface use to a
reservoir. The Model Act's requirement of "technologically sound and
economically practicable" procedures for mineral owners would have
excluded the cost-prohibitive alternatives posed by the surface owner,
the water district.31 6 More important, the Model Act's protection for
the converse of the Getty Oil situation (a mineral owner with a preexisting or "ongoing" use) allows that use to continue regardless of the
reasonableness of alternatives.3 1 v The Haupt court might have
prevented or reduced the costs and time invested in this litigation if
it had adopted the Model Act's pragmatic approach.

309Id. § 5.
310Id. § 2(s).

311Id. § 8.
312 id.

313

Id. § 8(d).
addition to Getty Oil, the Model Act cites two prior decisions where the surface owner

314 In

prevailed, Royal and Jergenson. See supra note 302 (discussing Royal and Jergenson).

"' THE MODEL ACT, supra note 305, § 5. The introductory section states, "[tihe public policy
of this State is to maximize the economic, cultural and environmental welfare of the people by
preserving all reasonable opportunities for optimum development and use of all surface and
mineral resources." Id. § 1.
311 Haupt, 854 S.W.2d at 913.
317

THE MODEL ACT, supra note 305, § 8(d).
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Because currently Texas courts accept the accommodation
doctrine, adoption of the Model Act would most likely fail to support
a traditional takings claim.3 18 Political obstacles pose a more likely
barrier to Texas' adoption of the Model Act. Surface owners might
view the Model Act as permitting mineral owners to avoid
internalizing most costs, and mineral owners would not want to
sacrifice Sun Oil's reassertion of mineral-estate dominance. 3 9 For
example, the Surface Damage bill recently failed to become law in
Texas.32 ° Therefore, in Texas and other states without clear guidance
from the courts or surface-damage legislation,3 2 1 private agreements
remain imperative for both surface and mineral owners.32 2

SIB
Even in states adopting strict liability statutes which significantly altered the common
law, courts have upheld the statutes against constitutional challenges. See Murphy v. Amoco
Prod. Co., 729 F.2 552 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding constitutionality of North Dakota's Surface
Damage Statute which required mineral developers to pay all damage to surface owner during
development); see also Lowe, Easement of the Mineral Estate for Surface Use, supra note 219,

§ 4.04[31, at 4-34 (noting opinion that surface damage acts do not result in an unconstitutional
taking). But see Polston, Doctrine in Disarray,supra note 62, at 576-79 (criticizing courts for
upholding surface damage acts as constitutional).
3" The Model Act has been criticized as unfairly promoting the dominance of the mineral
estate. Michelle A. Wenzel, Comment, The Model Surface Use and Mineral Development
Accommodation Act: Easy Easements for Mining Interests, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 607, 675 (1993)

(viewing Model Act as still protecting mineral owners "from the reasonable desires of surface
owners to use their land.").
320 A recent Surface Damage Litigation Reform Bill failed in the 74th Texas Legislation.
Senate Bill 1538 would have vested the Railroad Commission with exclusive jurisdiction over
issues regarding remediation. The bill also would have required that prior to investigating an
action for environmental harm due to exploration and production activities, administrative
remedies available through the Railroad Commission must first be exhausted.
321 Though Texas does not have general surface damage legislation, it does have a statute
specifically designed to protect surface owners seeking to develop subdivisions in heavily
populated areas. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 92.001-007 (West 1995). The Texas Mineral Use
of Subdivisions Act allows surface owners to create a qualified subdivision if their parcel of land
meets the statutory requirements. Id § 92.003. In order for mineral owners or lessees to drill
on these subdivisions they must designate well site locations. Id. § 92.005. This statute permits,
"the imposition of restrictions on a mineral owner's surface use which are more stringent than
those imposed by the accommodation doctrine." SMITH & WEAVER, 1 TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS
26 (1992). The Model Surface Use Act embraces and expands both the scheme of the Texas
Subdivision Act statute and the accommodation doctrine. UNIF. MODEL SURFACE USE & MIN.
DEV. ACCOMMODATION ACT, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 673, 675 (1993).
31 See Welborn, New Rights of Surface Owners, supra note 218, at 22-39 (noting that when
there is a lack of surface damage legislation, private fairness standards such as "good neighbor
policy" and "golden rule" assist surface and mineral owners in reaching compromise); Burney,
Accommodating and Condemning Surface and Mineral Estates, supra note 258, at E-11

(recognizing importance of carefully drafted surface use agreements in absence of sufficient
surface use legislation).
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5. The Colorado Example
a. Gerrity Oil & Natural Gas
Corp. v. Magness
Another jurisdiction without a Surface Damages Act,
Colorado,32 3 has been a contentious battle site between surface and
mineral owners over who should bear the costs of oil and gas
development. Several counties in that state contain highly productive
agricultural acreage with severed surface and mineral ownership.3 24
For example, in 1993, Weld County, Colorado, ranked fourth in the
nation in agricultural production, and was the "most drilled county"
in the United States.3 25 The debate raging there between surface and
mineral owners epitomizes the polar positions of those owners in the
environmental era. While mineral owners in the region staunchly
assert the right to destroy the surface under the dominant-estate rule,
severed-surface owners claim, "[ilf you break it you fix it. That's an
issue the oil industry has a hard time understanding."32 6 This
polarization has left the parties entrenched in their corners, with
unfortunate effects on private negotiating. 327 For example, it has been
reported that oil and gas companies are offering "take-it-or-leave-it
deals" with dollar numbers lower than the minimum amount which
surface owners consider acceptable for their farm lands.3 2
323

Legislation for a Surface Damages Act recently failed in Colorado. See Jeanine Feriancek

& Cynthia L. McNeill, Oil Company Surface Use: Do FarmersNeed Protection?, NR & E 28
(Winter 1995) [hereinafter Feriancek & McNeill, Oil Company Surface Use] (describing politics
over surface damage legislation in Colorado). In 1993, the Colorado legislature considered but
defeated two bills for surface owner's rights. See Colorado Surface Rights Bills Defeated, E &
P ENV'r, June 11, 1993, at 14. SB 230 was voted down due to continued debate over substantive
changes to the bill, while HB 1345 died in the Chambers Agricultural Committee. Id.
31 Welborn, New Rights for Surface Owners, supra note 218, at 22-32.
325Gerald Karey, Regulation & The Environment, PLArs OILGRAM NEWS, Dec. 6, 1993, at
3. The situation is exasperated because the county has a high percent of severed-surface owners
who receive no royalties. Because they receive no royalty payments, surface owners are not
compensated although they have to "take land out of agricultural production during energy
development." Id.
326

id.

327 Id.

32 Id. at 3. A real estate broker and appraiser is quoted as hearing that "companies are

offering from $1,000 to $2,500 and I've heard of surface owners wanting as much as $50,000.
• . If you have a farm high in carrots, onions, potatoes, sugar beets and spinach, you're
conceivably in the $25,000-$35,000 range. But that isn't the normal situation. The 90th
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As support for the dominant-estate rule, mineral-estate owners
depend upon a 1966 Colorado Supreme Court case, FrankfortOil Co.
v. Abrams.3 2 9 In Frankfort, the court held that, "[wlithout a lease
provision the rule seems to be that absent unreasonable use or
statutory provisions or a suit brought in tort for negligence, no
payment is due the surface owner for damage due to exploration or
drilling. 33 0 Although the court construed a specific surface-damages
clause in a lease, Frankfortis frequently cited for the proposition that
Colorado strictly adheres to the common-law concept of unabashed
mineral-estate dominance.3 3 '
The gap between rights asserted by mineral and surface
owners has likely contributed to Colorado's inability to pass a Surface

percentile will be in the $4,000-$6,000 range." Id.
329 413 P.2d 190 (Colo. 1966).
330Id. at 195.
131 See Welborn, New Rights of Surface Owners, supra note 218, at 22-30 (noting lack of
judicial direction in Colorado courts on what damages, if any, are compensable and Frankfort's
role in shaping Colorado law); Feranicek & McNeil, Oil Company Surface Use, supra note 323,
at 29 (citing Frankfort Oil as setting "clear rule" of mineral-estate dominance). Mr. Sam
Oldenburg, an attorney who has practiced oil and gas law for many years in Colorado and
represented surface owners in Gerrity Oil and Natural Gas Corp. v. Magness, discussed infra,
opines that: "Those in the oil and gas industry carry Frankfort Oil around in their brief cases;
it is even rumored that they sleep with it under their pillow at night." Telephone Interview with
R. Sam Oldenburg (January 24, 1996).
In Frankfort Oil, the court strictly construed a surface-damages clause and relied on an
earlier case suggesting that the surface owner bears the risk of damage to the agricultural value
of his land:
When plaintiff leased the land, and purchased or erected valuable
improvements thereon, he did so with knowledge of the right of the State
[the mineral-estate owner] to explore and operate the land for oil and gas,
and with knowledge that such use by the State might affect the agricultural
value and use thereof ....
FranfurtOil, 413 P.2d at 196 (citing Anderson-Prichard Oil Corp. v. McBride, 109 P.2d 221, 224
(1940)).
In a recent inverse condemnation case handed down by the Colorado Supreme Court, a
concurring judge asserted the mineral-estate owner's right "to mine his estate in the most
reasonable, lowest-risk, and most cost effective method" and concluded a mineral owner would
have a constitutional claim for damage upon suffering "a material and substantial impairment
of the right to access" caused by a governmental entities' use of the surface estate. City of
Northglenn v. Grynberg, 846 P.2d 175, 188 n.8 (Colo. 1993)(Erickson, J., concurring). In support
of that statement, Justice Erickson cites a Texas case relied upon by the appellate court in
Haupt, discussed supra notes 268-301 and accompanying text. Chambers-Liberty Counties
Navigation District v. Banta, 453 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. 1970). Recall that the Haupt appellate court
opinion did not rely on the accommodation doctrine but rather on cases involving denial of
access when adjoining streets were condemned by government entities. Haupt, 833 S.W.2d at
698.
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Damages Act.33 2 The state's political bodies, however, have responded
to the concerns of the environmental era in other ways. For example,
the Colorado legislature has authorized its conservation agency, the
Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission (COGCC), to issue
regulations to avoid environmental problems caused by oil and gas
production.3 3 3 Additionally, special rules adopted by the COGCC have
embraced the "due regard" concept and expressly addressed cost
considerations: "due regard" shall not mean that the operator shall be
required to accept locations or time schedules which would
unreasonably increase the operator's cost of operations . .
Recently, an appellate court relied upon the COGCC rules and
regulations to restrict the rights that mineral-estate owners claim
under Frankfort Oil. In Gerrity Oil and Natural Gas Corp. v.
Magness, 335 the court held that the COGCC's rules and regulations
created a private right of action for surface owners who have been
injured by the alleged failure of an oil drilling site operator to
properly remediate the soil after drilling oil wells. 6 In Gerrity Oil,

332 See

Welborn, New Rights of Surface Owners, supra note 218, at 22-37 (recognizing

reasons preventing adoption of Surface Damages Act in Colorado).
...
The amendment to Colorado's Oil and Gas Conservation Act authorizes the commission
to regulate oil and gas resources "in a manner consistent with protection of public health, safety,
and welfare." COLO. REV. STAT. § 34-60-102 (Supp. 1994). "Prior to the amendment, the
Commission's role was simply to foster, encourage and promote development, production and
utilization of the natural resources of oil and gas in the state of Colorado." Feriancek & McNeill,
Oil Company Surface Use, supra note 323, at 30.
Several counties in Colorado have also responded to the debate by passing ordinances
restricting or denying drilling. See Welborn, New Rights for Surface Owners, supra note 218,
at 22-34 n.162 (expounding on oil and gas ordinances that have been promulgated). Whether
these efforts by local governments are within their authority and not violative on pre-emption
grounds remains unclear. Id. at 22-35; see Bowen/Edwards Assoc., Inc. v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 812 P.2d 656 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990), affd in part and reu'd in part, 830 P.2d 1045
(Colo. 1992) (reversing decision that oil and gas conservation act totally preempts county's landuse authority); Voss v. Lundvall Bros., Inc., 830 P.2d 1061 (Colo. 1992) (affirming decision that
oil and gas conservation act preempted home-rule city from enacting land use ordinance).
"34
The Wattenberg Special Area Rules, adopted by the Commission in 1993, resulted from
a task force "comprised of representatives from the oil and gas industry and Colorado's
agricultural communities." Feriancek & McNeill, Oil Company Surface Use, supra note 323, at
30. In this article the authors address whether these Special Rules are enforceable since they
were passed prior to the changes made in the conservation agency's duties. In concluding that
the rules are enforceable, the authors state, "[gliven that several other states have found
protection of agricultural activities to be a matter of public welfare. .. the 1994 amendment to
the Conservation Act at least arguably gave the Commission additional retroactive authority
for the Special Rules." Id.
335 Gerrity Oil & Natural Gas Corp. v. Magness, 1995 VL 755092, at *3 (Colo. App. Dec. 21,
1995) (No. 94CA1319), as modified on denial of reh'g (Mar. 7, 1996).
336 Gerrity Oil, 1995 WL 755092, at *2-3.
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the surface owner, Magness, raised horses on his land and planted
crops.3 3 v After the operator, Gerrity, drilled one of four planned oil
wells, Magness' attorney informed Gerrity that it lacked the authority
to proceed with further drilling operations.3 3 Gerrity obtained a
temporary restraining order and requested a permanent injunction at
trial. Magness asserted several counterclaims claiming that Gerrity
had breached its duty to remediate the surface after drilling.3 39
In rejecting the surface owner's claims, the district court
reasserted mineral-estate dominance and expressly rejected adoption
of the accommodation doctrine.3 4 ° On appeal, Magness stressed his
rights under COGCC rules and regulations, convinced that a court
would interpret Frankfort Oil as precluding adoption of the
accommodation doctrine in Colorado.3 41 The appellate court adopted
his view and concluded that the COGCC's rules demonstrated a
legislative policy "that the negative environmental impact of oil and
gas extraction be minimized."3 42
The Gerrity Oil opinion promoted the accomodation doctrine,
and consequently significantly increased the rights of surface owners,
in three ways.34 3 First, as noted above, the opinion interpreted the
conservation statutes as creating a private right of action for surface
owners against mineral-estate developers.3 44 Second, the court held
337Id. at *1.
338 Id.
331 Id. Magness' counterclaims dealt primarily with the manner in which Gerrity Oil had
conducted the post-drilling cleanup of the surface area. Id. Magness alleged that he was unable
to irrigate a field and lost a portion of his alfalfa crop as result of Gerrity's unnecessary delay
in filling several water pits and other holes it had dug during the drilling process. Id. He further
alleged that irrigation was still impeded once the pits were filled-in due to the sinking and
settling that occurred. Id. At trial, Magness presented evidence that Gerrity's agent, buried
large pieces of plastic lining material in the pits, rather than removing them. Id. He also
presented evidence that Gerrity Oil had failed to remove many of the substances used or
unearthed during the drilling process. Id.
340 Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness, No. 92CV802 (D.C. Colo. Apr. 22, 1994).
3" Telephone Interview with R. Sam Oldenburg (January 24, 1996).
342 Gerrity Oil, 1995 WL 755092, at *3.
343

Id.

14"Although the statutes do not expressly establish a private right of action for surface
owners, the court determined that Magness was in the class of persons intended to be benefitted
by the statute and that an implied private right of action would be consistent with the purpose
behind the legislative enactment. Id. at *2 (citing Allstate Insurance Co. v. Parfrey, 830 P.2d
905 (Colo. 1992)). In reaching its conclusion, the court relied on statutes creating a limitations
period, another statute creating an environmental response fund, and the act's statement of
purpose to "promote the development . . . of oil and gas . . . in a manner consistent with

protection of public health, safety and welfare; [and] to protect the public and private interests
against the evils of waste in the production. . . of oil and gas. . . ." Id. at *3.,
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that expert testimony about standard practices in the industry was
not required to establish the surface owner's duty of care in
development, determining instead that the statutes and rules
delineate those standards.3 4 5 Finally, the court also held that the
doctrine of trespass is a remedy for surface owners alleging
unnecessary use of the surface, irrespective of the "reasonableness"
of the operator's conduct.34
If the Gerrity opinion survives a challenge in Colorado's
supreme court, its interpretation of the COGCC rules will
substantially restrict the rights of oil and gas developers in Colorado
as they have been perceived under Frankfort.The question remaining
is whether, in addition to imposing more costs of development on
mineral-estate owners, the COGCC's rules could also lead to denying
them access. Writing before Gerrity, commentators predicted that "the
Commission's expanded - authority . . . in regulating oil and gas
resources potentially could lead to denial of drilling permits based on
balancing oil and gas development and other land uses such as
agriculture."34 7 In other states, commission rules have led to the
denial of access for mineral developers.3 4 Gerrity Oil should convince

345 Id. at *3. An attorney for Mr. Mayness has commented that no expert testimony was
used

at trial because no experts would be available in Colorado to contradict the industry practices.
Telephone Interview with R. Sam Oldenburg (January 24, 1996). The court's holding regarding
the use of expert testimony apparently reduces the burden placed on surface owners under
Frankfort Oil's reasonable use rule.
346 Gerrity Oil, 1995 WL 755092, at *5.
17 See Feriancek & McNeill, Oil Company Surface Use, supra note 323, at 69. If access is
not denied totally, mineral owners risk de jure denial with costly conditions. See also Gulf Oil
Co. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n, 693 P.2d 227 (Wyo. 1985) (recognizing
helicopter mobilization as reasonable alternative means of accessing well); Feriancek & McNeill,
Oil Company Surface Use, supra note 323, at 31 (observing that surface owners want mineral
developers to use expensive slant well drilling); Welborn, New Rights of Surface Owners, supra
note 218, at 22-34, 35 (citing county ordinances that place a variety of restrictions on mineral
owners).
348 See Michigan Oil Co. v. Natural Resources Comm'n, 276 N.W.2d 141 (Mich. 1979)
(upholding state Natural Resources Commission's denial of mineral owner's drilling application
on state-owned land in order to protect wildlife habitat). The majority and dissenting opinions
of Michigan Oil reflect the polarized positions of environmentalists and oil and gas industry
proponents. The majority rejects a narrow construction of the Oil Conservation Act, which
permits oil and gas drilling "unnecessarily detrimental to other natural resources." Id. at 146.
In construing the act to prevent environmental damage, the majority states:
The ordinary use of the term "waste" does not refer only to waste of oil and
gas, but includes any spoilation or destruction of the land, including flora
and fauna, by one lawfully in possession, to the prejudice of the estate or
interest of another ....
Conservation should not be read to apply only to
efficient extraction of oil, but should include the efficient extraction of oil
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legislators to pass surface-damages legislation that would ensure
access for developers due to the potential threat to the mineral
industry's well-being. However, the legislature should require mineral
owners to pay damages to surface owners.3 4 9
Surface-damages statutes respond to the policy shifts in the
current environmental era by ensuring access to the minerals lying
subsurface and by clearly assigning responsibility for the costs of
mineral development. In Colorado, surface-damages legislation would
balance the rights asserted by surface and mineral owners and
provide predictability currently lacking with the COGCC's expanded
authority. However, as demonstrated in Texas, passage of a surfacedamages act is not guaranteed despite cues from the judiciary about
requiring mineral owners and producers to assume more of the costs
of development. Therefore, as these controversies continue in the
judicial system, it is incumbent on courts to embrace the pragmatic
process and recognize that mineral-estate dominance has shifted to
the periphery of the web of beliefs of informed decision making in an
environmental era.
B. New Technologies: The Role of
Trespass and Other Torts
In addition to shifting policies, new and improved technologies
will continue to challenge courts in this era of oil and gas
jurisprudence. The hydraulic fracturing technique at issue in Geo
Viking, discussed in Part II, provides an example."' Geo Viking
pressed the Texas courts to balance the rights of neighboring property
which simultaneously conserves the other natural resources (flora and

fauna) of the state.
Id. at 147. However, according to the dissent, the purpose of the Oil Conservation Act is not to
conserve the environment, but to conserve oil and gas, so that they are efficiently extracted:
The act is not designed to assure the balanced conservation of all natural
resources but to assure conservation with a view to the ultimate recovery
of the maximum production of oil and gas. The primary purpose of the act
it to prevent waste of oil and gas so as to assure maximum production.
Id. at 156 (Levin, J., dissenting).
"' Prior to Gerrity Oil, Colorado Conservation Commissioner John F. Welborn opined that
the Model Act had little chance of adoption in Colorado since the state courts had not adopted
the accommodation doctrine. Wellborn, New Rights for Surface Owners, supra note 218, at
22-26. In light of the court's interpretation of the commission rules in Gerrity Oil, however, the
oil and gas industry should welcome the approach codified in the Model Act.
'50 817 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991).
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owners against the policy of encouraging the use of techniques which
enhance recovery of oil and gas. As demonstrated in Part II, the
Texas courts have failed to engage in pragmatic decision making and
have failed to articulate standards for striking that balance between
property rights and improved technology. Instead, the courts left the
mixed messages of Manziel unresolved and the following questions
unanswered: Whether these techniques constitute an actionable
common-law trespass, which would permit a court to issue an
injunction and to impose liability for tort damages. Or whether these
techniques are permissible procedures under the rule of capture
which precludes a court from issuing injunctions or imposing liability
in tort.
A more recent technological advancement in geophysical
exploration"' poses similar questions for the courts. The threedimensional seismic survey has transformed exploration and
production by providing information about oil and gas reserves which
could not have been derived from techniques such as two-dimensional
surveys used throughout the Great Era.35 2 The technique has been

351

"Geophysical exploration" has been defined as:

The search for geologic structures favorable to the accumulation of
petroleum by means of geophysical devices. By use of one or more of such
devices, geophysicists seek to arrive at a picture of subsurface conditions.
The gravity meter measures the gravitational pull of subsurface rocks,
revealing on occasion disconformities and structural traps. The
magnetometer measures the magnetic attraction of iron contained in various
types of rock, from which it is sometimes possible to locate a subsurface
structure. Perhaps the most commonly used geophysical device is the
seismograph, which measures shock waves reflected and refracted by
subterranean rock layers. From this data is plotted a contour map indicating
the presence (if any) of structural traps. Today, in any new area, geophysical
investigation is the almost universal preliminary to exploratory drilling.
8 WILLIAM & MEYERS, supra note 24, at 469.
3152Allen Johnson, Integration Makes Industry Seek Ways to Break Data Bottleneck, OIL &
GAS J., March 14, 1994, at 50. See also David Bennett, Seismic Revolution: ComputerTechnology
Making Oil, Natural Gas Easier to Find, Sept. 11, 1994 at 1G [hereinafter Bennett, Seismic
Revolution] (reporting that three-dimensional seismic studies of oil and natural gas producing
land use giving a "much-needed shot in the arm to the United States' oil and gas exploration
industry."). Oil companies have shown new interest in the Gulf of Mexico because 3-D imaging
indicates that the Gulf holds giant oil reserves, perhaps making it the last huge domestic oil
discovery. Agis Salppukas, The New Gulf War: Man Your Computers: Off the U.S. Coast, The
Oil Giants Gird for Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 18, 1995, at 1, 10. But cf. House Committee Votes
to Slash EnvironmentArts Programs,SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, Jun. 28, 1995, at 3A (noting
that exploration in coastal waters will continue to be limited because the House Appropriation
Committee recently voted to continue the thirteen year-old moratorium on drilling off most of
America's coasts).
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"hailed as the salvation of the onshore United States industry," which
"is helping the industry operate profitably even in an era of low
prices.
Unlike two-dimensional exploration, with sources and receivers
for shock waves placed along a straight line, three-dimensional
surveys require locating the sources and receivers in a grid pattern
over a larger area. This pattern produces more detailed subsurface
information, which leads to accurate imaging of structural traps for
oil and gas; the result has been a marked increase in drilling-success
rates."M As the cost of the computer technology necessary to process
the 3-D data has become more affordable, the use of this exploration
technique has expanded. 5
In the Great Era, courts were confronted with questions raised
by the use of two-dimensional surveys. In Kennedy v. General
Geophysical Co.,356 the defendant had located "shot points" for the
operation on land adjoining the plaintiffs land, with one shot point
located within ten or fifteen feet from plaintiffs boundary.3 5 7 The
Kennedy court determined no trespass had occurred because the
defendant had not physically entered the plaintiffs land.3 58 According
to the Kennedy court, mere vibrations caused by the survey's shock
waves were not enough to constitute a trespass. 359 Additionally, in

Williams, 3-D: The Light and the Way, Oil & Gas Investor, May 1994, at 24.

3' Bennett, Seismic Revolution, supra note 352, at G1. "On developmental wells in proven

producing areas, the historical success rate using 2-D seismic was in the 30 percent to 50
percent range. Now using 3-D seismic in proper drilling, successes have been 70 percent to 80
percent and higher." Id. The chairman of a company using these surveys described them as "the
closet thing we have ever come to a direct oil and gas finding tool." Id. at G6. See also Harry
L. Blomquist, III, Geophysical Trespass? The Guessing Game Created by the Awkward
Combination of Outmoded Laws and Soaring Technology, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 21, 29-31 (1996)
(recognizing that accuracy of 3-D seismic technology results in drilling fewer dry holes)
[hereinafter Blomquist, Geophysical Trespass?].
3"5Bennett, Seismic Revolution, supra note 352, at G6; Blomquist, Geophysical Trespass?,
supra note 354, at 29.
36 213 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Ct. App. 1948).
57Id. at 708-09.
3Id.
at 712.
359 Id. at 711-12. But see Ohio Oil Co. v. Sharp, 135 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1943). Applying
Oklahoma law the court assumed there was a trespass stemming from vibrations and from the
information obtained from the process. Id. at 307-08. The trespass issue was not determinative
because the cause of action was between the explorer and the purchaser of the information from
one of the explorer's employees. Id. at 308. However, a concurring opinion emphatically stated
the vibrations did not constitute a trespass because the geophysical tests were "conducted upon
lands rightfully entered." Id. at 309 (Phillips, J., concurring). The concurring justice based his
opinion on the fact that Oklahoma is a non-ownership jurisdiction. Id. (Phillips, J., concurring).
As noted, infra at note 305, a jurisdiction's view of oil and gas ownership should be considered
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holding the defendant was not liable, the Kennedy court was
plaintiffs failure to prove an injury resulting from
influenced by the
3 60
procedure.
the
Despite this additional statement noting the absence of an
injury, the legacy of the Kennedy court is the general proposition that
a physical entry is required before a geophysical explorer will be
liable in trespass for conducting seismic surveys.36 ' Under that
interpretation, a trespass occurs only on the lands where shot holes
are located, not on lands affected by the resulting sound waves. Such
a restrictive definition of trespass provides immunity to explorers
using technologies such as 3-D seismic surveys that furnish valuable
geophysical data without physical entry on the property.36 2
To avoid the limitations of this restrictive definition of
common-law trespass, many courts and commentators suggest other
causes of action for protecting a mineral owner's property rights.
These causes of action include trade secrets, assumpsit, or a new tort
labeled "interference with prospective advantage. 3 6 3 From the

in resolving controversies arising from the use of three-dimensional surveys and other
technologies that do not require a physical entry in order to obtain sub-surface information.
360Kennedy, 213 S.W.2d at 709; see also Blomquist, Geophysical Trespass?, supra note 354,
at 26 (stating that "[bly qualifying its holding, the court inferentially left the door open for an
actionable trespass on the mineral estate without physical entry, conditioned upon a showing
that the trespasser has obtained valuable subsurface information under the subject property").
361See, e.g., WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 24, § 230; HEMINGWAY, supra note 61, § 4.1,
Robert J. Rice, Wrongful Geophysical Exploration, 44 MONT. L. REV. 53, 58 (1983); Mark D.
Christiansen, Note, Oil and Gas: Improper Geophysical Exploration- Filling in the Remedial
Gap, 32 OKLA L. REV. 903, 907 (1979) (discussing geophysical explorational assessing trade
secret laws as potential frameork for trespasser liability) [hereinafter Christiansen, Improper
Geophysical Exploration].
362Another device, the aerial magnetometer, can be used to conduct surveys from several
hundred feet above the ground. See Scott S. Slater, Note, The Surreptitious Geophysical Survey:
An Interference with ProspectiveAdvantage, 15 PAC. L. J. 381, 387 (1984) (discussing various
methods to explore and survey for oil and gas) [hereinafter Slater, Surreptitious Geophysical
Survey].
363 See, e.g., Grynberg v. City of Northglenn, 739 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1987) (Grynberg I)
(recognizing actionable claims for geophysical trespass absent physical trespass); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Cowden, 241 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957) (allowing plaintiffto waive trespass and
sue in assumpsit for the reasonable value of use and occupation of land where permission of
severed mineral owner was not obtained); Slater, SurreptitiousGeophysical Survey, supra note
362, at 410. Slater notes that the new tort "interference with prospective advantage" would
avoid many of the inadequacies resulting from alternative tort actions:
The unauthorized geophysical survey involves an intangible invasion of the
landowner's estate. That survey results in a misappropriation of confidential
commercial information, and whether conducted from on or off the property,
this misappropriation is the kind of unethical commercial activity that
should be guarded against. The tort of interference with prospective
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mineral owner's point of view, these approaches are more reliable
vehicles than common-law trespass for addressing the wrongs
inflicted upon them when the mineral owner's have not consented to
surveys that provide information about the producing potential of
their land.
Controversies caused by 3-D surveys inevitably will require
more courts to address the viability of these causes of action, as well
as Kennedy's criteria for imposing liability on the surveyor for
common-law trespass. The trespass issue parallels the problems
discussed earlier in Manziel and Geo Viking, involving secondary
recovery and sandfracing, respectively. In other words, are producers
or their agents liable when they conduct procedures on one tract of
land, with the landowner's consent, that affect tracts of neighboring
landowners from whom the explorer has not received permission?" 4
The secondary recovery and sandfracing procedures result in a
physical trespass of other substances, fluids or sand, that permit
drainage of oil and gas from the neighbor's land. By contrast, seismic
surveys emit vibrations rather than tangible substances that lead to
information about the potential for production from a tract of land
owned by the non-consenting neighbor. Despite these factual
differences, 3-D surveys require addressing competing policies similar
to the policy conflicts created by secondary recovery and sandfracing:
1) protecting a mineral owner's rights, and 2) encouraging the use of
these procedures to ensure efficient production of oil and gas.36 5

advantage can provide the needed legal redress.
Id. See also Christiansen, ImproperGeophysicalExploration,supranote 361, at 909 (urging use
of trade secret principles to protect the interest of a property owner in subsurface information).
A recent law review article reports that in a Texas case involving an aerial survey, the trial
court recognized the viability of these causes of action for the nonconsenting mineral owner. See
Blomquist, Geophysical Trespass?, supra note 354, at 34 (citing BGM Airborne Surveys, Inc. v.
Coppock, No. 92-CI-13993 (288th Dist. Ct., Bexar County, Tex., filed Oct. 6, 1992) as an
illustration of "the courts' willingness to fashioning alternatives for protection of the property
rights of mineral owners against unauthorized intrusions").
3' The issue could arise in two situations: first, when the surface has been severed from the
mineral estate and the geophysical explorer has received permission only from the surfaceestate owner, and second, when the mineral estate is owned in co-tenancy and the explorer has
not received permission from all of the co-tenants. Regarding a dispute between surface and
mineral owners, courts have generally held that the mineral estate owner owns the right to
consent. See generally HEMINGWAY, supra note 61, § 4.1. Professor Hemingway explains that
modern lease forms generally grant the lessee the "exclusive" right to explore; without such a
provision, some cases have held that the right to explore co-existed between the lessor and
lessee. Id.
36' Blomquist, Geophysical Trespass?, supra note 354, at 49-50.
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Courts embracing a pragmatic process should directly
acknowledge these competing policies and assess the effects of
alternative courses of action. One alternative is to protect the rights
of mineral owners in the prospective value of their estates by
recognizing causes of action that do not require a physical entry on
their land, or by extending the definition of trespass to cover sound
waves and vibrations.36 6 A competing consideration is that those
remedies subject producers to more frequent liability and encourage
the holdout problem described with secondary recovery in Part 11.367
These additional costs discourage exploration and development in an
era of depressed prices.
In order to encourage the use of 3-D surveys, another
alternative is for courts to consider applying the rule of capture and
its caveat of non-liability for the consequences of procedures
conducted rightfully on neighboring land. Such a rule embraces
Williams and Meyers proposed "negative rule of capture," which thus
far has received little acceptance in cases determining liability when
drainage occurs incident to a secondary-recovery project.3 68 In
weighing this alternative a court might distinguish the secondaryrecovery cases because that procedure causes actual physical
drainage, whereas geophysical exploration provides only information.
Faced with that factual distinction, the initial inquiry for courts
should be whether mineral owners have a protectable property right
in the information about their estate, just as they may have in the
actual minerals.3 6 9 Several courts have recognized that such
information is a protectible property right. 37 ' To protect that right
36

See HEMINGWAY, supra note 61, § 4.1, at 194.
Recovery [by the mineral owner] should be allowed. This would follow by
viewing the acts as comprising a new tort, or by extending the traditional
scope of trespass to cover any type of energy wave caused to pass through
the property of another ... the value of the exploration rights may be lost
by the use of modern technology and it is ridiculous that the law not
compensate for such taking by application of archaic and out-moded
concepts.

Id. See also Slater, Surreptitious Geophysical Survey, supra note 362, at 409-10.
367 Supra Part I notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
38 See supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text (discussing Manziel and Williams &
Meyers's negative rule of capture).
...As in determining the rights of landowners in the oil and gas beneath their property
produced by drilling, the extent of protection a court extends to a mineral owner's rights in the
information about her estate will depend on whether the jurisdiction is an ownership-in-place
or non-ownership jurisdiction. See supranote 359 (noting Phillips' concurring opinion in Sharp).
370 See, e.g., Grynberg v. City of Northglenn, 739 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1987) (refusing surface
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without unnecessarily discouraging seismic exploration, a court
should consider an approach reminiscent of the Jameson decision
regarding remedies for mineral owners who have not consented to
secondary-recovery projects.3 7 1 Pursuant to that approach, a court
could balance the competing policies by prohibiting injunctions but
allowing limited damages when an explorer receives information from
sound waves or vibrations without obtaining permission from the
affected mineral-estate owner.3 72
The legislature is the logical venue for resolving the competing
policies raised by shifting policies and new technologies.3 73 As

owner authority to authorize geophysical exploration where surface and mineral estate are
severed); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden 241 F.2d 586, 592 (5th Cir. 1957) (allowing plaintiff
mineral owner to waive trespass and sue in assumpsit for value of land actually used); Layne
Louisiana Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 26 So. 2d 20, 22 (La. 1946) (recognizing mineral owner's right
to geophysically explore land for oil or other minerals as valuable right requiring compensation
when used by others). The Layne court states, "[tihe average landowner is without means or
funds to secure geophysical or seismograph information. Where that information, which is
exclusively his by virtue of his ownership of the land, is unlawfully obtained by others, the
landowner is clearly entitled to recover compensatory damages for the disregard of his property
rights." Id.
371 See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
372 The issue then becomes whether damages should be based on loss of market value of the
property or the contractual value of the use and occupation of the land for conducting the
survey. See Cowden, 241 F.2d at 592 (damages in assumpsit based on contract value of
exploration right); Blomquist, Geophysical Trespass?, supra note 354, at 43 (noting court's
difficulty in determining an appropriate value and causal connection between trespass and
resulting damage). Another issue is whether punitive damages should be allowed. Compare
Layne Louisiana Co. v. Superior Oil Co. 26 So. 2d 20, 21-22 (La. 1946) (not permitting punitive
damages under Louisiana Law) with Teledyne Exploration Co. v. Klotz, 694 S.W.2d 109 (Tex
Ct. App. 1985) (allowed exemplary damages when trespass is willful). To promote the policy of
encouraging the use of new technologies, punitive damages should be disallowed or restricted
to cases involving malicious conduct.
...Louisiana recently enacted a statute affecting geophysical exploration. The statute
provides that seismic surveys cannot be conducted without "the consent of either the owner or
the party or parties authorized to execute geological surveys, leases or permits as provided in
the mineral code." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.217(A)(1) (West 1995). That statute was passed in
response to Jeanes v. GFS Co., 647 So. 2d 533 (La. App. 1994), which interpreted a criminal
statute prohibiting conducting geophysical surveys without permission as requiring the consent
of the surface owner rather than only the consent of the mineral owner. See Millard E. Matthew,
Jr., GeoPhysicalData:Acquisition and Protection-WhosePermissionDo You Need?, 13 ADV. OIL
& GAS COURSE, Sept. 21-22, 1995; see also Blomquist, Geophysical Trespass?, supra note 354,
at 49-50 (recognizing value in statutes to resolve competing policies).
Statutes should clarify the rights of severed-surface owners relative to mineral owners and
the relative rights of cotenants in the mineral estate as well. Whereas most jurisdictions
consider that the right to consent to geophysical exploration belongs to the mineral owner,
courts have not clarified whether a geophysical explorer can proceed without consent from all
of the mineral co-tenants. Blomquist, Geophysical Trespass?, supra note 354, at 35-37. In
suggesting a statute to govern geophysical exploration, Mr. Blomquist analogizes to statutes
governing the underground storage of gas. Those statutes protect a storer from liability when
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described in Part III, many states have passed surface-damages
statutes in response to the debate surrounding the scope of the
mineral owner's surface easement in development. Similarly, most
major producing states, other than Texas, uncomplicate conducting
secondary-recovery efforts through compulsory unitization statutes.
However, the policies and politics surrounding the unitization and
surface-use debates also have stymied legislative efforts. The
competing policies posed by new technologies could produce a similar
polarization in the legislature over statutes governing geophysical
exploration. Without any guidance from the legislature in defining the
rights and liabilities of geophysical explorers, the burden inevitably
will fall upon the courts to resolve the controversies created by the
use of 3-D seismic surveys and other technologies.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Great Era of the Oil and Gas Industry has
ended, courts will continue to confront issues raised by the pursuit of
these prized resources. A reassessment of the approaches used by
courts in the past provides guidance to the lawyers, judges, and
legislators who are charged with creating a coherent jurisprudence for
oil and gas law, a jurisprudence that respects precedent and
legislative mandates, but also responds to contemporary policy
considerations.
During the Great Era, courts frequently frustrated industry
goals and created confusion for property owners and developers with
approaches that myopically ignored relevant policies or surreptitiously
masked the role of policy in formalistic garb. The continued use of
those misguided approaches deprives oil and gas jurisprudence of the
"practical certainty" needed to enable property owners and other
actors in the industry efficiently to order their conduct. As politics
continue to stymy legislative resolutions to controversies caused by
shifting policies and new technologies, the burden will continue to fall
upon the courts. To avoid the counterproductive effects of approaches
to decision making that fail pointedly to address the role of prevailing
policy, judges should adopt a pragmatic process. This process must

the rights of a certain percentage of mineral owners have been obtained. That approach
balances the policy of promoting underground storage of gas and protecting the rights of mineral
owners in reservoirs. See, e.g., TEX.. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.171-184 (Vernon 1993).
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first, identify goals and policy conflicts. Second, it must assess the
effects of available courses of action. Finally, it must adopt standards
or rules to clarify the relative rights of property owners and
developers. Indeed, clarifying rights and liabilities through legislation
and judicial decisions should be the ultimate goal for the next era of
oil and gas jurisprudence.

